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A dissertation is, in the end, neither conclusion nor summation. As a piece of writing it 
signifies the finale to a period of study, offering a testament of one’s knowledge, but also 
an opening to another stage that, if carried about properly, only continues the work that 
one has engaged for many years already. Despite that this document represents years of 
thought and research, however broad its topic or deep its claims, it does not summarize 
an intellectual decade of a life any more than an intense conversation might. It cannot 
represent such breadth because as wide as its interest it only presents an infinitesimally 
small fraction of what was learned in that time, debated passionately, and thus meagerly 
illustrates only fragments of what was thought and said, let alone what had transpired. 
Yet it does express a life – or at least a period, a phase, or a moment of one’s life – in 
which other things ceded the foreground and the issues represented below took 
precedence. Such it the paradox of writing: One must limit with a certain degree of what 
can only be understood as intellectual violence what could be said in favor of what can be 
said. 
 I say this because during this period of writing I sacrificed the least, and those that 
I love sacrificed the most – at least insofar as our interactions went. The irony is that 
without their support this dissertation could never have been written. In that sense a 
dissertation could be thought a supreme act of selfishness. One might more 
sympathetically call the reliance upon others a pathetic dependence, and it certainly is a 
form of that, but it is also a form of power – in which, together in common, a product can 
come to fruition by way of imparting not the abstract ideas of love and support or care, 
but also the empowerment to endure. Spinoza refers to this in the spirit of true friendship, 
wherein the pursuit of truth allows interconnection and strength as friends persist in their 
differences.1  
I knew this long before encountering Spinoza because I am the son and grandson 
of teachers whose lives were dedicated to human flourishing. Their careers – if one can 
call the work of a teacher by such a trivializing and mitigating word – operated outside of 
the parameters of delivering knowledge, but rested instead upon the belief that education 
– and especially so of the disabled and marginalized – meant empowerment. For them the 
idea that one person can affect another in order to learn to navigate the world more 
fluently was the noblest work that could be undertaken. Education isn’t in this sense a 
                                                
1 Spinoza, Ethics, Part IV, Proposition 37, Scholium 1. 
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form of transmitting useful knowledge, or rendering a person more fit to be configured 
into the labor force, but a sense of mentorship, of subtle guidance, and enacting of a 
specific kind of love that grants another a fuller orientation to the world.  
I came to the seeds of this dissertation on the final day of a seminar taught by 
Antonio Vázquez-Arroyo organized under the themes of catastrophe, memory and the 
Enlightenment. After reading broadly in political theory, philosophy, history, literature, 
and cultural studies we had circumnavigated the organizing concepts without reading 
directly much in the way of confronting any of these ideas in the most concerted sense. In 
the final moments, consternated, I blurted: “I still don’t think I even know what a 
catastrophe is.” Professor Vázquez-Arroyo simply nodded, and it should be noted, very 
calmly and kindly, asked what I thought. I replied: “It cannot be anything but a signature 
of cost – it’s the worst cost. It shows us what people think would be the most devastating 
to lose.” To be honest, I had literally no idea what I meant by that. But as many things 
productive, the statement caused me to revisit it and ask myself what I might have meant 
– trying to retroactively impart meaning to a more or less meaningless, though hopeful, 
stab in the dark. Building out from this nonsense grew a project seeking to determine, in 
the absence of knowledge about the worst of what might come, how human beings 
organize themselves with the hope to survive.  
In so doing, I argue below that in the particularities of that pursuit one can detect 
the expression of how a society thinks collectively, what it thinks about when it thinks 
about its survival, and how in that very process it could be inferred what a political 
society cares about. If, in hopes to survive, a political society has come to fear most the 
abstract idea of a “coming catastrophe,” then what its members attend to, in a way, 
demonstrate what it fears losing most – in this sense, a catastrophe (in the imaginative, 
future-oriented sense) is a “signature of cost.” Professor Vázquez-Arroyo was very 
helpful in the early formation of my ideas, he introduced me to the newest literature, 
much of what is referred to here (though only a fraction of its total scope), and his own 
writing preoccupies a significant portion of the dissertation’s core chapter on what I 
provisionally adopt following some of that literature as “catastrophism.” We have not 
spoken in a long time, but he deserves thanks for helping to foster me and this project at 
its earliest stages. 
 I came to the University of Minnesota with full knowledge in mind that it would 
take approximately a decade of my life. In retrospect it gave me these years – to put it as 
a loss would be backward at best. Among graduate schools, I had several excellent 
options, but the notion of working across disciplines with Bruce Braun, Cesare Casarino, 
and Bud Duvall drew my interest more than any other place. Despite its frigid weather, I 
imagined it to be a place of avant-garde ideas that might help me transform into the 
thinker that I imagined myself possibly capable of becoming. Each of these three people 
have shaped me indelibly, though in different ways. Bruce, in his constant questioning of 
“what’s at stake,” brought me from abstract ontological concepts to political practice and 
sturdier considerations of empirical reality and its problems. Cesare taught me that 
philosophy could be read – and lived – as a form of art, as literature, which is to say both 
radically and creatively transformative and poetic. And Bud led me to question my 
deepest views about the world – those implicit ideas that we take for granted sometimes – 
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as expressive of ideology, subjectivity, and political structure; to remain ruthlessly 
critical, not just of as Marx once put it, “of the existing order,” but also of my own innate 
presumptions. Together they formed a critical triad, underlying my advancement, and 
demonstrated by example what it means to be an intellectual of the highest order. For 
whatever depth I carry as a scholarly person, it is due to their uncompromising example. 
Midway through my graduate career Joan Tronto joined our faculty, and joined Bud as 
my advisor. Joan in my opinion is a towering intellectual, someone who represents the 
highest standards of the pursuit of knowledge, but also demonstrates her mastery over the 
history of political ideas with poise and – unsurprisingly for those who know her writing 
– care. Each of these thinkers and teachers taught me as much by example as they did 
through their pedagogical labor. I am forever changed for having spent this time with 
them, and forever humbled by their accomplishment. 
I am grateful to have had many friends foster me, teach me, hear me, house and 
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Isn’t it strange to see an event happening  
precisely because it was not supposed to happen?  
What kind of defense do we have against that?  
– Nassim Taleb 
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but when it comes to death all men live in a city without walls. 
 –Epicurus 
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I. Introduction 
Future catastrophes pose intensifying threats to human life. The climate is warming; 
warfare is becoming less conventional; economic turbulence is increasing; global 
interconnectedness escalates risks of pandemic. We live in an age defined by extreme 
precariousness, where human life hangs in the balance of often surprising and perhaps 
even irremediable future disasters. Highly improbable, yet high impact events vex human 
security at every turn.2  Richard Posner summarizes the problem well: “…the low 
probability of such disasters – frequently the unknown probability, as in the case of 
                                                
2 This couplet, joining the highly improbable with the high impact is borrowed from Nassim 
Taleb’s well-known The Black Swan (2010). I take from his central thesis the title of my 
dissertation, though little else besides the notion that often unforeseen events which were 
highly improbable can have enormous impacts. This is more or less the way that I understand 
and define catastrophe, though in a more Bergsonian sense via Jean-Pierre Dupuy, as I 
explore in Chapter One below. 
 3 
bioterrorism and abrupt global warming – is among the things that baffle efforts at 
responding rationally to them. But respond we must…”3  
But, respond to what, exactly? We cannot understand such an imperative without 
contending with a critical problem, too often left implicit: To respond, security efforts 
must imagine events that do not yet exist. Human security is therefore a speculative 
undertaking nevertheless bearing an enormous cultural and political force of imagination 
as much as it is a data-driven enterprise. And, often overlooked by scholars of security, 
but rarely so by political and cultural theorists, such enterprises rely upon knowledge 
production, imperatives, interests, and desires that emerge from cultural and political life. 
The core of this dissertation stems from a simple assumption: That all politics, 
and especially politics devoted to human survival, are confronted by a common problem. 
More than adversarial states, rivaling factions, sleeper cells, or whatever else, politics of 
survival grapple with phenomena that, somewhat bizarrely, have no reality. Or, at least, 
have no reality yet. 
 This not yet is because the central problematic of whether or not humans survive 
the basic phenomena of security, the threads weaving the fabric of security endeavors, the 
events against which humans, states, and now, a planet, seek protection – none of these 
events have yet occurred. In other words, the central common thread of the politics of 
human survival share a lack of existing yet. This is what people mean when they write 
about the “politics of the future.”4 But politics of the future – that is, politics obsessive 
over future events – are politics in the present, organized by and organizing present states 
                                                
3 Posner 2004, 6. 
4 Anderson 2010a and 2010b; Aradau and Van Munster 2008; de Goede and Randalls 2009  
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of affairs. It is their motivators, their stimuli, which exist in the future, if they will come 
to pass at all. Death, that which at its most base level security seeks to forestall, will find 
its inevitable cause at some point for every living being, but not in the present for the 
living, not yet.  
 Certainly it cannot be said that this claim is itself innovative. After all, fearing 
what might come next is hardly a new concern. Epicurus once related this point to a 
younger thinker seeking advice on the philosophical life more than two millennia prior to 
our time:  
…death, the most frightening of bad things, is nothing to us; since when we exist, 
death is not yet present, and when death is present, then we do not exist. 
Therefore, it is relevant neither to the living nor to the dead, since it does not 
affect the former, and the latter do not exist. But the many sometimes flee death 
as the greatest of bad things and sometimes choose it as a relief from the bad 
things in life.5 
 
Nothing could be more antithetical to Epicurus than the obsession over security in our 
contemporary political scene. He, writing above, insisted that to live fully one must 
recognize the irrelevance of death. Death lacks connection to ontological existence, or at 
least death operates to negate the life which, of course, the politics of security seek to 
prolong. In a sense the Epicurean fate, the Epicurean idea of finitude, is so caught up with 
contingency, so aleatory, that to perseverate on death really only forecloses on the 
possibility of a life well-lived. In the contemporary sense it can be clearly put: The 
Epicurean view of death is utterly devoid of politics. That’s because contemporary 
politics are driven by security from a range of hazards unified under the banner of 
                                                
5 Epicurus, 2004, pg. 29.  
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disasters – and these disasters occupy a peculiar temporality, given their urgency to so 
many forms of political life and order.  
 The political differences from Epicurus’s time to our own notwithstanding, the 
preoccupation with finitude persisted. It was a central concern of Blaise Pascal, whose 
mathematical prowess led him to create the archetype of modern game theory as he 
sought a convincing and logical solution to prove the fate of disbelievers in God.6 Except 
at the core of Pascal’s endeavor was not only the desire to solve the mysteries associated 
with failures to believe in the divine, but also to strike at the heart of a central problem of 
life at the time. How could human beings deploy reason in order to dispel the 
consequences of the unknown? How could people learn to navigate their temporal lives 
in order to prevent damnation eternal, however long in the future tense? In Christian 
theology, and this is a core assumption leading to Pascal’s wager, temporal death is 
inevitable. Part of the legacy of Pascal’s early rational choice model worked through the 
presumptive success of harnessing secular reason to vanquish uncertainty. This hope – 
the hope to deploy rational choice to inch closer to certainty – persisted through much of 
the successive centuries, becoming refined and more complex. 
Pascal and many others sought to establish human reason as a means of 
navigating the torments of unpredicted futures.7 This drive founded Cartesian skepticism, 
which in turn advocated for practical philosophies that could refashion human beings and 
their use of reason as the “masters and possessors of nature.”8 There was God, now there 
is catastrophe. Marking secular disaster as particularly modern in its construction – 
                                                
6 Pascal 1995 
7 Jordan 2006 
8 Descartes 1998, 35. 
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whether “natural” or moral in nature – few beyond insurance companies and evangelicals 
use the language of “acts of God” any longer, favoring instead scientific explanations 
positing, if not the capacity to meld understanding and action, than at least a more 
rational interface with the complexities of events. To turn to science for explanation of 
disaster involves a faith not only in science, but in modern humanism and its promise that 
through scientific knowledge, human beings can determine their own fate.  
In other words, epistemological uncertainty and what it corresponds to – 
ontological indetermination – are hardly new. Already in the mid-18th century these 
themes were debated with reference to catastrophe. After Lisbon was decimated in 1755 
Voltaire and Rousseau engaged in a heated debate about ontologies stemming from 
Liebnitz via Alexander Pope in what became a philosophically important debate about 
modernity, philosophy, and catastrophe.9  At its core, the debate can be summarized as a 
set of questions about whether or not the earthquake-turned-tidal wave-turned-wildfire 
could be blamed on God-as-nature (Voltaire) or some version of civic-political failure 
(Rousseau).  
Imperative about this debate, regardless of the philosophical causes of 
understanding the calamitous events of Lisbon, was a reorganization of the terms 
                                                
9 This transition from premodern superstition to modern secularism is noted by many (see 
Israel 2013 for a general discussion), but with reference to catastrophe the turning point is 
frequently cited in the debate between Voltaire (2005) and Rousseau (1997) regarding the 
Lisbon earthquake of 1755. Charles Walker (2008) invites readers to consider the colonial 
implications of a similar event nine years earlier in Peru. It is worth noting that even despite 
Walker’s excellent book, Voltaire and Rousseau’s debate concerning the perilous catastrophe 
of 1755 continues as the touchstone of Enlightenment transitions to secular thought in the 
realm of catastrophic events. On the connection between Voltaire and Rousseau on the 
Lisbon earthquake see Bauman 2009, Dynes 1999, Dupuy 2005, Meiner 2012, Neiman 2002, 
Regier 2010 to mention only a few good discussions. 
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considering catastrophe’s role in organizing civic and political life. From that point on, 
catastrophe meant a terrible event with costs registered in terms of loss to a (politically 
demarcated) population. And the element of surprise intrinsic to it contributes a 
peculiarity that insists the cause of that death comes from the future. The way that it is 
fabricated in the project of securing against such future threats is a signature of the 
civilization that bespeaks it, what and whom they value, etc. While the Voltaire-Rousseau 
debate betrayed some elements of political consideration, it took another two centuries 
for catastrophe to be more fully politicized.  
For many in the recently growing literature surrounding catastrophe, to think 
politics is to seek for the exercise of power. More often this pursuit of power involves 
locating an agent whose occupation or expertise permits such an exercise, at very least, in 
terms of setting the terms of urgency: Either we act to protect ourselves, or disaster will 
strike!10 Some of the more incisive critics of the politics of catastrophe notice that such a 
statement occurs neither in a vacuum, nor innocent of political motives, so often imbued 
as they are by avaricious attempts for themselves to secure positionings of compulsory 
power.11 As a result, when scholars focus on the politics of catastrophes – whether they 
are focused on security or other elements – they so frequently focus on the function of 
states when mounting their critical posture. In other words, political theorists and security 
scholars alike tend to tie the politics of catastrophes to the state, which narrows the scope 
of what contributes to the growing concern about catastrophic futures. And from a critical 
                                                
10 Vázquez-Arroyo 2013 
11 On political power and catastrophe, see for some context: Amoore 2013, Aradau 2014, de 
Goede 2012, Dillon 2008, Dupuy 2013, Vázquez-Arroyo 20012 & 2013, Walter 2008 On 
compulsory power, see Barnett and Duvall 2005. 
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perspective, they often tend to tie the state-based politics of catastrophe to empire in the 
broadest sense.  
Much critical ink has been spilled arguing that empire, and specifically American 
empire after 9/11 involved a resurgence of the repressively bellicose regime that seemed 
quaint in the 1990s.12 After all, certainly one way to understand the overwhelming 
success of Michael Hardt and Antonio Negri’s Empire, even if interrupted by the newly 
foreign wars of the early twenty-first century, was because of the way that it ably 
diagnosed what so many had celebrated in the “peaceful” and “cosmopolitan” post-Cold 
War landscape of geopolitics.13 Only a year after the publication of Empire, the United 
States launched a now nearly two decade-long foreign invasion (and another in 2003) that 
shifted scholarly attention from less militaristic elements of empire to the critique of 
imperialism in a more familiar tongue.14  
Yet as the decade wore on, new institutional formations expressed shifting 
emphases in the way that a great empire conceived not only of military intervention and 
its causes, but also threat itself. When the US Department of Homeland Security was 
established in 2002, the rhetoric surrounding its establishment echoed with 
acknowledgements of changing times. Four of the seven “primary mission(s)” of the 
nascent department focused exclusively on terrorism. It is worth noting that another of 
the seven focuses on economic “security,” another is procedural, and another – most 
                                                
12 For critiques, see Amin 2005; Noys 2010 (Ch4); Barkawi and Laffey 2002; Reid 2005; 
Lazarus 2006. 
13 Hardt and Negri 2000. 
14 Collier and Lakoff discuss this in passing at the end of their well-known 2008 essay. 
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critically for both the evolution of DHS, but also my argument – links DHS as a “focal 
point regarding natural and manmade crises and emergency planning.”15 
Within the first decade of its existence DHS had acknowledged to some degree 
the inevitability of catastrophe, and as a consequence awarded heightened priority to the 
coming catastrophe all and sundry. As U.S. security politics evolved away from 
terrorism, and toward “resilience” against “all-hazards,” as the core idea of preparedness, 
the prominence of FEMA in the operational priorities of DHS was revealed. The point 
remains that among the enduring and growing foreign wars of the world’s so-called only 
remaining superpower, internally the terms were shifting from the singular threat of 
foreign adversaries to a laundry list of issues that included not only “unconventional 
threats” like ununiformed military aggressors, but economic collapse, natural disasters, 
technological failures – the list only grows with our imagination. 
In a landmark study, the conceptual historiography of Reinhart Koselleck 
grappled with the problem of foresight across scales, from individual prudence to broad 
scale political concern.16 Key to his framework were the ways that knowledge of history 
informs our visions of the future, how historical knowledge illuminates possible 
prognoses of future events. At the core of his thesis was the complexity often missing 
from prognosis, viz. when the scope of possible futures is narrow enough – as is the case 
in our everyday decisions – prognosis functions simply, and the occasional failure usually 
                                                
15 U.S. Congress 2002. 
16 “Humans, as cosmopolitan beings, necessarily conduct their lives, simply to exist, by 
remaining future-oriented. In order to even act, one must take into account and plan for the 
empirical inexperience of the future. Whether it makes sense or not, one must foresee the 
future. It is with this paradox that we come to the core of our investigation and can pose the 
following questions” (Koselleck 2002, 133).  
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results in inconvenience and accident. Previous experience informs our decisions, but we 
often blur temporal scales when thinking more abstractly about the future, combining 
near-, mid-, and long-term futures.  
As a result, even when scaled up to complex security decisions, when we can 
think simply, when we can focus on data that is discernable, our chances of prognosis 
improve drastically. But as the aleatory field of information increases, prognostic success 
decreases in inverse proportion:  
…the scope of future predictions ranges from absolutely certain prognoses to 
those that contain the highest level of improbability. Thus it must be considered 
absolutely certain that our earth could survive the catastrophe that would be 
brought about for the whole of humanity by an atomic war. Significantly more 
difficult to predict, however, is whether such a catastrophe would be caused by 
chance, by mistake, or on purpose, or whether it will turn out to be entirely 
prevented in the first place. That is to say, the further we distance ourselves from 
long-term data of what is naturally pregiven and concentrate our predictions on 
situations involving political decision making, the more difficult the art of 
prognosis becomes. The tentative light-ray of a searching prognosis oscillates 
between dependable and certain framework conditions and those that procedurally 
change and are comparatively uncertain in the field of political action. But in 
every case, prognostics draws its evidence from previous experience that is 
treated scientifically. To this extent, forecasting the future is an art of combining 
data from diverse experiences.17  
 
Historical information will not always suffice. Further, when considering singular threats, 
considerations of future costs remain at least imaginable. But as the field of possible 
futures broadens, as well as the realm of actors diversifies, prognosis gains distance from 
everyday decisions. Data sets become less legible in their swelling magnitude. 
Imagination fills the cracks between discernable probabilities.18 FEMA’s strategy of “all-
hazards” security expresses this reality. It may no longer be possible to prepare for the 
                                                
17 Koselleck 2002, 134. 
18 Aradau and Van Munster 2011 
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coming catastrophe because the coming catastrophe cannot be measured. Future 
catastrophe, in and of itself, in the way that it is organized by knowledge, exceeds 
prognosis not because the world is more complex, but because the concept itself has 
bloated beyond imaginable (and quantifiable) constraints.   
Stephen Collier and Andrew Lakoff rightly understood the contemporaneous 
broadening field of security threats and attributed them to a changing common sense 
amongst political and security professionals. They sought to understand… 
…how this logic [of security] became common sense; how experts, politicians, 
pundits, and journalists learned to think and speak in a certain way about security 
problems; and how a diverse range of possible events – natural disasters, 
pandemic diseases, terrorist attacks – came to be seen as part of the same class of 
security threats and as manageable through the same set of techniques.19 
 
In large part, their historicization of the tendency to all-hazards set the stage for much of 
what came after them in critical scholarship aiming to understand the ways that the 
principal and official security concerns of contemporary western governments had shifted 
from those of purely military concerns to an alarmingly broader list. But their writing 
focuses solely on security professionals, and on the ways that policy shifts 
accommodated and gave birth to such shifts. A welcome contribution, yet they really do 
not address their concern of “how this logic became common sense.”20 Put more 
sympathetically, Collier and Lakoff succeed in showing the ways that security policy 
shifted to ensconce a broader terrain of threats to human security – in short from national 
security to human security – but they in the end have little to say about the emergence of 
that “common sense.”  
                                                
19 Collier and Lakoff 2008, 10. 
20 ibid 
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 This dissertation seeks to contribute what is so often claimed, yet so often 
overlooked: That over the past few decades, a rationality emerged that orients subjects to 
the question of omnipresent threats to life, and that the discursive register of that 
rationality blurs the lines between specific and conventional kinds of threats toward the 
idea of a coming catastrophe. I supplement the divergent critical literatures around shifts 
in security with a new reading of how they ought be organized, but also crucial 
differences in what preparedness, resilience, and other future-oriented modes of security 
thinking respond to. In response, I argue that they respond, not to material threats, but to 
an abstraction that emerges from many vantage points – exceeding the capacities of states 
and security experts, and inclusive of contemporary culture and political discourse – in a 
way that shapes and reshapes political life in the present. In short, I refer to this “common 
sense” as a political rationality for our times – under the banner of catastrophism, 
borrowed from the French for “doomsayer.”21 Catastrophism reorients political subjects 
to their own finitude through a litany of concerns stepping forward from nearly all angles, 
always inclined toward a threat from a future not yet, with consequences not yet known. 
But requiring unflinching critical attention uniting philosophies of knowledge and reality, 
political sciences of human security, and the politics of life in a time when we are told 
our lives stagger at the precipice of death at each and every single moment. 
  
 
                                                
21 This concept has a well-established tradition in recent French philosophy and is addressed 
exhaustively in Chapters 4 & 5 below. For now let it suffice that I mean to Anglicize the 
term, to draw it from its convention in French which permits an association with a 
streetcorner doomsayer, and shift its emphasis in English by capitalizing on its ‘-ism’ which 
connotes a rationality or ideology. 
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Précis and Chapter Breakdown 
This dissertation outlines the ways that conceptions of human security are organized by 
the threat of future disasters. Climate change, terrorist attack, genocide, contagious 
outbreak, economic collapse: each is uniquely and highly improbable in its own right. 
While the occurrence of such events already populate our present world, the presence of 
such events stimulates a different sort of action than what I focus on here. Disasters in the 
present already exist as states of affairs, and as such involve specific kinds of response. 
Yet future disasters – against which ideas about security find salience – produce 
speculative response. The not yet existing future catastrophe is complex and rendered 
generic by ideas and practices (which I outline in the first three chapters below) that 
contend with the ambiguity of the future; yet, despite its ambiguity, how incredibly 
dangerous it could be. More importantly, the effort to contend with future catastrophe 
tends to render differences between these events less important than efforts to prepare for 
whatever might come in the abstract. So taken together, we understand various kinds of 
future disasters as the coming catastrophe – whatever shape it takes, precisely – the 
altogether probable next catastrophe.  
The dissertation does not challenge the urgency of protecting against coming 
events. Instead it asks about the social and political effects of human security when 
organized around anticipation. What does the prominence of “the coming catastrophe” 
instead of, say, the “Evil Empire,” tell us about how we live now? What does it tell us 
about what we aim to secure? Where does strategy remain, and were might we find 
political life given over to an acceptance that to some extent the future can never be fully 
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enough imagined that we can evade its worst promises? These questions animate the 
project as a whole.  
A significant literature has emerged that, in one instance, investigates how 
undetermined future disasters have become the organizing principle of expert security 
practices;22 and in a second instance, interprets the experience and administration of 
contemporary political life in relation to claims of future threats. 23 In the former 
literature, social scientific writings on the subject focus more narrowly on the behavior of 
security experts; in the latter, a unidirectional exercise of power conditions features of 
democracy, intervention, and contemporary life. Part of the original work this dissertation 
undertakes presents this literature as a literature, when many parts of it do not engage 
one another for disciplinary reasons – most clearly because the former focuses on the 
activities of security professionals and the latter on the effects of political actors on the 
experience of lived experience.24 I connect these critical literatures that mine expert 
practices of anticipatory security to these broader philosophic reflections on 
contemporary political life. And as a result I argue that inclusive of and beyond a 
particular model or phase of contemporary security, that the anticipation of catastrophic 
events engenders a central political and cultural rationality of our time.  
                                                
22 This literature is organized by the writings of figures such as Anderson, Aradau and Van 
Munster, Cooper, De Goede, Ewald, Lakoff and Collier, and Massumi among others. 
23 These claims involve writings by Dupuy, Neyrat, Ophir, and Vázquez-Arroyo. 
24 This is not to say that none of whom I cite below engages the others, but that one 
recognizes a glaring lack of conversation between the social scientific endeavors to 
characterize the phenomenon of future catastrophe and more philosophical attempts to 
outline the effects on cultural and political life. Nevertheless, I maintain that, especially in the 
social scientific literature, a chasm exists between those whose focus is on strategizing 
prevention and those writing on resilience. 
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To be clear, the dissertation takes writing as empirical object – as a means to 
interpret the thinking it represents. Its central claims involve the relatively synonymous 
emergence of a discourse about the threat of future catastrophe. It is clear that the 
obsessions about future disaster can be most clearly found in writing as a form of 
reflection on knowledge and practice. I cull these reflections from an extraordinarily 
diverse group of sources – from government agencies, empirical studies performed by 
social scientists, philosophical reflections on current affairs, literary fiction, public 
intellectualism, and others. This dissertation does not, however, function as a review of 
relevant literature. It collects writing as evidence of a concurrent discourse, organizes 
these writings for the reader, and presents a new body of writing as evidence that a 
problem is present. Methodologically speaking, much of what occurs on its pages 
demonstrate the production of a narrative about contemporary thought that derives from 
thinkers concerned with a common phenomenon, though these thinkers are not always 
aware of one another, though sometimes of course they must be. 
The dissertation as a consequence organizes writing that otherwise does not often 
interrelate and then, in turn, offers an interpretation of the product of its empirical work. 
The result being an argument that stems from contemporary thought, about contemporary 
thought, that is diagnostic of thought in the present. It is from this calculus that I feel 
confident making claims about contemporary rationality. The dissertation after all, to the 
extent that it is successful at all, is a reflection on a disparate but interpretable set of ideas 
unified by the concern for future catastrophe. In other words, the dissertation organizes 
an otherwise disorganized discourse into an object of interpretation. In Part One, the 
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interpretation focuses on efforts of political elites and their interpreters to account for 
threats that emerge from an undetermined future. In Part Two, I introduce theories 
attempting to supplement the work on political elites, toward a diagnosis of a broader 
thematic found in contemporary life in the United States: the preoccupation with future 
catastrophe and questions about human survival from beyond sectors of security 
expertise. The contribution of the dissertation, in the end, is to register the political and 
critical effects of that collective concern. 
After drawing into critical dialogue a range of thinkers from the Cold War to the 
current moment, I reflect on other work that attempts to give meaningful voice to wide-
ranging concerns about catastrophe – whether by security professionals or not – 
deploying useful terminology and concepts such as logics of “the catastrophization of 
political life”25 or “modes of knowledge and styles of reasoning.”26 Yet such discussions 
do not explore thoroughly enough how the language and desire of political actors 
interfaces with a clear popular concern – one might even call it an eschatological concern 
– in which an emergent cultural production preoccupied with future disaster can be 
successfully outlined.  
For this reason, it is important to supplement claims about future catastrophe that 
involve political elites with what I understand to be processes of cultural production. 
Thinkers like Vázquez-Arroyo and Aradau & Van Munster each in their own ways is 
preoccupied with an important component in rhetorics of disaster and security: Where the 
specter of insecurity, as Vázquez-Arroyo puts it, “authoriz(es) the expansion of 
                                                
25 Vázquez-Arroyo 2013, 745 
26 Aradau and Van Munster 2001, 2 
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unaccountable power” and depoliticizes populations.27 While this is clearly an important 
political feature of any vision of political life obsessed with catastrophe, it is also the case 
that rather than depoliticizing populations, discourses about security are cultural – far 
exceeding official concerns – and therefore fully political in the ways that they guide 
contemporary rationality and beliefs about the potential for human survival.  
I will insist below that discourses surrounding catastrophe are both political and 
cultural. Many of my interlocutors insist that discourses about catastrophe and security 
are political in a specific way: They assert that the manipulation of power by political 
elites, especially when deploying rhetoric of future disaster, tends to “depoliticize” 
populations.28 What they mean, to be clear, is that especially in democracies, that elites 
threaten the welfare of the body politic with speculations about threats to their security. 
As a result, democratic societies face an intimidating warning and potent threat to the 
democratic ethos: “Let me protect you, or else catastrophe will strike!” For scholars like 
Vázquez-Arroyo, Adi Ophir, and Aradau & Van Munster this ultimatum reprioritizes 
security over democratic self-determination and democratic ideals of constraining 
autocratic and other forms of state power. The political threat of catastrophe and the 
promise of security by political elites is for them therefore fundamentally antidemocratic 
and depoliticizing (in its antidemocratic seizure of power). 
I agree that surrendering liberty for security, especially out of fear for survival 
against speculative threats, is an important mechanism of contemporary political power. 
But work preexisting this dissertation already shows this effectively. Yet if we follow 
                                                
27 op cit, 745 
28 This claim is addressed repeatedly in following chapters 
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their arguments to their logical conclusions, several shortcomings emerge. First, while 
true that certain claims to security tend to support less than democratic modes of politics, 
that does not mean that political power ceases to function in political societies. Such 
claims tend against the presence of resistance, of activism, and other concurrent explicitly 
political modes of power. In short, claiming that securitizing language depoliticizes 
unnecessarily homogenizes our ideas about the heterogeneity of political power and 
obscures alternatives to autocracy that already exist in the world. In other words, it is too 
narrow to say that the process is “depoliticizing.” It may be depoliticizing in the sense 
that it vitiates democratic ideals and weakens democratic participation. Yet even then, 
that diminishment would indicate to me more of a transformation in a political state of 
affairs then to, literally, depoliticize a political state of affairs. It would support 
arguments of a state of exception, perhaps, or the passage from a democratic form of 
politics to one more autocratic.  
Most importantly to me, however, is that such claims gesture away from another 
mode of power entirely. When constraining notions of power to state actors and political 
elites, analyses overlook the power of cultural production. Taking power as already 
variously applied and exercised, as I do, and expressed in the process of knowledge 
production, understanding the problem of catastrophizing speech acts as depoliticizing 
overlooks the range of ways that power works not only to dominate, but also can animate 
discourses and meanings; accept or elide modes of inclusion and exclusion (both of 
peoples and their ideas); it can produce as well as destroy. In other words, the notion that 
seizing on a compulsory form of depoliticizing power overemphasizes both the power of 
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the state and a conceptual understanding of power as domination. In this dissertation, 
when I insist that discourses of catastrophe are “fully political,” I mean by that statement 
that conversations about catastrophe have potent effects of animating discourses, 
orienting people to problematics, and ultimately shaping the experience of life in relation 
to such discourses. 
Likewise, by “culture” I mean the production of meaning in a given society. I take 
the broadest definition of this word intentionally. In mobilizing culture as the collective 
production of meaning, I want to resist elitist demonstrations of the word, as in Matthew 
Arnold’s famous 19th-century definition, “the best which has been thought and said in the 
world,” which insisted that culture is “high culture,” a rarified and selective grouping of 
artistic and intellectual achievement toward which others should aspire.29 Instead I align 
more closely with the writings of Stuart Hall, who is not a central figure below, but 
remains as an inspiration. Against an elitist view of culture, I consider the production of 
meaning in a society to not only: 1) traversing analytic distinctions of “high” and “low” 
culture, but also importantly “elite” and “popular,” which come to inform the ways that I 
understand catastrophe discourse to imbue a society with concern stemming both from 
political elites and citizens alike; 2) the production of culture needn’t be homogenous. I 
refuse an understanding that cultural production in order to be meaningful, ought to be 
singly coherent. In an important way, in this dissertation I mean to suggest that a reader 
of its findings should recognize the varied intentions and motives, the separate ideologies 
and convictions, of the range of voices represented here. What unites them? A focus on a 
problem. This problem, I believe, stems from sources further than the concerns of 
                                                
29 Arnold 1993, pg. 190. 
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inhabitants of security institutions and, rather, percolates from a growing number of 
voices across political society.  
By “rationality,” I mean the assimilation and reproduction of meaning. In this 
sense I mean that a rationality associates meanings into a rationale, a more coherent way 
of sense-making. Such a definition implies the production of knowledge, but is not 
necessarily limited to explicit knowledge; it can also mean more simply the ways that 
knowledge appears reasonable. The process by which meaning becomes reasonable is not 
always explicit, and often operates in ways that orient subjects to certain questions over 
others. Moreover, when I insist that considerations of catastrophe across culture produce 
a rationality of catastrophism, I mean not only that the knowledge associated with future 
disaster comes to preoccupy thinking beings – which it no doubt does – I mean to insist 
also that it configures consequential byproducts as well. Put simply, rationality produces 
not only a certain kind of assimilated meaning, but also predispositions as well. I often 
refer to these predispositions as, in a sense, orienting subjects toward the questions of 
future catastrophe and human survival. Rationality creates limitations at the same time as 
creating opportunities. In this sense, my deployment of rationality explains the discursive 
skeleton of political dispositions and priorities, not an instrumental rationality so all 
encompassing that emplaces its subjects into an iron cage, streamlining them as means to 
ends economic or political in their devices. Instead, like my usage of the words culture 
and political, I want the word rationality to function in this dissertation as a functionary 
of how meaning is made, disseminated, and assimilated. With the end of that pursuit 
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being that political subjects react to terms of a political rationality because of its attendant 
problematics.   
The dissertation is therefore at its core about how the concern about surviving 
future catastrophes has become widespread, naturalized as a cultural phenomenon that 
concerns both security professionals and everyday subjects alike, reorienting ideas as 
critical as life and survival toward a future that, quite literally, has no actual reality in the 
present. This orientation that prioritizes imagined dangerous futures over concrete issues 
in the present founds the political rationality that I seek to outline in the work. 
In order to accomplish this broad project, I set out to elaborate two concepts. The 
first concept is “the coming catastrophe,” which I show over the first three chapters 
became “normal.” In this sense I mean that the notion of the “future catastrophe” emerges 
as an abstraction that stands in for a long list of potentially disastrous events, and as such 
the abstraction is an object of securing human life.30  
The second concept focuses on the political rationalities that surround such a 
security concern, “catastrophism.” Drawing together philosophical literatures 
conceptualizing “catastrophism” (Dupuy, Neyrat) and “catastrophization” (Ophir, 
Vázquez-Arroyo) that address how political imaginaries emerge (or should emerge) to 
respond to crises in the present, I suggest that theories addressing the politics of 
catastrophes excavate a political rationality that is still not yet sufficiently outlined. In 
response, I argue that catastrophism is especially useful for conceptualizing future-
oriented politics because it helps us to analyze evermore pervasive instances of 
“enlightened doomsaying” from security practitioners to novelists, public intellectuals, 
                                                
30 Toscano 2008 
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and philosophers, because the concept articulates a sensibility, an orientation.31 Again, 
this sensibility or orientation stands at the heart of what I mean when I invoke the concept 
of rationality. The final and concluding chapter then introduces a critique of the 
extensively persistent nature of catastrophism. Not only does catastrophism shift 
perspective from present crises to future calamities, making events that literally have not 
occurred take primacy, it preempts critique of structural processes that give rise to 
suffering in the present and which very well may cause the catastrophes of tomorrow.  
The dissertation is divided into two parts, containing five substantive chapters. 
Each of the two parts develops a single concept. Part One (the first three chapters) 
organizes ideas about “the coming catastrophe” in order to show how future catastrophe 
became an event that we can expect, rather than the distinct catastrophic event remaining 
highly improbable. Part One first divides considerations about either prevention or 
resilience into legible modes of future-oriented security thinking, and then in Chapter 
Three attempts to conceptualize their overlaps in an effort to demonstrate the ways they 
became fused into a category of actionable knowledge. Part Two (chapters four and five) 
develops and critiques the concept of “catastrophism” as a form of contemporary 
rationality that moves beyond elite security thinking and admits other modes of 
knowledge production from outside the purview of state practices.  
 1. The Coming Catastrophe: Logics of Prevention 
This chapter aims to both historicize and contextualize critical and theoretical approaches 
to thinking about future catastrophe through the particular lens of approaches to 
“uncertainty” as opposed to “indeterminacy” (Best, Dupuy) in critical theory and security 
                                                
31 Dupuy 2004 & 2005 
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studies. It organizes writings that pursue security logics about future catastrophe that stay 
their focus on strategies of preventing future disaster. Beginning from the latter stages of 
Cold War writing about the possibility of nuclear war, I trace the “fabulation” (Derrida) 
or necessarily future-oriented discourses of imagining nuclear annihilation across a range 
of literature focusing on the creative necessity to imagine the future in order to 
contextualize threats in the present. From this perspective I trace the emergence of an 
anticipatory discourse that has to be imagined in order to be treated critically (Derrida, 
Marcuse, Galison, Enzensberger).   
I then turn to contemporary post-9/11 critical responses to securitization, 
precaution, and other reactions to terrorism developed in the U.S. security establishment 
to deal with “unknown unknowns” (Lakoff and Collier, Anderson, Aradau and van 
Munster, De Goede, Ewald, Massumi). But in the ensuing decade, I show how 
hurricanes, tsunamis, economic crises, and other massive disasters stretched the pursuit of 
certainty about future events to encompass larger and larger swaths of potentially lethal 
phenomena, blurring the singular nature of “the coming catastrophe” into a catchall 
watchword signifying a universal insecurity from the unknown, but also the not yet 
determined (Best, Dupuy), and thus require new vocabularies and approaches to securing 
against their non-singular nature.32  
 2. From (Pro)Action to Reaction to Acceptance: Logics of Resilience  
The second chapter considers the way that the prospects of future catastrophes often are 
managed in the present through the lenses of resilience planning. I argue that where the 
preventative strategies outlined in Chapter One sought to avoid specific potential 
                                                
32 Corry 2012 and 2014 
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disasters, resilience accepts the inevitability of many potential disasters all at once. In 
sum, I argue that resilience marks a departure from strategy to acceptance; from 
(pro)action to reaction. This argument is especially important because it helps to show the 
pervasiveness of the practical response to “normal catastrophes” as argued in the next 
chapter. Resilience has become a keyword of contemporary global security governance, 
drawing from a range of other fields, exemplified by the U.N. report, Resilient People, 
Resilient Planet: A future worth choosing (2012) which argues for a global project of 
“sustainable development” that “eradicate(s) poverty,” “combat(s) climate change,” 
among other challenges while “building resilience through sound safety nets, disaster risk 
reduction, and adaptation planning.”33  
Resilience attempts to engineer measures of adaptability that take priority over the 
presumed stasis of risk thinking (Holling). Yet, as Walker and Cooper have shown in 
their landmark critical genealogy of resilience, the initial techniques of resilience were 
not only drawn from engineering and ecology, but also from neoliberal economic 
theory.34 So one key critical approach to resilience policy has been to critique it from the 
perspective of neoliberalism and its attendant governmentality, and as such this line of 
thinking insists that resilience is a developed enough form of neoliberal governance that 
resistance to it has been subsumed or weakened substantially.35 Yet some others have 
argued that the critique of neoliberal resilience overlooks a key element of contemporary 
liberalism and its relationship to resilience: “liberalism is aimed today not at solving or 
preventing the manifestation of dangers and threats to security, but at making us forego 
                                                
33 UNISDR 2015, 6 
34 Walker and Cooper 2011 
35 Neocleus 2012; Reid 2012; Joseph 2013 
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the very idea and possibility of security, through the embrace of the necessity of our 
exposure to dangers of all kinds as a means by which to live well.”36 I read therefore the 
sides of this dialogue surrounding neoliberal articulations of resilience against each other 
to establish an analytic argument suggesting that despite the critical potentials – for better 
or worse – that both sides of the debate allow us to see how resilience reconstructs a 
broad field of threats as not only singular (future catastrophe), but also inevitable enough 
to prepare for in the abstract. Hence, resilience enables a reaction to the abstract concept 
of future catastrophe, rather than an action against a strategic threat, and therefore 
transforming a risk-averse politics into one of embrace; into one that “has seemingly 
embraced the Nietzschean imperative to ‘live dangerously’” by relenting to the 
possibility of what I call in the next chapter, “normal catastrophes.”37  
 3. Normal Catastrophes: Security Against All Hazards 
Chapter Three outlines the practical genesis of the coming catastrophe through the ways 
it was normalized. Focusing again on its roots in the Cold War, but then the ways that 
“Civil Defense” migrated from nuclear war to a larger range of disaster categories, I 
show how the disruptive and unusual category of catastrophe became normalized. The 
chapter traces both an empirical historical process in the U.S. through established 
accounts, and simultaneously theorizes the emergence of its consequences as a central 
political logic in a late-modern context. It contributes to the dissertation a passage from 
the more abstract ontological language of “the coming catastrophe” to the idea that 
catastrophe has been abstracted as a reified object of concern about human security. 
                                                
36 Evans and Reid 2014, 2 
37 The Nietzschean citation is also found in Evans and Reid 2014, 2. 
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 From Mutual Assured Destruction and empirical reflections on aerial bombing, to 
the creation of FEMA and all-hazards security, the chapter traces a conceptual history of 
future catastrophe as an abstraction. If chapters one and two reveal the limitations of 
prevention and resilience, this chapter shows how the broader interest in future disasters 
demonstrates overlap between them, thus normalizing the threat of future catastrophe. In 
the chapter I argue that the concept of catastrophe is a powerful abstraction that motivates 
a suite of security efforts. In this regard the chapter consequently traces the securitization 
of FEMA’s all-hazards approach through its incorporation into the Department of 
Homeland Security (DHS) in 2003.38 As a result the chapter shows how, through its 
expansive efforts to govern contingency as a security problematic, that DHS normalized a 
wide range of highly improbable events into the altogether probable event of 
catastrophe—abstract catastrophe, normal catastrophes. My aim is also to show the 
emergence of a particular technique involving how threat is conceived, and how security 
is produced as an anticipatory logic.  
4. Catastrophism I: An anticipatory security dispositif 
Marking a shift from matters of security to matters of political rationality, Part Two asks 
consequently why the preceding chapters seem to make such sense – literally, why the 
fear of an abstract event should cause concern. While a critical stance is possible toward 
the production of catastrophe as a defining abstraction of contemporary political concern, 
the increasing frequency of large-scale disastrous emergencies also demand attention if 
humans will survive late modernity itself.  
                                                
38 Collier and Lakoff 2006 
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Chapter four focuses on the ways that political rationality is produced across 
diverse modes of knowledge creation. Considering the ongoing tumult taking place in the 
Occupied Territories of Palestine, Adi Ophir rendered a complex concept of 
“catastrophization.” For Ophir, this concept both outlines the ways that a vast interaction 
between state governance and NGOs continues to push the Palestinians to the brink of 
disaster and simultaneously to rescue them from perishing, the active component of the 
concept explains the transformation of daily life into one of ongoing catastrophe. Yet his 
concept reaches further in an attempt to describe the advent of a governmentality that 
gives the ongoing catastrophe life, as Vázquez-Arroyo puts it, both as “an objective 
reality and a discursive process.”39  
In other words, Ophir’s concept of catastrophization produces an understanding 
where in actual policy, catastrophe is both produced and mitigated; but in this process, so 
are ways of thinking about political order in the very political landscape that it produces. 
Sympathetically critiquing Ophir’s deployment, Vázquez-Arroyo introduces the notion of 
the “catastrophization of political life,” in which as he puts it:  
…the rhetoric of catastrophe, its menacing shadows, is deployed to depoliticize 
populations, as well as to legitimize catastrophic situations that are already under 
way. This, in order to establish a threshold in which state power is not only 
exercised but regularized, and normalized, in fundamentally undemocratic ways.40  
 
This conception outlined by Vázquez-Arroyo follows another element of the 
catastrophization of political life that he leaves to the side in pursuit of what I quoted 
immediately above. In this passage that I have quoted, the “rhetoric of catastrophe” 
carries with it an air of intentionality where the rhetoric’s deployment permits the 
                                                
39 Vázquez-Arroyo 2013, 744 
40 ibid 745 
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undemocratic exercise of state power. This is certainly empirically the case, often 
enough, but by his own admission Vázquez-Arroyo abandons another process in which 
catastrophe enters the fray: The way that discourses of catastrophe “connote an increasing 
awareness of vulnerability to forms of power, the pervasiveness of superfluous suffering 
and destruction, and the need to be politically alert to these, in order to mitigate or avert 
catastrophes…”41 Here Vázquez-Arroyo hedges much more closely to the presentation of 
the effects of discourses of catastrophe that I endorse, but I argue that 1) he overlooks the 
broader concern about catastrophe because he follows Ophir too closely; and, more 
importantly, 2) in arguing that the process of catastrophization of political life that he 
insists upon is effectively a device intended to “authorize the expansion of unaccountable 
power” with a form of rhetoric “deployed to depoliticize populations,” he mistakes the 
exercise of authority as politics for what he refers to as “political life.”42  
In so doing, Vázquez-Arroyo mainly addresses the way that certain rhetorics 
bolster the abuse of antidemocratic power. I argue that, when seen as a broader concern – 
a preoccupation with the future-oriented abstraction of catastrophe – that we can see to 
the contrary that a discourse of catastrophe works in ways far from depoliticizing 
populations. Instead we can see a re-politicization – a re-orientation – of political life to a 
broad concern about security in general. This inspires this chapter’s discussion of the 
emergence of a political rationality of which I make sense by way of Foucault’s concept 
of the dispositif and a discussion of seemingly unlike writings sharing a common concern 
for human survival which all take imagination as their core narrative device.  
                                                
41 ibid 
42 ibid 
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Analyzing literary narrative (Atwood’s Oryx and Crake), ethical philosophy 
(Mulgan’s Ethics for a Broken World), public intellectualism’s appeals for resilient 
security practices (Flynn’s The Edge of Disaster), and a formerly secret DHS program 
that incorporates novelists and screenwriters into contingency planning, I bridge 
similarities across seemingly unrelated modes of writing to show the common fear of 
pending existential finitude as a mobilization of catastrophe for, at very least, rhetorical 
purposes. The reading also draws their work into conversation with Foucault’s notion of 
the dispositif – an assemblage of wide-ranging practices and forms of knowledge 
production unified by a common, and forceful, political rationality. Chapter four aims 
above all else to substantiate the following claim: What catastrophe truly stands for is an 
expression of contemporary political rationality. So, chapter four conceptualizes how an 
anticipatory dispositif organized around catastrophic concern catalyzes action across 
disciplines and institutions, shows how we can understand contemporary rationality as 
organized by future-oriented logics, logics that re-imagine human finitude in response to 
those very fabrications.  
 5. Catastrophism II: Elaboration and Critique  
Building on the previous chapter, this chapter extends our understanding of 
catastrophism. Showing its conceptual affinities and points of divergence with its usage 
in the natural sciences, I suggest that catastrophism is a political rationality deeply 
engrained in modern thought, as well as germane to problems of modern governance. 
Beyond its conceptual usage in planetary sciences, I interpret two important 
contemporary thinkers who have written provocatively on the concept of catastrophism in 
French. After briefly discussing the liberalism of Ulrich Beck in his thin deployment of 
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the term, I turn to Jean-Pierre Dupuy, who advocates for an “enlightened catastrophism” 
which results from a paradox intrinsic to humanism itself. As an answer to that paradox, 
Dupuy insists that a “new metaphysics” is necessary that will help deploy an important 
political “ruse” which could reposition human beings in ways that might inform their 
efforts to resist a catastrophic destiny. I then turn to Frédéric Neyrat, whose vision of 
catastrophism results from an incisive reassessment of biopolitics in an age of 
catastrophes. Showing the limits of the biopolitical paradigm helps to show how my 
assessment of catastrophism in the previous chapter responds to fissures in modern 
governance given to security. The chapter ultimately concludes by bridging these 
discussions with a discussion of why these assessments also portend a foreclosure on 
critical thinking in a catastrophic age. 
 
Living with Catastrophism 
The writing that follows from here traces an emergence – a coming into being – of a way 
of thinking. Tracing this emergence is why so much of the project is devoted to 
accounting for the arguments of others. As the arguments of the dissertation unfold, I 
trace the contours of how a diverse field inside and outside the academy and across 
concerns and disciplines, inaugurated a way of thinking that commands new ways of 
thinking about human security, and in fact even produced new objects of consideration. 
Such a way of thinking, a way of thinking already emergent at the beginning of the Cold 
War, and coming to full fruition by the 1970s in its usefulness beyond military strategy, 
produced a future-oriented range of existential threats facing the U.S. and the West. In 
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other words, the rise of risk management, and its supplementation with theories of 
resilience – as well as the ways that both have been challenged because of their potential 
impacts in the future – mark an important signpost for political action. All such actions 
are informed by anticipatory thought, crystallized in diverse practices and institutional 
formations, and fully realized as the principal raison d'être of a new security paradigm.  
 Further, the logic of the dispositif means that the capacity to generate knowledge 
that informs action (and likewise actions that inform knowledge) exceeds a closed 
institutional framework. The threat of the looming catastrophe is a constant reminder. It 
is an organizing principle, an affect, a ubiquitous trope. In other words, while the rest of 
this project is devoted to the relatively closed world of security policy and analytics, the 
dispositif produces discernable modes of thinking and action corresponding to a 
culturally produced field of knowledge. In this case, it is knowledge about potential 
stakes of future events. And it is important that the events are as yet undetermined 
because, such as it is, the undetermined future becomes the productive potential for the 
dispositif’s reproduction. 
 The French have a word for this thinking, whether it’s the name of a broad 
political rationality, or simply a doomsayer, the word is le catastrophisme. A person, then 
who embodies such a rationality is a “catastrophist.” Catastrophism, in the sense that I 
deploy the term here, is more than simple doomsaying, more than simple quivering at 
assumptions about the coming end. Frédéric Neyrat calls it, “legitimate madness.”43 In a 
                                                
43 “Legitimate madness. Catastrophe is the disastrous disruption of order, that overwhelms 
the supposed course of normal existence, the natural bed of a river or artificial dams, carrying 
with it the instituted order, habits and habitations, a way of life, of illusions… A major 
accident that overthrows the course of things, catastrophe renders space uninhabitable. But 
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word, it is more than dystopian futurism; more than certainty that the end is nigh; it is 
more than futurism at all. In fact, catastrophism lacks usefulness when attached to its 
orientation to the future. Of course, this is not to say that catastrophism has no connection 
to future events – it does – nor is it to say that there isn’t a possible connection to 
annihilation for the catastrophist – there could be. It is rather to say that what makes 
catastrophism special when thinking about either the politics of security, or cultures of 
everyday life, is that catastrophism marks an awareness about a specific kind of danger – 
and one that is shared by a spectrum of political subjects – that can tell us quite a bit 
about the way we think now. This dissertation suggests that a theme about survival 
suffuses political society, and is not limited to professionals whose careers are devoted to 
such questions. Instead, we should understand that a major question about living in the 
present is what it means to be threatened with catastrophic peril at any moment. 
  
 
 
 
                                                                                                                                            
only for a time. In the worst scenarios of science fiction, the survivors adapt and rebuild, 
becoming as rational as Mad Max to compensate for the lack of energy and the absence of 
peace. Otherwise it is the final catastrophe, the cataclysm essentially irreparable, no more and 
no less than the end of the world. The catastrophe stands effectively between the accident –
etymologically “what happens”, that which supplements the ordinary without shattering 
historical continuity – and the apocalypse as the last discontinuity” (my translation, Neyrat 
2008: 35). 
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The Coming Catastrophe: Uncertain Logics of Prevention 
 
 
 
 
 
I. Introduction 
 
Critical attention paid to events described as disasters, apocalyptic scenarios, and 
catastrophes focus primarily on the element of uncertainty about possible future events 
for which we have little or no warning.1 So much so that the attention relating uncertainty 
and the many institutional projects involved in warding off future calamity “in an 
uncertain world” link in nearly indelible ways the investment in human security with the 
struggle against uncertainty about the future. But to resign events bearing the highest-
impact imaginable to uncertainty is to subordinate events (or at least efforts to contain 
them) to the epistemological — “If only we had adequate knowledge…” — a mistake, 
perhaps, or maybe more specifically, too narrow a conception when we are confronted by 
future events which by definition have not only not yet occurred, but have not yet been 
                                                
1 The motif of uncertainty is common in the critical security studies literature, among others, 
that make efforts to analyze configurations of security practices with respect to future events. 
This is only a cursory, but highly representative list of some of the central, most well-known 
texts, each of which is engaged in this chapter: Aradau and Van Munster 2007, 2008, 2011; 
Aradau, Lobo-Guerrero, Van Munster 2008; Adey and Anderson 2011 and 2012; Amoore 
2008 and 2013; Best 2008; Collier 2008; de Goede 2008 and 2012; de Goede and Randalls 
2009; Dillon 2007 and 2008; Ewald 2002; Lakoff 2006, 2007, and 2008; Stevenson 2008; 
Posner 2004.    
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determined, a fact which at very least hints also at the question of the ontological as 
well.2 
Emblematic of the privilege uncertainty receives, consider Claudia Aradau and 
Rens Van Munster in the opening pages of their Politics of Catastrophe:  
In the domain of security…many experts have associated the emergence of 
catastrophe as a peculiar and challenging object of governance with the 
introduction of nuclear weapons after World War II or with recent suspicions of 
terrorist or so-called rogue actors – states or otherwise – getting access to nuclear 
materials in the post-Cold War or post-9/11 era. Most of the arguments tend to 
emphasize the particularity of catastrophes as types of events that remain 
shrouded in uncertainty, confound expectation and challenge the predictive, 
preventive and protective knowledge of security experts. They are seen as ‘rare, if 
not unique, and as striking rarely and without warning’ (Clarke 2005: 6). They are 
unexpected and unknown both in their scope and their singular actualization.3  
 
Aradau and Van Munster encapsulate several important trends in thinking about future 
catastrophes in this brief introductory passage. First, they associate the “domain of 
security” with expert knowledge, especially “security experts” and in so doing they 
narrow their pursuit to elites whose concerns involve security provision, and far from the 
fuller range of intellectualism and criticism. Second, they locate the “emergence of 
catastrophe as a peculiar and challenging object of governance” in the invention of 
nuclear weapons, tying that particular technological birth to the post-9/11 era of 
counterterrorism by virtue of nuclear arms. Third, and most central to the work of this 
chapter, they cast these claims under the guise of knowledge and reason. Conceptualizing 
such emergences (of catastrophe and nuclear war) by casting them in light of how they 
“confound expectation,” how they are “unexpected and unknown,” to the extent that they 
                                                
2 Here I have in mind the experimental work of Herman Kahn, but as I will show later, 
Dupuy (2004 and 2005) is especially relevant to this line of thinking. On Kahn studies, 
Ghamari-Tabrizi, S. 2000 and 2005; Stevenson 2008. 
3 Aradau and Van Munster 2011, 1. 
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“remain shrouded in uncertainty” exposes the way that knowledge and reason emphasize 
the subject matter of future catastrophes, especially when it comes to logics of security 
and their discourses.   
In this chapter I do not argue that uncertainty is not a key feature partly 
embodying future catastrophes. Nor do I argue that uncertainty does not preoccupy 
concerns about future catastrophes. What I will argue however is that uncertainty 
dominates discourses about future catastrophes to the extent that it overshadows the 
ontological element of indetermination that composes both the future and its potential for 
catastrophic events.4  
The stakes of epistemological dominance are several. First, it tends to bolster 
interest in those methods that claim to reduce uncertainty, which results in reduced 
interest in the processes of invention and imagination that are deployed when faced with 
indetermination. Second, the emphasis on uncertainty recruits discussions focuses on too 
narrowly on expert knowledge and efforts to produce a growing body of knowledge 
adequate to the range of possible futures. Third, emphasizing the “unknown” (or even 
frequently the “unknown unknowns”) privileges the epistemological over the ontological, 
obscuring the cause for knowledge about future catastrophe in the first instance.  
As I proceed I therefore address the concern with future events, the critical 
preoccupation with the dangers that such events pose, and begin to develop a concept of 
“the coming catastrophe” as a productive concept for this literature. The productivity of 
discourses of uncertainty reflect an intrinsic problem of limited knowledge, which is an 
epistemological problem, in the face of causal indetermination, which is an ontological 
                                                
4 In making this argument, I draw heavily on Derrida and Dupuy. 
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problem.5 I thus shift the emphasis from what we can anticipate or speculate about the 
future, to the materialist problem of the future itself: that it is not yet determined. After 
all, if the question of survival can be articulated in terms of what may come, then the 
question is fundamentally ontological and temporal before human knowledge confronts 
that reality.  
As such, this reformulation opens the possibility of recasting the conceptual 
relationship between future events and political security. Rather than presenting the 
epistemological problem of futures which may cause insecurity, a standpoint from which 
one can only advance a thesis that we ought to develop more mastery over the 
(necessarily) unknown, stressing an ontological approach on the other hand attempts to 
explain both the changing relationship of institutions of security governance to 
indeterminate causal mechanisms, as well their effects in the formation and management 
of knowledge and power in the present. Moreover I want this chapter to insist that 
recalling the ontological stakes of future-oriented security will tell us more about the 
shortcomings of knowledge. In short, there is something about shortcomings of 
knowledge (intrinsic to the “future-oriented” and most evident in “uncertainty”) that 
incentivize projects of knowledge production, which seems to redouble as a widespread 
concern. More than simply conceptual, this argument will support what I will in later 
chapters pursue as a “rationality,” or what others have likewise productively called a 
“logic” or “styles of reasoning” surrounding anticipating catastrophes.6 
                                                
5 Dupuy 2009, 1. 
6 Vázquez-Arroyo 2013, 750-55; Aradau and Van Munster 2011, 31-33. These authors and 
many others frequently also utilize the language of “rationality,” as is common in social 
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  To write a comprehensive conceptual history of uncertainty is well beyond the 
scope of this project, but it is also quite different from its aim.7 Below I assemble texts 
from the past half-century that analyze “the coming catastrophe” by emphasizing 
uncertainty. In short, these texts show a tendency to cross over, in a manner of speaking, 
from the fundamental ontological issue of an indeterminate future, and to stress an 
epistemological question rather than the more obvious ontological one: the question, 
“how do we cope with indeterminacy” becomes, so often, “how do we deal with our 
incapacity to know what will come next.”8 This may seem at this point a small matter of 
difference. To stress the lack of knowledge about what might occur surprisingly may 
seem little different than stressing that indetermination produces uncertainty. But by the 
end of this chapter I hope to have widened that crack in a way that sheds light 
simultaneously on the questions of indetermination and uncertainty when we consider 
“the coming catastrophe,” but also to have advanced our understanding of how each of 
those positions might cause us to understand what a future catastrophe is, in and of itself. 
Not to mention that such understandings may lead to striking differences in how the 
future catastrophe is imagined, planned for, and so on. 
The roots of concern for uncertainty with reference to future catastrophe are not 
new. Today’s apocalyptic concern for the abstraction, “catastrophe,” has very concrete 
                                                                                                                                            
scientific writing about power and social organization, which I adapt and differentiate as 
necessary when the conversation focuses on this discussion in Chapter 4. 
7 Histories of uncertainty and attempts to cope with it abound. One particularly pertinent (and 
accessible) introduction is Bernstein 1996. 
8 Anderson 2010b is an excellent text on this subject, as is Best 2008, and de Goede & 
Randalls 2009. 
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conceptual critical roots in Cold War thought as well as important departures from it.9 
Wanting to reign in somewhat the scope of that concern, and in keeping with the aims of 
the rest of the dissertation, I focus here on critical thinkers from the late 1970s and 
onward. This periodization will become more clearly important in Chapter Three when I 
outline the shift from what I will call “particular catastrophes” to “normal catastrophes;” 
the latter signifying the outgrowth from imagining particular kinds of future disasters to 
imagining “catastrophe” as such, as a catchall for the abstract future event that must be 
secured against. But for now, it will have to suffice to mention that from the period 
followed here there is a conceptual history which will be retraced, at least in its zeitgeist 
when I return to these issues and examine them from the standpoint of institutional 
responses later. At that point, I emphasize a history of responding to the threat of future 
catastrophes that emerges from institutional practice, but also show how such a concept 
loops back on itself to underwrite such institutions, rendering the concept of “the coming 
catastrophe” something that at once requires attendant institutions, and at the very same 
time is discursively developed by those institutions. Hence catastrophes as normalized 
phenomena, everywhere and always possible: normal catastrophes.  
But that discussion takes place elsewhere in detail. Here my aim is to found the 
later stages of the project in a conceptual discussion of catastrophe as it is viewed 
critically and conceptually. One main part of this chapter’s thrust regards the 
genealogical roots of contemporary critical dispositions to catastrophe. Taking its 
contemporary roots from the well-developed critical work taking place during the latter 
                                                
9 Aradau and Van Munster 2011, 17; Collier and Lakoff 2008; Galison 2001; Stevenson 
2008. 
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stages of Cold War thought, one can extrapolate that the particular threat – and one might 
acknowledge the potentially more calamitous threat – of nuclear doomsday scenarios 
downplayed somewhat the indeterminacy now in place when we discuss catastrophic 
futures.  
During the Cold War, the constant possibility of species- (if not planet-) ending 
nuclear war may have in fact loomed more severe than the contemporary view.10 Then, 
the threat of nuclear annihilation was mostly singular, and realized as a technology of 
human invention. It hailed from a singular confrontation, from a singular source, and 
from a singular (and hopefully avoidable) antagonism. There were of course other 
disasters, some of which were catastrophic,11 but the vision of a catastrophe in the most 
severe and urgent sense imaginable always referred back to the conceptual space opened 
by the new possibility of nuclear annihilation, a possibility only extant since 1949.12  
Today, in a very different sense, the notion of catastrophe no longer appertains 
solely to the (still very real) possibility of nuclear extinction. Its contemporary sense 
ranges. It subsumes the possibility of dramatic cataclysm resulting from climatological 
instability, and the ever-present reality of plagues and scourges made worse by intensely 
interlinked trade and transportation networks.13 Increasingly uneven distributions of 
wealth threaten evermore-vulnerable populations with catastrophic futures of starvation 
and poverty, not to mention potentially more vulnerable to colonization and tyranny. 
                                                
10 de Goede and Randalls rightly note that such large-scale threats still endure and refer to 
these as “total threats” in de Goede and Randalls 2009. 
11 Take for example the large literature on AIDS. See Johnson and Hopkins (1990) for a 
particularly poignant call for policy action based on anticipatory findings.   
12 1949 was the first detonation of the Soviet bomb. The U.S. had quite obviously developed 
nuclear capacities years earlier. See Stevenson 2008; Rhodes 2012, 767; Kaplan 1983. 
13 Clarke 2001 and 2005; Flynn 2004 and 2007; Garcia 2005; Hanson 2009; Palmer 2010. 
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Terrorism, asymmetric warfare, and the potential for Great Power conflict continue to 
threaten human casualties of unspoken proportions as urgently as perhaps ever.  
Unlike the singularly perceived source of cataclysm during the latter half of the 
20th century, to evoke a future catastrophe today is to speak in one breath of many sorts 
of cataclysmic futures. Likewise, today’s most serious thinkers view this important shift 
to a more inclusive vision of catastrophe – if one can phrase it this way – as a problem 
that faces intellectuals and policy makers alike with a problem of inadequate knowledge. 
“If only we could know what lay ahead, we might prepare properly,” the logic goes. Such 
emphasis on the epistemological has its advantages and has gained more attention since 
the Bush presidency made famous both the Cheney Doctrine (also known as, The One 
Percent Doctrine),14 as well as the real threats emerging from Rumsfeld’s quasi-poetic 
“unknown unknowns.”15 Hence my argument that the popularity of conceiving future 
catastrophes as emphasized by languages rooted in “uncertainty” can fall short of 
understanding the force of the what that is involved in such phenomena as “unknown 
unknowns,” to capitalize on that popular phrase.  
What is lost is the ontological indeterminacy of future events and the very real, 
but as yet undetermined possibility of future catastrophe as a material process in many 
ways beyond the grasp of human politics, or at very least the institutions of security that 
aim to respond to foreseeable events. This argument is not intended to obliterate the 
importance of knowledge, nor to downplay the significance of uncertainty in the politics 
of catastrophe. Instead, ontological indeterminacy adds nuance to our understanding of 
                                                
14 See Suskind 2007. The one percent doctrine shares important with the precautionary 
principle, which is much more important in European discourses than in official U.S. policy. 
15 See Aradau and Van Munster 2011, esp. 6-7. See also, Žižek, 2006.  
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the politics of imagining future events that by their very definition do not yet have their 
own reality, and may never come to be; and so, indirectly, not only refocuses on the 
ontological but, in so doing, reorients the epistemological to “the coming catastrophe” at 
the same time. The argument will therefore contribute a concept of catastrophe that 
emphasizes its intrinsic lack of objective reality in the present, something that will 
become all the more important in later chapters that discuss the politics of imagining “the 
coming catastrophe” inside institutions of security provision and beyond, animating a 
principal element of contemporary rationality refocusing politics at every turn.    
 
II. Uncertainty and Indetermination 
At root of this chapter’s aim is a conceptual wedge outlined by Jean-Pierre Dupuy 
involving the dual sense of the German word Unbestimmtheit, famously translated into 
English as “uncertainty” as part of Heisenberg’s groundbreaking thesis in particle 
physics.16 Yet in German it means simultaneously, “undetermined” or “indeterminate.” 
Dupuy notes the difference as a preface to his important essay that I will address in the 
last section of this chapter. As in Dupuy’s essay which helps to form part of the 
conceptual foundation of how I think of catastrophe here, the aim of the present chapter is 
to emphasize “indeterminacy” at very least as it is obscured by the more widely studied 
problem of “uncertainty,” and the conceptual dividends paid to that end.17 With reference 
                                                
16 Dupuy 2009, 1; Heisenberg 1930, §3. 
17  My work differs substantially from Dupuy’s extensive writing on catastrophe and 
philosophy. Here in this chapter the reader will see our affinities, how much we align in our 
agreement that an ontological view of catastrophe is necessary to understanding its political 
force, and the importance of asserting indeterminacy in at least equal view with uncertainty. 
But our differences, which occur on the level of politics and critique, will only be fully 
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to Unbestimmtheit, Dupuy draws the two senses of the concept apart in a way that will 
prove useful for my purposes here: 
The German word “bestimmt” is fundamentally underdetermined. It can mean 
“festgelegt,” that is, “determined,” “resolute”; or it can mean “gewiß,” “certain,” 
“sure”; or it can mean “genau,” “precise,” “specified,” “explicit.” When Werner 
Heisenberg chose to call his famous principle the “Unbestimmtheitsrelation,” it 
was a stroke of genius: thanks to the indeterminacy of the German terminology, 
he did not have to choose which interpretation of quantum physics was better: 
uncertainty or indeterminacy. The difference is essential, however: uncertainty 
refers to the epistemic domain, that is, our knowledge about the system under 
observation, whereas indeterminacy refers to the ontological domain, that is, 
things as they are. In French and in English, we are not so lucky and we do have 
to choose.18 
 
In one sense, this distinction evoking Heisenberg seems to force a choice between 
approaching phenomena from the standpoint of the epistemic or the ontological. That 
forced choice may be reflected in how Dupuy characterizes the double valences of 
Unbestimmtheitsrelation in Heisenberg’s formulation as “genius.” But rather than cast 
the name under the veil of tactical genius, as if Heisenberg’s aim was to obscure, it is 
more useful to think Unbestimmtheitsrelation, with its own conceptual indetermination as 
an accidental opening wherein the concept carries with it both the sense of uncertainty 
and indetermination. In the principle of particle physics, as in the way that 
Unbestimmtheitsrelation sheds light, as we will see, on the issue of future catastrophe, 
there is an inalienable link between the ontological phenomenon which has not yet 
occurred and the human incapacity to know what might occur from indeterminacy. 
Unbestimmtheitsrelation allows us to see in the same vein how each feature may express 
different features of the same problem. In other words, it would seem that for the political 
                                                                                                                                            
revealed in the extensive discussions in final chapter below, when I develop a partial though 
affirmative critique of the concept of catastrophism. 
18 Dupuy 2009, 1. Italics appear in original. 
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study of future catastrophe we must choose either the ontological or the epistemological, 
not least because securing against potential future catastrophes seems to rely on 
imagining them in the first place.19 The more nuanced view of the related phenomena of 
future catastrophe and security regimes seems to draw out the subtle relation with series 
of events that are not yet determined and the human impulse to produce knowledge about 
them anyway. The epistemological referent of “uncertainty” places inquiries under a 
different light of scrutiny than the ontologically emphasized “undetermined.” 
Unbestimmtheitsrelation illustrates a conceptual flexibility that I want to inject into 
catastrophe. The concept shows the duplicative nature of imagining future catastrophe. 
“The coming catastrophe,” to the extent that it may happen, will register itself 
ontologically.20 But the political response is nevertheless registered as an epistemic 
problem, showing strange openings in the relationship between thinking and the material 
when it comes to anticipatory security. 
 
III. Uncertainties About Nuclear Annihilation 
To evoke the catastrophe in 2018 is to in part evoke a different phenomenon than during 
the Cold War.21 Today, the concept of the catastrophe tends toward the all-encompassing 
possibility for wide-scale disaster.22 The possibility for massive cataclysm, even total 
annihilation, resided in a singular possibility before the end of the Cold War.23  
                                                
19 Dupuy and Grinbaum 2005, 464. 
20 This element of the argument will become clearer as I elaborate the emphasis placed on the 
importance of thinking the unthinkable, and conquering uncertainty below. 
21 Aradau and Van Munster 2011, 17-19. 
22 Kindervater 2017. 
23 See Anderson 2010, 777. 
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 Derrida characterized the problem of nuclear war as “fabulously textual,” where, 
more than any other sort of weapon, nuclear arsenals relied on codes, structures of 
language, command relations. 24  One should not overlook the choice of the word 
“fabulously (fabuleusement),” which lends an air of exaggeration, but also in its very 
roots points to fabulation, or the Latin fabulosus, “the celebration of fable.”25 The 
language of “fabulously textual,” in this sense, occupies two senses. It impresses upon the 
reader an amplified textuality, and also a fictive presence in which nuclear war would be 
the opposite of, say, the merely textual. Instead it is fabulously textual: reliant on its text 
for both its reality and its capacity to be imagined, to be produced, fabulated.26 Following 
Derrida’s formulation, “the phenomenon [of nuclear war] remains fabulously textual also 
to the extent that, for the moment, a nuclear war has not taken place: one can only talk 
and write about it.”27 The non-historicity of nuclear war—i.e. that a nuclear war had 
never occurred—threw the threat of total human annihilation, and in fact the threat of any 
and all of its effects, into a realm of inquiry in which to think nuclear war was, in the 
most perverse sense, to dream. 
                                                
24 This is mentioned in passing in Aradau and Van Munster 2011, pg. 18. 
25 See OED. Derrida’s original French fabuleusement textuel, carries thus both meanings in 
everyday parlance of the extraordinary and the chimerical (Derrida 1987, 369). On fabulation 
and fiction, see Scholes 1967, 1979 and 1975. 
26 There is an interesting connection between this move and the way that Aradau and Van 
Munster characterize Carlo Ginzburg in which they note that conjectural reasoning as they 
import it through Ginzburg proceeds through “a model of reality as double: some trivial 
details from reality, invisible to all but to the eyes of specialists, offer access to a hidden 
reality underneath.” While not a trivial connection, the two points of view vary importantly, 
not least because for Derrida his notion is about fabricating a sense of reality through one that 
necessarily does not exist and is, in fact, a danger to existence itself. Where Ginzburg’s is 
more a methodological concern that allows for a spectacular deductive moment of knowledge 
production. Aradau and Van Munster 2011, pg. 32. 
27 Derrida 1984, 23.  
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 It was to fantasize annihilation practically, to enfold human civilization into a 
process where in order to avert nuclear war, nuclear war had first to be imagined.28 A 
hypothesis had to emerge as to what such a war might look like, what and how it ought to 
be waged, and at what cost.29 Surrounding the prospect of nuclear war were discourses of 
events that may at any moment occur, but by definition hadn’t yet; and, for that matter, 
had never happened in the past.30 This feature separated the prospect of nuclear war from 
all previous wars, which from Hans Morgenthau to Jacques Derrida had been theorized as 
sharing such similar features that conventional warfare was known as an historical 
constant. Nuclear war threatened a departure and required hypotheses: 
…the hypothesis of a total nuclear war, which as a hypothesis, or, if you prefer, as 
a fantasy, or phantasm, conditions every discourse and all strategies. Unlike the 
other wars, which have all been preceded by wars of more or less the same type in 
human memory (and gunpowder did not mark a radical break in this respect), 
nuclear war had no precedent. It has never occurred, itself; it is a non-event. The 
growing multiplication of the discourse – indeed, of the literature – on this subject 
                                                
28 The quintessential works on this conceptual formulation are by the strategist Herman 
Kahn. See esp. Kahn 1962a, 1985, but also 1960, and 1962b. For historical renderings of 
their effects, see also Ghamari-Tabrizi 2000 and 2005; and Stevenson 2008; Kaplan 1983. 
29 Aradau and Van Munster make a point of this feature of novelty in the threat that nuclear 
war posed to security, and its attendant experts: “…uncertainty had been key to 
understandings of security dilemmas (see Glaser 1997, Roe 1999, Cerny 2000, Booth and 
Wheeler 2007) and did not enter security studies with post-Cold War debates about risk and 
uncertainty… Bernard Brodie, another RAND scholar and a founding father of strategic 
studies, argued that nuclear weapons ‘have transformed all recognition with the past,’ the 
‘change being so unprecedented that historical comparisons fail us almost completely’” 
(Aradau and Van Munster 2011, 18.) Aradau and Van Munster, too, connect this new form of 
uncertainty, its break with a history of warfare, and imagination with Derrida’s essay that I 
discuss here. But their account merely points to an affinity where Derrida “sum(s) up” the 
problem as considered by the RAND intellectuals. By contrast, my discussion emphasizes 
how the necessity to fabulate becomes central to the project of meaning-making in the face of 
war without history.    
30 Klein (2008) elaborates this in relation to Derrida’s ruminations on philosophy after 9/11. 
Thanks to Brian Michael Murphy for alerting me to this essay. 
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may constitute a process of fearful domestication, the anticipatory assimilation of 
that unanticipatable entirely-other.31  
 
The notion of the non-event of nuclear war acknowledges that the indeterminacy of 
nuclear war does not merely present us with the uncertainty of its occurrence.32 Instead 
the speculation about its possibility breeds hypotheses and discourses, projected against 
the backdrop of events that have not yet occurred. In its lack of history, nuclear war and 
its potential for catastrophic annihilation become premises for anticipatory discourses—
the anticipation of the purely invented scenario—unlike other sorts of catastrophes 
rendered more or less banal33 and sufferable in their wake. Catastrophes which had been 
passed through, endured, could take on the sense as more than possible, whether 
momentary or enduring, because of their historical concreteness, their actual referential 
possibility. But when we consider the possibility of nuclear war and its coupled 
catastrophic winter: 
For the moment, today, one may say that a non-localizable nuclear war has not 
occurred; it has existence only through what is said of it, only where it is talked 
about. Some might call it a fable, then, a pure invention: in the sense in which it is 
said that a myth, and image, a fiction, a utopia, a rhetorical figure, a fantasy, a 
phantasm, are inventions. It may also be called a speculation, even a fabulous 
speculation.34 
 
                                                
31 Derrida, op. cit., 23. 
32 It is important to recognize the specificity of Derrida’s use of the word “war.” One might 
object if taking his usage casually, that the bombings of Hiroshima and Nagasaki would 
nullify this claim. His understanding is precise. It does not refer to the use of nuclear 
weapons, but to nuclear war as an escalating exchange of nuclear bombs – which, still to this 
day, remains a textual, i.e. imagined series of events. 
33 Masco makes a similar argument: “…what might be the social consequences of living in a 
world where the everyday has been so colonized by the possibility of annihilation that, for 
most, it has become seemingly banal?” (Masco 2006, 12). See also de Goede and Randalls 
(2009), who make the same reference while insisting also that the imaginative capacity 
carries material force and ought to be taken seriously by social scientists. 
34 op cit. 
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In this sense, the notion of nuclear war which held much of the world transfixed (or 
rehearsing for catastrophe),35 was part of a discursive regime of fantasy, not least because 
in threatening all of human life, in a strange futur antérieur, also threatens the future of 
memory itself, and with it all future history.36  
Rehearsing the stakes and the preparations for catastrophe were productive of 
more than terror. It was productive of the only identifiable knowledge on a mass scale for 
what could be possible, should the impossible – or never before occurred – come finally 
to be. The discourse of nuclear war became the only reality that could surround the 
possibility of complete human annihilation at the hands of a weapon that had only been 
witnessed in test phase, or worse, in the doubled events of Hiroshima and Nagasaki for 
which there was no symmetric answer. The bomb had been shown ending a conventional 
war; it had never been seen to inaugurate a global thermonuclear war.  
 The speculative prospect of nuclear war constituted a new bellicosity in which 
there was no adequate understanding of the reality of nuclear war. In place of a “real” 
war was the building of speculative discourses preparing the intellectual architecture of 
what such a war might look like. It was to fabulate the future as projection of the 
                                                
35 Davis 2007, esp. 1-103. 
36 Klein, in a beautiful essay on the subject: “…what in Derrida distinguishes major events, 
like Total Nuclear War, or 9/11, from other events, is that they disclose the unthinkable 
possibility that a future event will have no future to mourn it. In the case of the nuclear 
holocaust, Derrida asks the question, not about what would be most tragically lost in the total 
destruction of nuclear war – the loss of life and of habitat – but about what would be most 
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(Klein 2008, 176). I will revisit this in §V. below somewhat when returning to the ontological 
question that uncertainty and knowledge tends to obscure. 
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fabulously textual never-before.37 Such a discourse is not limited in the least to popular 
imagination, but extends itself to the preparation of contingency plans and war games, an 
entire edifice predicated on imagining a future that had no historical basis but only a 
referent in the ashes of Hiroshima and Nagasaki.38 The supposed reality of what such a 
war might look like cast against the way that it was imagined assumes the related features 
of assembling the components of living under the constant threat of nuclear annihilation:   
…the ‘reality’ of the nuclear age and the fable of nuclear war are perhaps distinct, 
but they are not two separate things. It is the war (in other words the fable) that 
triggers this fabulous war effort, this senseless capitalization of sophisticated 
weaponry, this speed race in search of speed, this crazy precipitation which, 
through techno-science, through all the techno-scientific inventiveness that it 
motivates, structures not only the army, diplomacy, politics, but the whole of the 
human socius today, everything that is named by the old words culture, 
civilization, Bildung, scholè, paideia. ‘Reality,’ let’s say the encompassing 
institution of the nuclear age, is constructed by the fable, on the basis of an event 
that has never happened (except in fantasy, and that is not nothing at all), an event 
of which one can only speak, an event whose advent remains an invention by men 
(in all the senses of the word ‘invention’) or which, rather, remains to be invented. 
An invention because it depends upon new technical mechanisms, to be sure, but 
an invention also because it does not exist and especially because, at whatever 
point it should come into existence, it would be a grand premiere appearance.39  
 
The vision of a novel war – the imagined nuclear fallout – feeds back upon itself, 
perpetuating the actual preparations for a conflict with no historical precedent.40 The 
                                                
37  Dupuy understands this as a projection that created an agreement of “existential 
deterrence” where mutual destruction could be avoided by fiat of making certain that it was 
humanity’s fate. See Dupuy 2005, 88; my emphasis. 
38 On preparations of contingency plans and war gaming, see Ghamari-Tabrizi 2000 and 
2005. For how such plans played a role in postwar industrial development in the U.S., see 
Galison 2001. On the bombing of Japan, see Schaffer 1988. 
39 Derrida 1984, 23-4. 
40 This is quite different from the way that Aradau and Van Munster characterize the logic of 
the conjectural style of reasoning as distinct from imagination, not least because of the way 
that imagination evokes a distinction from scientific knowledge which makes reference, at 
the very least to empirical data in the form of historical reference. See Aradau and Van 
Munster 2013, 31.  
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process affects not only the military-industrial complex that expands with the imagination 
of future nuclear war, but the fabulated fantasy of future nuclear fallout extends beyond 
and into the general mindset occupying everyday life, where not just the security 
profession but culture too engineers a sense of being “people of the bomb.”41  
Hence Derrida references above “Bildung, scholè, paideia” as features of culture 
and civilization. Each – the first German, and latter two Greek – signify the constitution 
of proper citizen-subjectivities, the civil projects of reproducing right-mindedness, or 
being rationally oriented to social life. Wherein the repetitive necessity to imagine a 
society’s (or a species’) complete annihilation becomes part of a general imaginary, as 
part of the training of everyday citizens.42 Picture the primary school students during the 
Cold War rehearsing taking shelter underneath their desks, huddled from the imaginary 
falling bomb.43  
 To Derrida’s mind the actuality of nuclear war had no historical precedent, the 
imagination of it became tantamount to the necessity for survival. The explicit 
interrelation between uncertainty and indetermination is at best blurred because while a 
nuclear future may indeed remain not yet determined, the epistemological element of 
uncertainty comes to at very least shape the determination of any possible nuclear future. 
While by definition a nuclear future remains in doubt, in other words, the present tends 
                                                
41 Gusterson 2004 
42 Kinsella argues, citing Derrida, for the ways that such teaching reaches beyond Derrida’s 
understanding of the fabulously textual into a regime of discipline: “As an overarching 
presence beyond the limits of its linguistic representation, that threat appears mysterious and 
self-generating. Such an ontological or theological absolute can neither be changed nor 
ignored; it appears as if our only available response is to submit to its potent disciplinary 
effects” (Kinsella 2005, 58). 
43 For a wonderful treatment, see Davis, Tracy. Stages of Emergency. Thanks to Lauren 
Wilcox for introducing me to this text. 
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toward it by virtue of the discursive fabulation of the worst-case scenario, the negative 
fantasy of a nuclear holocaust, never before seen, yet now always present in 
imagination.44 
 Marcuse recognized this decades earlier in the opening sentences of the first 
edition of his classic One-Dimensional Man (1964), which opens with the words, “Does 
not the threat of an atomic catastrophe which could wipe out the human race also serve to 
protect the very forces which perpetuate this danger?”45 One notices upon first glance 
two things: First, Marcuse has not in mind an actually existing nuclear catastrophe – 
Japan of 1945, regardless – but the threat, the image, the discourse of future wastelands. 
Second, there remains the feedback loop that appeared in Derrida twenty years later 
wherein the threat (as imagined scenario) comes to underwrite the logic of nuclear 
defense, and reproduce with an escalating remainder the manufacture of that threat itself. 
Seen as a form of irrationalism, a systematically oppressive regime in which the aims of 
civilization and technological development and discourse seem to prevail, Marcuse poses 
the social ambition for technological progress, signified in its purest form by the nuclear 
arms race, against the free ambitions that late modern progress avers to provide. 
Therefore the routinization of progress and defense are equated with protecting against 
the promises of technological progress and defense in a tautology of potentially species-
ending severity. And so the tautology preserves itself without significant duress from 
broad scale social resistance or disruption:  
The efforts to prevent such a catastrophe overshadow the search for its potential 
causes in contemporary industrial society. These causes remain unidentified, 
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unexposed, unattacked by the public because they recede before the all too 
obvious threat from without—to the West from the East, to the East from the 
West. Equally obvious is the need for being prepared, for living on the brink, for 
facing the challenge. We submit to the peaceful production of the means of 
destruction, to the perfection of waste, to being educated for a defense which 
deforms the defenders and that which they defend.46  
 
“Culture, civilization, Bildung, scholè, paideia,” recalling Derrida. A social production, a 
discursive regime, emerges in the mass preparation for the potential for its own 
annihilation in which entire populations are mobilized in service of themselves.47 Yet 
unlike Derrida, Marcuse poses this problem as part of the development of industrial 
society, where the creation of nuclear weaponry was not the apotheosis of such a 
civilization, but emblematic of its critical fault lines. Where Derrida ascribes what I have 
referred to as a feedback loop to a “fabulously textual” fantasy of a future without 
historical referent, Marcuse insists that the development of such a tautological insecurity 
is thanks to a long material history of technological development. Moreover his vision of 
that “development” coincides with other efforts of governance to reproduce relations of 
                                                
46 ibid. 
47 Gilles Deleuze and Félix Guattari ascribe this autocatalysis to the state as universal idea in 
and of itself: “Only thought is capable of inventing the fiction of a State that is universal by 
right, of elevating the State to the level of de jure universality.  It is as if the sovereign were 
left alone in the world, spanned the entire ecumenon, and now dealt only with actual or 
potential subjects. It is no longer a question of powerful, extrinsic organizations, or of strange 
bands: the State becomes the sole principle separating rebel subjects, who are consigned to 
the state of nature, from consenting subjects, who rally to its form of their own accord…The 
State gives thought a form of interiority, and thought gives that interiority a form of 
universality: “The goal of worldwide organization is the satisfaction of reasonable 
individuals within particular free States.” The exchange that takes place between the State 
and reason is a curious one; but that exchange is also an analytic proposition, because 
realized reason is identified with the de jure State, just as the State is the becoming of reason. 
In so-called modern philosophy, and in the so-called modern or rational State, everything 
revolves around the legislator and the subject. The State must realize the distinction between 
the legislator and the subject under formal conditions permitting thought, for its part, to 
conceptualize their identity. Always obey. The more you obey, the more you will be master, 
for you will only be only obeying pure reason, in other words yourself…” (1987, 375). 
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labor and productivity in the process of developing means of defense of the nation state 
as preserver of a “high standard of living.”48 
 It is possible that the two perspectives are commensurable, at least in the sense 
that they each require a notion of the future nuclear catastrophe in their explanations. For 
Derrida, whose essay is a narrower examination of the force of the imagined nuclear 
winter, the relation is obvious. But for Marcuse, the nuclear dream is part of the 
nationalist project that provides a rationale for so much that confronts the working classes 
in industrial civilization. The triumph of industrial rationality cosigns for a “universe of 
administration in which depressions are controlled and conflicts stabilized by the 
beneficial effects of growing productivity and threatening nuclear war” where production 
and employment motivated by the possibility that a foreign adversary may out-produce—
at the level of capitalist production, but also of the production of machines of 
annihilation—thus recycling the arms race into the organization of social and political life 
itself during the nuclear age.49 
 Consider the immediate aftermath of the bombings of Hiroshima and Nagasaki in 
1945. In order to learn from the first urban atomic bombings in human history, the U.S. 
reformed the Strategic Bombing Survey that had studied the Allied bombing efforts in the 
European theaters of World War II.50 The Survey found that in both Hiroshima and 
Nagasaki, the surviving buildings and facilities that somehow withstood the atomic blasts 
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were set outside somewhat of the centers of the cities.51 The same had been the case in 
Hamburg. According to the survey itself:  
The Survey’s investigators, as they proceeded about their study, found an insistent 
question framing itself in their minds: ‘What if the target had been an American 
city?’ True, the primary mission of the Survey was to ascertain the facts just 
summarized. But conclusions as to the meaning of those facts, for citizens of the 
United States, forced themselves almost inescapably on the men who examined 
thoughtfully the remains of Hiroshima and Nagasaki.52 
 
In response to the first ever nuclear attack on a human population, one of the inescapable, 
“insistent question[s]” of the official report on its effects was, in effect, “What if this had 
been us?” At this time there had only been rumors that the Soviet Union had the capacity 
to one day build such a weapon. Yet nevertheless the potential for a violently nuclear 
future reflected back upon the authors of the Survey in a way that crystalized in many 
ways the more theoretical discussion that I staged above. No one knew then (or now) 
what a nuclear war would truly look like. But the question had been made possible, and 
the consequence was deployed in terms of undeniable uncertainty. In other words, 
nuclear war lacked an ontological reality, but its epistemological component garnered full 
expression within the discursive reality of its possibility. 
 Four years later, the U.S.S.R. would detonate its own hydrogen bomb, the largest 
weapon of its kind discharged until then. The U.S. security establishment reacted with a 
sense of disillusionment and of panic. Over the course of the next two years, as a 
response to the nagging question of the Hiroshima and Nagasaki Survey team’s wonder 
concerning the tables turning on their homeland, the U.S. National Security Resources 
Board inaugurated a program aimed at industrialists, replete with an informative booklet 
                                                
51 Galison 2001, 13. 
52 U.S. Strategic Bombing Survey 1946, 44. Cited in Galison 2001, 13. Emphasis added. 
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entitled, Is Your Plant a Target?53 The aim of the program was to decentralize the 
nation’s infrastructure, encouraging private industry that might play an important 
manufacturing role (however tertiary) in a war effort to consider moving beyond 
deliberate points on a radial map. The national program offered incentives for factory and 
plant owners to relocate out of urban areas, thereby creating a diffuse area where the 
nation’s most vital economic resources of industrial production were not concentrated 
enough to perish all at once.54 
 According to Galison, not only were the nation’s industrial concentration to be 
physically moved, to be tactically decentralized, but so motivating was the force of 
atomic uncertainty that the decades-long interstate highway system was finally funded in 
order to support distributed shipping from the now further-fetched centers of industrial 
production.55 In a concrete sense, the resulting reorganization of U.S. industrial resources 
emerged from a more or less singular source. The Strategic Bombing Survey had both 
discovered the tendency for total atomic destruction in densely populated urban area, and 
it had mimetically reflected that empirical notion onto an imagined conflict that at the 
point of its conception was not even possible. The “insistent question” of what if the 
attacks had taken place on U.S. soil was entirely fabricated, was resultant entirely from 
the possibility of imagination, and from the uncertainty implicit in that insistent question, 
one of the largest industrial transformations of the 20th century history was undertaken. 
Or, as Galison puts it, “Three years before the Russians had the bomb, in fact before, on 
just about anyone’s account, the Cold War had begun, American analysts were already 
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advocating a massive dispersion of factories and populations against atomic aerial 
attack.”56  
Through Galison’s historical account, Derrida’s fabulously textual nuclear war 
synthesized with the Marcusian terror of technological determinism gains salience. On 
one hand, the purely discursive textuality of the Strategic Bombing Survey cast into 
fabulation the possibility of a global thermonuclear war, where the ashes of Hiroshima 
and Nagasaki were mimetically mapped onto the possible destruction of the American 
urban industrial landscape. But that the strategic move was to revolutionize the 
infrastructural grid for the survival of American manufacturing meant that the Marcusian 
insistence that the self-fulfilling drive of the industrial-warfighting civilization had 
become one with the necessity to imagine the war that would solidify it, crystallize it. It 
was as if the nightmare of nuclear evisceration motivated the practical policy initiatives, 
and each were supplied by the complete uncertainty concerning a crowning achievement 
of technological arms making. The imagination of a carbonized United States caused the 
dispersion of its principal economic machinery as an anticipatory program developing 
“defense in space” (in the sense of space between targets, not necessarily in the yet 
breached final frontier). Galison summarizes the stakes of this well:  
As the Cold War arms race accelerated, the search for ‘defense in space’ grew 
more desperate: jet bombers, atomic bombs, hydrogen bombs, intercontinental 
ballistic missiles. With each step, more frantic urging to spread the cities into their 
‘marketing areas.’ Highway systems, dispersed factories, gridded telephone links. 
If nuclear war could not be won, it could, perhaps, be survived—if the nodal point 
of the society could be broken up and scattered, redundantly, through space. 
Meshed satellite communities joined by an interstate and defense highway 
system; grids of phone nodes joined by an array of cable and radio links. 
Throughout the transformation of these architectures of infrastructure, 
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computation, highways, and factories lay the remarkable practice of training 
Americans to see themselves as targets.57 
 
How bizarre to reflect on such a systemic shift predicated on a nagging question that 
concerned the incapacity to know whether or not one’s own military capacities could one 
day be reflected back to cause such destruction at home. A full-scale reorganization of 
American industry, utilities, and domestic transportation; transformations in geographies 
of work; innovations in communications networks to facilitate the new landscape of the 
nuclear age: And none of it was inspired in an age where more than one nation-state 
possessed the bomb. Collier and Lakoff connect this history to the present by way of 
arguing that this scene of material distribution in response to imagined threats animated a 
framework with long lasting results, now understood through what they call “distributed 
preparedness.”58 
 All of this frames the catalyzing force of uncertainty in the age of the singular 
global catastrophic threat. The impossibility of knowing how or when, but the 
simultaneously present possibility of a nuclear holocaust, placed the concept of the future 
catastrophe in seemingly permanent relation with the possibility of nuclear war. Yet the 
diffusion of the threat, as we saw somewhat abstractly in Marcuse’s mind, and more 
concretely in Galison’s, showed the potential for a distributive form of imagining the end. 
Enzensberger encapsulates this ubiquitous terror in a way that anticipates the post-Cold 
War mentality concerning the future catastrophe. His vision shows how endemic 
catastrophic thought had become already by 1978.  
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In a piece that seems dramatically prophetic for the late 1970s in how it imagines 
catastrophe in ways as dispersed as the early Cold War industrial dream, Hans Magnus 
Enzensberger echoes somewhat the reach of the fantasy of catastrophe, into myriad 
corridors of social life. In a prose-poem, “Two Notes on the End of the World,” 
Enzensberger confronts the end of the world as “aphrodisiac, nightmare, a commodity 
like any other.” 59  “You can call it a metaphor for the collapse of capitalism,” 
Enzensberger continues,  
which as we all know has been imminent for more than a century. We come up 
against it in the most varied shapes and guises: as a warning finger and scientific 
forecast, collective fiction and sectarian rallying cry, as product of the leisure 
industry, as superstition, as vulgar mythology, as a riddle, a kick, a joke, a 
projection. It is ever present, but never ‘actual’: a second reality, an image that we 
construct for ourselves, an incessant production of our fantasy, the catastrophe in 
the mind.60 
 
In one way, Enzensberger draws forward the motif of the imagined catastrophe – the 
actual material affective force of thinking an undetermined future, the necessity to do so 
that stems from existential uncertainty, a remote alienation from the harsh realities of 
existing at a time when human life might end categorically at a moment’s notice. But in 
another way, Enzensberger extends beyond that discourse, though he inhabits it as well, 
in distributing the affect of catastrophe – the aphrodisiac, the vulgar mythology, the 
superstition – compounded with the lived reality of a pending end of the world event. The 
future catastrophe is no longer numbing, spellbinding; its affects are felt across a 
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spectrum.61 He refers to that abstract, yet looming disastrous event alternatively as 
apocalypse and catastrophe. One sacred, one secularized; both simultaneous.62  
 The future catastrophe is transformed, elaborated, and diversified in 
Enzensberger’s “Note…” No longer is the fabulously textual future one which stems 
from only the possibility of nuclear war, but the socially distributed effects of an age 
securitized by the omnipresent possibility of complete destruction has now reached into 
other dystopias: “the police state, paranoia, bureaucracy, terror, economic crisis, arms 
race, destruction of the environment.”63 The Marcusian harmony of industry and war-
making in Enzensberger’s observation occupy many operative corners of social life: but 
each is a feature of repression, of a multivalent secularized apocalyptic possibility in 
every corner of contemporary life. 
 Anticipating the critics and theorists of the post-9/11 age (this is the subject of the 
following section), Enzensberger departs from the looming possibility of the singular 
event – the nuclear holocaust – and reflects on the discursive noise of catastrophic 
anticipation springing from cinemas and other screens; evangelists, policy makers, and 
scientists: 
The apocalypse was also once a singular event, to be expected unannounced as a 
bolt from the blue: an unthinkable moment that only seer and prophets could 
anticipate – and, of course, no one wanted to listen to their warnings and 
predictions. Our end of the world, on the other hand, is sung from the rooftops 
even by the sparrows; the element of surprise is missing; it seems only to be a 
question of time. The doom we picture for ourselves is insidious and torturingly 
slow in its approach, the apocalypse in slow motion.64 
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Where the Marcusian-Derridian dream had been one of singular nuclear annihilation (or 
at least its message), and in that vision the end would come as surprise, more than 
gesturing to the importance of it being an uncertain fulfillment, Enzensberger’s version is 
lethargic and hanging everywhere discursively. It almost heralds a banality. Moments 
later in the passage, after an imagined Dr. Strangelove imposter explains that the ozone 
layer will be completely gone in twenty years’ time, and the audience simply yawns: 
“…it’s not going to come this afternoon. This afternoon, everything will go on just as 
before, perhaps a little bit worse than last week, but not so that anyone would notice.”65 
Enzensberger shows the affective baggage attached to the constant barrage of fabulously 
catastrophic textuality:  
It would really be simpler if we were rid of the problem once and for all; if the 
catastrophe really did come.  
 
More and more, Enzensberger strives to show how the dream, fantasy, or fabulation of 
“the coming catastrophe” had not in the least disappeared. Instead the fabulation of future 
catastrophe leaked from the institutions of security provision and into most sectors of 
social life. From massive programs to literally restructure places of work and production, 
to innovate networked means of communication, and in the transfixed reality of the ever-
present possibility of annihilation, two results can be seen. 
 First, so much was transformed that the effects of the looming catastrophe had 
suffused into areas of life that were not usually associated with national security.66 The 
place of work, for example, became de facto re-placed in an effort to conform to the 
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imagined future catastrophe. Second, and related, the catastrophe therefore could now 
involve the collapse of any part of civil life, given how much of civil life had been 
reorganized in response to the potential for massive, if not final, attack. Repeating 
Galison, “throughout the transformation of these architectures of infrastructure, 
computation, highways, and factories lay the remarkable practice of training Americans 
to see themselves as targets.”67 And now, it mattered less if the catastrophe was because 
of a nuclear war. At stake was the continuation or collapse of a certain version of a way 
of life, translated into a particularly Western “high standard of living.”68 
And so, now it seems that the “Apocalypse is part of our ideological baggage.”69 
But it is necessary that it cannot be felt the same for everyone. The once singular 
catastrophe, now distributed through industrial Western society, and rearticulated by the 
pursuit of a high standard of living transforms the sense of looming tragedy – 
disambiguates it, really – from the traditional sense of apocalypse or the nuclear sense of 
total annihilation: 
…doom is no longer a leveler, quite the opposite. It differs from country to 
country, from class to class, from place to place. While it is already overtaking 
some, others can watch it on television. Bunkers are built, ghettos walled in, 
fortresses erected, bodyguards hired, on a large scale as well as a small.70 
 
The possibility certainly remained in 1978, as it does now, that human civilization could 
succumb to more or less instant death. Nuclear war could quickly transform a planet 
overtaken by the human species into a planet of corpses. But the constant affect of 
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fabulously textual catastrophic warning has diffused, and strangely separated, again, 
those who might suffer from events not yet determined.  
 As we shall see, this mode of political thought has not dissipated, but renewed in 
the contemporary moment, renewed by even more diverse fabulations of uncertain 
futures, recombining security and catastrophe powerfully still.   
 
IV. Contemporary Critical Uncertainties 
 
 The theme of uncertainty, to the extent that it ever fell out of fashion, reclaimed a 
certain centrality in political discourse in the aftermath of the events of September 11, 
2001. But before that, a theoretic vocabulary was already importantly supplied in the 
writings of Ulrich Beck in his landmark The Risk Society (1992).71 That book, published 
in English in the immediate aftermath of the Cold War which animated the imaginations 
of thinkers adumbrated in the previous section, begins from the claim that the word post-, 
in the way that it modifies post-modernity, imagines that the postmodern age – a new 
moment at the end of history as Fukuyama would put it72 – negates what preceded it at 
the same time as being built upon its history, vocalizing an ambition “to move the future 
which is just beginning to take shape into view against the still predominant past.”73 
Perhaps a rhetorical flourish, but Beck had written a book that held uncertainty about the 
future at its center of defining modern social life as it lurched into a new modern moment 
of capitalist production, just as he simultaneously attempted to redefine the way that 
modern social life more broadly had subsumed both the future and the past into a 
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technocratic endeavor collapsing these temporalities. His view of postmodernity was not 
incommensurate with industrial modernity but reflexive, a society that learned to 
redistribute risks over itself and render, therefore, risk endemic to modern social life in its 
very structure.74  
 In a sense, risk is only a mode of calculation.75 It marks no ontological reality in 
itself, but attempts to cope with and add significance to the category of uncertainty.76 As 
Jacqueline Best puts it, “risk underlines both our sense of fragility and our constant 
attempt to reduce it by making those unknowns calculable.”77 Uncertainty, on the other 
hand, persists as an epistemological category not beholden only to categories of risk – 
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can be a risk; it all depends on how one analyzes the danger, considers the event” (Ewald 
1991, 191). Dean 1998 echoes this in the opening lines of an important essay: “There is no 
such thing as risk in reality. Risk is a way – or rather, a set of different ways – of ordering 
reality, of rendering it into a calculable form. It is a way of representing events so they might 
be made governable in particular ways, with particular techniques, and for particular goals” 
(Dean 1998, 25). In other words, the calculable feat of risk involves, a) rendering or 
representing reality, so that b) it can be governed calculatively. Such a formulation 
permanently attaches to risk a place in the analysis and critique of power, and removes from 
it a presumed innocence of objectivity. 
77 Best 2008, 355. 
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and therefore the calculable – but is intrinsic to “our ability to anticipate what the future 
holds…”78 In other words, while risk and uncertainty are so often paired – as when we 
are uncertain, we consider the risks – uncertainty corresponds more naturally as I argued 
above to indeterminacy. But to be most clear, risk refers to calculation as an attempt to 
make sense of the unknown: “It is thus not possible to speak of incalculable risks, or of 
risks that escape our calculation…” because risks are by their very definition a species of 
calculative knowledge.79 
 Best argues that the broad range of knowledge produced as an outcome of 
uncertain thinking often results in ambiguity. The flexibility of interpretation leads 
political scientists often to desire certainty. But Best issues a much-needed provocation. 
In nearly endless ways, the objects of governance, security, and political-economic 
activity more broadly all correspond through their interpretive mechanisms. As a result, 
each fundamental field of politics and international relations correspond to interpretation 
by way of the necessity to govern ambiguities of meaning.80 The point, to be clear, is that 
the relationship between uncertainty and indetermination – and precisely not uncertainty 
to risk (which is quantitatively calculative) – produce an array of interpretations that are 
central to the actually-existing process of governmental activity. Instead, the interpretive 
necessity to work within, define the limits of, and navigate ambiguity, emerge as a 
fundamental element of practices of political governance.81 
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 To readers and enthusiasts of the risk paradigm, the possibilities of risk analysis 
offer sophisticated means through which to measure the possibility of ameliorating, not 
simply uncertainty, but the worst ontological possibilities of what may come, what the 
future itself may be.82 But when indeterminacy is considered in the era immediately 
following September 11, 2001, the question, posed by both intellectuals and security 
professionals alike, moves somewhat from the calculative to the imaginative.83 In this 
section I emphasize the continuing dominance of uncertainty in contemporary political 
theoretic writing on future catastrophes. By doing so I reflect on the continuities and 
discontinuities of the previous section/historical moment with the present, post-9/11 
moment. It draws mainly on scholars of critical security studies and critical geopolitics 
who reflect on the changing landscape of U.S. security after the terrorist attacks of 9/11.84 
In the contemporary post-9/11 critical responses to securitization, precaution, and other 
measures developed in the U.S. security establishment to deal with “unknown 
unknowns.”85 But in the ensuing decade, these techniques of thinking the future came as 
well to envelop other phenomena including hurricanes, tsunamis, economic crises, and 
other massive disasters, and stretched the pursuit of certainty about future events to 
encompass larger and larger swaths of potentially lethal phenomena.  
As a consequence, this section supports the arguments of Chapter 3 below that 
outline the ways that the same problem of uncertainty-indeterminacy blurred the singular 
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nature of “the coming catastrophe” as total nuclear war into a catchall watchword 
signifying a universal insecurity from the unknown.86 The contemporary style of thinking 
about future catastrophe is more opaque, and yet still more given to the logic of 
uncertainty – how to cope with it, how to reduce it. The ultimate point that this section 
emphasizes should be stated explicitly: The nascent work of imagining the future 
inaugurated by Cold War thinkers concerned about human survival continues.87 It has 
now diversified into multiple ranges of possible futures that threaten human life – but not 
before total nuclear war was practically and, as a result, critically, transformed into 
attempts to imagine terrorist attacks in the post-9/11 imaginary. The effects of this 
transformation are far-reaching and now inform a litany of threats including and beyond 
the potential for terrorist attack, but also touching upon a range of so-called natural 
disasters, technological accidents, civil unrest, economic collapse, and as far as the mind 
can reach. In other words, the centrality of imagination to security efforts resulted 
likewise in a proliferation of ideas anticipating catastrophe as a problem encompassing all 
of the uncertainties about all the different ways to die.88   
The presumed association in the literature about catastrophe and security 
emphasizes the relationship between knowledge (un/certainty) and action (security 
behavior) that tends to underestimate the importance of indetermination in what 
constitutes a catastrophe. Jacqueline Best, as I mentioned, partly frames this in terms of 
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ambiguity.89 Aradau and Van Munster tend toward a discussion of imagination made 
more technical in the form of “conjectural reasoning,” citing Carlo Ginzburg.90 Each 
corresponds to uncertainty, but the “what” of uncertainty isn’t knowledge in my view – it 
is the undetermined future.91 In place of a scholarly attention to the ontological infirmities 
of indetermination stands a widespread fascination with the practical limits of calculative 
analysis deriving from the prominence of risk. In other words, uncertainty dominates and 
further complicates matters, as much of the theoretical literature – critical as it is – often 
circulates around the notion of uncertainty (such is the case that “thinking the 
unthinkable” is not merely a cliché of this school of thought).92 In prominent ways, Cold 
War thought anticipated the current moment by introducing the logic of invention – the 
strategy of imagination – as a means to cope with tensions between the uncertain 
(epistemological) and the undetermined (ontological).93 But it tended to do so in two 
important ways. First, Cold War thought preoccupied itself with a singular phenomenon – 
total nuclear war – and consequently was able to theorize more precisely the calculable 
elements of its probability and potential outcomes.94 Second, and as a result, Cold War 
thought added credence to the calculable qua risk that provided emphasis to “thinking the 
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unthinkable,” but at the same time in only the calculable form. So the foundation was laid 
for imaginative thought to pervade security theory – both practical and critical, but 
mostly under the guise of risk analysis.95 Such a powerful confidence in risk analysis led 
to what Didier Bigo called the “authority of statistics” as a means to create hierarchies of 
risks which prioritize threats – all of which depend to some degree on the calculable as 
expressive of, not what is unknown, but what can be known even to an infinitesimal 
degree.96 As the Cold War came to an end and the range of threats reduplicated from the 
singular – total nuclear war – to a growing landscape of whatever could be thought, all 
and sundry, such that the calculative emphasis deteriorated in both priorities of practical 
and critical thinking about human security.97  
There exists a strand of thinking that when read together emphasizes 
“imagination” as a critical response to the issues inherent in the unknown features of 
future events: They required imagination in order to have reality in the present. But the 
problem of future catastrophe also has an ontological edge wherein it has not yet been 
determined, and as such might embody a long range of future realities whether imagined 
or not. Aradau and Van Munster recognize this tendency to prioritize imagination. But 
they do so by way of “conjecture” (to which I will return in due time).  
Aradau and Van Munster make a point of this feature of novelty in the threat that 
nuclear war posed to security, and its attendant experts: “…uncertainty had been key to 
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understandings of security dilemmas and did not enter security studies with post-Cold 
War debates about risk and uncertainty… Bernard Brodie, another RAND scholar and a 
founding father of strategic studies, argued that nuclear weapons ‘have transformed all 
recognition with the past,’ the ‘change being so unprecedented that historical 
comparisons fail us almost completely.’”98 Aradau and Van Munster, too, connect this 
new form of uncertainty, its break with a history of warfare, and imagination with 
Derrida’s essay that I discuss here. But their account merely points to an affinity where 
Derrida “sum(s) up” the problem as considered by the RAND intellectuals.99  
In their landmark study, Politics of Catastrophe, Aradau and Van Munster 
attempt to develop a theory of catastrophe for security studies that attends to the range of 
ways that threats – necessarily not in the present, which is to say events that would have 
already occurred, but threats understood “on the basis of what has not and may never 
happen: the future”100 – came to preoccupy contemporary expertise with respect to 
security. Many experts focusing on security and its logics trace the emergence of 
catastrophe to either the rise of nuclear warfare or the post-9/11 age of surprise terrorist 
attack.101 “Most of these arguments,” Aradau and Van Munster recognize, “tend to 
emphasize the particularity of catastrophes as types of events that remain shrouded in 
uncertainty, confound expectation and challenge the predictive, preventive and protective 
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knowledge of security experts.”102 Part of the focus on uncertainty reflects a shift from a 
retrospective to a prospective temporal emphasis on what matters most about the ideas 
surrounding catastrophes themselves.103 (Such a shift expresses a pointed change in focus 
on catastrophe to the future-oriented, anticipatory importance of conceiving catastrophes 
as a necessary part of human security.) But the centrality of catastrophe in terms of 
future-oriented events can be seen in several ways, the articulating logic of uncertainty 
being only one.  
Yet when articulating the different trajectories of Cold War and post-9/11 modes 
of reasoning about catastrophe, the distinction that they draw – and how they delineate it 
singularly along the lines of uncertainty – deserves more attention. Specifically, as 
Aradau and Van Munster attempt to write a history of catastrophic security theory, they 
notice a perceived “radical break” in how security scholars view the Cold War differently 
than the post-9/11 present. Citing Christopher Coker, Aradau and Van Munster isolate a 
false dichotomy in this literature in which the threat of nuclear war was constructed as 
singular and certain, as opposed to in the post-9/11 environment when threats are 
perceived as more diffuse and varied.104 They aptly cite Michael J. Williams remarking 
that “[t]oday’s world is far from predictable… Risk and uncertainty are the hallmarks of 
world politics at the dawn of the twenty-first century.”105 As Aradau and Van Munster 
point out, the presence of certainty during the Cold War projected against the uncertainty 
of the present imposes a false dichotomy.  
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Aradau and Van Munster assert correctly that the dichotomy of Cold War 
certainty versus post-9/11 uncertainty is a false one. Thinkers ranging from security 
experts to philosophers knew that the notion of nuclear annihilation was far from certain. 
Writers as varied as Herman Kahn and Jacques Derrida recognized, for example, that the 
certainty of nuclear annihilation was far from a foregone conclusion.106 But simply 
insisting that there was a lack of certainty – or, more precisely, that acknowledged 
uncertainty drove much of the intellectual production by security experts (and even their 
critics) – does not alleviate the tension produced by the aporia of positing the differences 
between the Cold War atmosphere of security thinking and the security thinking of the 
present. For Aradau and Van Munster, there is a common thread connecting the 
relationship to future catastrophe exhibited in the Cold War and in the post-9/11 present: 
the future cannot be known. Because future uncertainty drives so much security thinking, 
they argue, there are common threads of today’s security rationales that can be traced in a 
genealogy to their Cold War ancestors.  
I do not dispute that uncertainty in fact drove a considerable amount of 
intellectual thinking about security during the Cold War, and it certainly remains a 
driving force today. But there is a worthwhile distinction to be drawn between the two 
eras that shines new light on the prominence of catastrophe in the present. Their book, 
bearing the telling subtitle, Genealogies of the Unknown, draws our attention to a history 
of the present driven by the human desire to secure in the face of uncertainty. The focus 
on uncertainty in writing – theoretical or otherwise – about catastrophe places the 
emphasis on human knowledge: a focus on uncertainty elevates practices of experts to 
                                                
106 Aradau and Van Munster 2011, 18; Kahn 1962a; Derrida 1984. 
 71 
control certain narratives of temporality, etc. with respect to what can be done in response 
to what, necessarily, becomes an object of imagination.  
Uncertainty can tell us a lot about, as Aradau and Van Munster put it, “[w]hat 
kind of actions in the present are made possible on the basis of worst case scenarios of 
nuclear war and natural hazards.”107 And, following them further, avoiding “postulating 
that the Cold War period was characterized by a future that was known and predictable, 
the interesting question to ask from a governmental perspective is what forms of 
discourses, methods and forms of knowledge are legitimized and deployed for governing 
an unknown future?”108 But couched in this couplet, “unknown future” is supposed to be 
a rebuke by Aradau and Van Munster of those security scholars who believe that the 
notion of security in the Cold War existed “within the management of predictable and 
well-known threats, whereas after the Cold War, with the demise of the Soviet Union, 
states were faced with a plethora of threats that could not be known, predicted and 
prevented.”109 Thus Aradau and Van Munster prioritize the concept of uncertainty as a 
means to disrupt the conventional reading of an era of security in which the worst case 
scenario – the prospective catastrophe – was riddled with elements of uncertainty, and as 
a consequence, security experts had to contend with such uncertainty as a focal point of 
their work.  
These reflections about the Cold War cover a lot of ground in troubling the waters 
about nuclear security. But their critique – and the way that it tends toward collapsing the 
false radical break between scholarship on Cold War nuclear security and present day 
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counter-terrorism – tends toward promoting uncertainty as the governing motivation 
behind security as an almost transhistorical impetus of the industrial age. In other words, 
there is a way that uniting the two eras in the way their shared emphases of uncertainty 
exalts an epistemological aporia that is central to trying to negotiate a present by way of 
the future. But it also obscures the ontological reality that the future – the very matter to 
which we stand uncertain – is yet undetermined. The future is not only an 
epistemological problem, in other words, but is also an ontological one.110  
Focusing on security expertise, and mostly committing to the prevalence of work 
aiming to protect against future terrorist attacks, Aradau and Van Munster deploy the 
concept of uncertainty to illustrate how the driving force of uncertainty in the Cold War 
provided tools for understanding the contemporary security landscape in which terrorism 
and unconventional war preoccupies current security professionals.111 Yet there was a 
prevailing agreement – or, certainty – in the Cold War security scene: The prospect of 
catastrophic death loomed most obviously because of the singular potential of nuclear 
war between the United States and the USSR.112 While there was clearly uncertainty 
about whether or not such a war would take place, or whether or not there were actions 
that could be taken to mitigate its potential for occurring, the widespread focus from 
security experts to duck and cover exercises in schools revolved around the singular 
phenomenon of the nuclear attack.113 In other words, the critique leveled by Aradau and 
Van Munster might be correct in terms of asserting that there was plenty of uncertainty 
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during the Cold War, but they make less of an issue about the what of what is presumed 
to be known. The prospect of nuclear war was singular; the present fear of future 
catastrophe is best characterized as a diffusely powerful abstraction, encompassing nearly 
all disastrously imaginable futures. The notion of uncertainty therefore only gets us so 
far. We also need a conceptualization of indetermination that helps to link knowledge 
(uncertainty) with the ontological element of what exactly is anticipated, prospected, and 
conjectured.  
In the post-9/11 era, the landscape of threats broadened considerably. Aradau and 
Van Munster, along with many others, recognize the ways that the singular-becoming-
diffuse created new problems that extended well beyond the calculative potentials of 
thinking the singular event.114 As a result, new critiques in the world of policy suddenly 
began to be waged on the successes and failures of imagination itself. In part because the 
threats had diversified in kind and scope, becoming less singular in nature than threats of 
a singular enemy in a singular form, ideas about security had to be recreated at the level 
of scenario-based imagination and speculative practice.115 
The idea of the lurking threat intrinsic to terrorism resulted in key changes that 
demanded imaginative practices for the purposes of security policy. The possibility of a 
disastrous attack coming from anywhere centralized the necessity to speculate, and to 
harness even the “craziest imagined views.”116 As Aradau and Van Munster rightly 
recognize, pressures to create practices that could more fully imagine the future emerged 
not just from overzealous practitioners, but even critiques from policy makers. The 9/11 
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Commission Report “criticizes bureaucracies for lack of imagination, for failing to notice 
signs that were indicators of the attacks.”117 The result was new architectures of security 
policy that incorporated importantly both series of scenario-based training exercises and 
also more seemingly outlandish experiments of writing worst-case scenario outlines with 
the help of spy novelists.118 
The profound effect that scenario-planning had on security practices (and 
practitioners) should not go understated. Andrew Lakoff and Stephen Collier have made 
more scholarly impact than almost anyone else in showing the historical and 
anthropological links between the Cold War and post-9/11 moments through, especially, 
the ways that scenario-based exercises grew to prominence in realizing the theoretical – 
or perhaps “imaginative” also fits here – in the sense that various inclusions of enacted, 
embodied exercises helped to alert security practitioners and managers to the affective 
importance of potential future disasters.119 Collier traces a genealogy of the ways that, 
literally, “acting out” scenarios of future disaster reached across the Cold War into the 
post-9/11 moment as a means for learning by way of enactment because a paradigmatic 
means of knowledge production for security professionals.120 Lakoff writes about the 
emergent affective force of scenario-based exercises in the context of emergent biothreats 
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in order to show the force that such exercises had upon shifting views of preparedness.121 
For each the process through which security professionals learned to imagine threats 
through experiences of rehearsing for future disaster scenarios proves materially 
important; not least because, as Lakoff puts it, they “generat[ed] an affect of urgency 
among officials in the absence of the event itself; and second, to generate knowledge 
about vulnerabilities in response capability that could then guide anticipatory 
intervention.”122 
The importance of the scenario-based exercise is twofold. It shows that there were 
efforts even before the post-9/11 era that attempted to breathe breath into the non-
calculable elements of future-oriented security. But it also, second, in the work of Lakoff 
and Collier shows the ways that, in the wake of 9/11, that new operational importance 
was placed on such measures because no longer was it seen solely advantageous, or even 
prudent, to operate from a standpoint of disaster prevention – it was seen as vital to enact 
a regime of preparedness.123 Ben Anderson has extended this scenario-based analysis to 
show how they have been enfolded into measures promoting counterterrorism 
activities.124 Building on what I showed with Collier and Lakoff, Anderson is able to 
show how the exercises enabled a future-oriented means for “naming” events that are 
only hypothetically possible, and as such producing a presumed specificity to generic 
events that were previously more abstract. As a result the future – as a constructed 
problem for security – becomes practical in the sense that it is no longer abstract but 
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exists in the specificity of practical knowledge, even if that knowledge itself remains 
somewhat hypothetical: “The impression of a future event is made present through a set 
of techniques that aim, even if they do not necessarily succeed, to foster a ‘realistic 
immersion.’ What the play of the game aims to create is the event as an intensified felt 
presence.”125  
Seen together, the range of scenario-based exercises unifies a swath of potential 
events into the notion of “the coming catastrophe,” and a catastrophe that is enormous in 
scale because at very least of its presumed implications in the absence of its own reality. 
In the face of “total threats,” such as terrorism or climate change, logics of preemption, 
precaution, and preparedness gradually took the place of prevention.126 Compounding the 
undetermined future – what Michael Dillon refers to as the result of “radical 
contingency” – with the scope of the threats attached to large-scale disastrous events 
means that new modes of security practices were passionately embraced to fill a void, 
that it should not go without saying, was being reproduced by these very methods.127 One 
can see immediately renewed the strange separation between uncertainty and 
indetermination. So profound are the stakes inherent in the indeterminate future of total 
threats emerging from radical contingency that an entire system of security practices 
emerges around them. The question of uncertainty exists nervously within the contingent 
present, redoubling the fear of the undetermined future. But most importantly for critics 
of contemporary security, that very insecurity intimately interwoven with indeterminate 
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temporalities, awakens the question of uncertainty. How is it that we can produce 
knowledge of what we cannot know? How else might we secure ourselves than to wager 
against our uncertainty?  
Aradau and Van Munster argue forcefully for a concept to cope with such radical 
contingency called “conjectural reasoning,” which… 
does not function through analogy with financial practices as implied by 
speculation, in denial of evidence as premediation would hold, or at a distance 
from scientific knowledge, as uses of imagination and fantasy in this context 
intimate… A conjectural style of reasoning…constructs an explanation out of 
apparently insignificant details. It links the smallest and most inconsequential 
details to a larger context which cannot be directly observed or experienced.128  
 
Embedded in this concept is an analysis of security expertise, but also a critical 
perspective on other kinds of knowledge production, with reference to operational modes 
of imagining future terrorist attacks. “The next terrorist attack,” comes to characterize 
their interest in “conjecture” with reference to terrorism-security, not catastrophe 
necessarily, at least as broadly conceived as I treat it here in this dissertation. Drawing 
from Ginzburg, who seizes on the methods of Giovanni Morelli, Sigmund Freud and 
others who extrapolate presumably scientific conjecture from small, seemingly errant 
details and mistakes, Aradau and Van Munster find promising homologies between this 
register of deciphering larger potential truths that are reflected in the operations of 
terrorism experts.  
As they put it, “the conjectural style as outlined by Ginzburg is underpinned by a 
model of reality as double: some trivial details from reality, invisible to all but to the eyes 
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of specialists, offer access to a hidden reality underneath.”129 This description outlines the 
process by which they understand the pursuit of conjectural reason. In the sentences that 
follow they however attempt to supplant a “dialectical” approach which would, to their 
minds, introduce a “promise of resolution” among contradictory styles. Their hope with 
combining the notions of conjectural reasoning with Foucault’s logic of strategy is to 
render a way of coping with uncertainty that allows for deductive-conjectural reasoning 
to operate while at the same time rendering the information, and the range of different 
practices, distinct from one another. This is laudable. Because the work of 
counterterrorism relies on such knowledge production that deals with copious amounts of 
information in which its principal objects (terrorists) operate in secret, conjecture must 
operate to amass information rendering a composed idea from, at very least, scattered 
data.130 Resulting from this mass of data are a range of different approaches to working to 
develop knowledge of future attacks – they call them the “P-modes of knowledge”: 
pursuit, prevention, preparation, and protection – all of which do not neatly align with 
one another in their aims.131 Nevertheless, as a whole they perform conjectural modes of 
reasoning, slightly modified:   
…counter-terrorism knowledge attempts to find clues on the basis of styles of 
reasoning that look at regularities, patterns and correlations. The unknowns of 
secrecy, ignorance, risk, uncertainty, surprise and novelty are not tamed through 
patient engagement with the archive in each particular case; they are supposedly 
“discovered” in a self-revelation of knowledge. On the one hand, preventative, 
precautionary and preparedness knowledges aspire to see through the irregularity 
in data and locate the detail that may yield the much-needed access to the 
invisible world. On the other, data itself is purged of inference and conjecture and 
not linked to any archive. Thus, the reasoning based on the discovery of new 
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patterns and clues among data uses conjectures in a quite different sense – they 
are seen as emerging not out of the individual case but out of the multiplicity of 
data…. As long as preventive, precautionary and preparedness knowledges 
establish truths, measure evidence and compute the future on the basis of styles of 
reasoning adapted to frequencies and regularities, they fail in the encounter with 
the irregular, the unexpected, radically uncertain and singular. 132 
 
Conjectural reasoning in the scene of counterterrorism involves a range of different 
approaches, hence their insistence on also including in their thought process the 
Foucauldian logic of strategy. But different from Ginzburg’s idea of conjectural 
reasoning, Aradau and Van Munster here show that rather than understanding data as a 
group of data from which to understand an individual case – as in a painting, or a 
psychoanalytic analysand – instead conjectural reasoning manifests in the range of 
different practices, working on another level of magnitude in terms of data, means that in 
the scene of security expertise, conjectural reasoning is productive of a body of 
knowledge that stands in for the reality of their object.133 As such security expertise 
hinges on, or even reflects its own practices back upon itself in hopes to effectively 
thwart the next terrorist attack. Hence why they close this long passage with an admission 
that conjectural reasoning so often results in failure. But they are also careful to note that 
such failure is also reproductive of the regime of knowledge itself. Uncertainty begets 
uncertainty; and the world of counterterrorism continues growing in response. 
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As a result the thesis of conjectural knowledge produces a rich conceptual context 
within which to understand an entire dispositif of security practices and beliefs.134 
Despite wanting to associate themselves more closely with a Foucauldian logic of 
strategy that allows incommensurate kinds of information to remain distinct, they remain 
focused on the primacy of expert knowledge, and less with the further-reaching 
implications that I deal with (in Chapter 4) below, thereby somewhat ironically limiting 
the range of knowledges that might be held apart by such a provocative conceptual 
tool.135 While Aradau and Van Munster are concerned with the problem of uncertainty 
relating to indeterminate futures, in fact because their object remains traditional western 
security studies and its practical object – security experts and actors – Aradau and Van 
Munster cannot move beyond the problem of expert knowledge. In other words, their 
focus on security professionals illuminates the aporia of uncertainty in the sense that their 
work exposes the centrality of non-knowledge in the activity of security provision.136 Yet 
this approach also leaves the problem of future catastrophes unnecessarily weighted 
toward terrorist attack, but more importantly it makes the concern for future catastrophe 
only important if we are trying to understand the motivations of security professionals.137  
                                                
134 Aradau and Van Munster 2011, 124. I elaborate on the dispositif at length in Chapter 4, 
while also making reference to a long list of others who make use of this concept as well in 
the context of thinking about security and survival. 
135 This aporia is most clearly gestured towards in the introduction of the book, when they 
write: “Confronted with the catastrophic event, expert knowledge needs to tackle its very 
limit: the unkown.” Aradau and Van Munster 2011, 6. 
136 Aradau and Van Munster 2011, 6. 
137 I.W. Holm has two interesting essays that speak to the effort to reach beyond the security 
establishment and consider such discourses in how they affect cultural production. See Holm 
2012a and 2012b. 
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Hence, the problem of, as they call it, a “conjectural style of reasoning” 
(producing a blend of Hacking with Ginzburg), might make sense as a mode of trying to 
understand the quasi-scientific motive of planning for futures still unknown. But it tells 
us less about trying to understand the future as a broad harbinger of death and destruction 
as is gestured toward when “catastrophe,” and not “terrorist attack,” is spoken. Aradau 
and Van Munster choose, rightly I think, the conjectural style of reasoning when 
addressing the behaviors and motives of people whose mission is to make calculations 
about future attacks, whose decision making is beholden to gathering massive amounts of 
data for the purposes of a mode of quantitative analysis often deployed in (or outside of 
government, as is the case with think tanks). But they are dismissive of other concepts 
that might help a reader to build out more broadly to the generalized concern for future 
catastrophes that takes place animatedly amongst both security professionals and the 
public alike – especially the notions of fictionalizing and imagination, most broadly 
conceived. What they occlude in their focus on conjecture – their dismissal of 
imagination – they note in precisely the moment that they call it inadequate to 
understanding imagination itself: that imagination connotes “a distance from scientific 
knowledge” that they themselves have already noted escaped the praxis of security 
professionals themselves in advance of 9/11.  
To be clear in closing this section, so much of the ink spilled to understand 
transformations in security culture post-9/11 focus only on the impetus brought forward 
by the notion of uncertainty. What Aradau and Van Munster, who have written the first 
dedicated book-length study on the political problem of catastrophe, manifest is that what 
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beginning from the problem of uncertainty (as a natural progression from risk analysis 
and management) accomplishes is necessarily a focus on security practitioners who 
configure their work in regard to what they do not know. Their book succeeds, in fact is 
yet unmet in its accomplishment, in this regard; but it is hardly a work adequate to its 
title, Politics of Catastrophe.  
Politics of catastrophe necessarily spring also from indeterminacy, leaving many 
to question the adequacy of knowledge, but also leaving room for substantial engagement 
with the ontological question of change and contingency outside of the concerns of 
security professionals. Hence, their subtitle, Genealogies of the Unknown makes more 
sense, because it is a book that refines and refreshes our understanding of how those 
whose professional responsibility it is to cope with indeterminacy question themselves 
and their own inadequacies, which can only reflect back upon the aporias of their expert 
inadequacies rendered crystalline by their lack of complete knowledge.  
But this should not define the limits of a politics of catastrophe, which ought to 
take as its point of beginning the ontological reality that the future is undetermined, first, 
and erect a theory of politics that is broad enough to at very least speak to the broadest 
range of ways that such a reality recomposes basic questions of politics itself. In other 
words, the most important book on the subject of catastrophes in recent memory 
organizes itself around the concept of “the unknown” as a configuration of uncertainty. 
The book itself advances the nascent field that studies the politics of catastrophes 
exponentially, but the epistemological constraints of “the unknown” enforces a particular 
discourse that narrows the range of discussion. Part of what this chapter tries to achieve is 
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to broaden the landscape of questions and politics surrounding catastrophe by insisting 
that the ontological elements involved, not only in catastrophes themselves, but also in 
the politics of preparedness, security, and scholarship surrounding “the coming 
catastrophe” are richer and more complex when viewed ontologically as well. 
 
 
V. Uncertainty and Indeterminacy Blurred: The Future of “The Coming 
Catastrophe”  
 
I have shown above the conceptual currency carried by the notion of uncertainty. 
Here in this section I aim to revisit the importance of the ontological (indeterminacy) 
elements in order to reinvest it in, and add conceptual force to, the prevalent idea of “the 
coming catastrophe.” In an effort to elaborate the salience of the coming catastrophe as a 
political concept, I return to Jean-Pierre Dupuy in an attempt to conceptualize what 
shifted and what remained constant about considering future catastrophes.138 In part I 
have already begun to argue that there is a kind of sleight of hand that occurs between 
“uncertainty” and “indetermination” where imagining (epistemological) future 
catastrophes seems to take priority over the material conditions of ontological 
indetermination. But it is worth noting and I will elaborate further that this is a tricky 
question: uncertainty always refers to the ontological question of indetermination, and the 
indeterminate nature of causality (ontological) provokes questions of uncertainty (again, 
epistemological). So how do they interrelate?  
The point is to show what has been obscured by the disproportionate attention to 
uncertainty: That the ontological capacities of future events, or the force of 
                                                
138 Dupuy 2005, 2007 and 2009. 
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indetermination has a force of gravity in shifting the relationship between the ontological 
and epistemological when thought attempts to conjure future events yet to unfold. With 
respect to human survival the stakes of this discussion reflect the need for a concept, as I 
have said, of “the coming catastrophe” as a complex political phenomenon that reflects 
not only the practical problems of governance, but also their relationship to the more 
philosophical concepts of knowledge/certainty and material causality/determinacy. As 
subsequent chapters will show, these concerns ought not be solely confined to the world 
of security professionals and their practices; yet even in their expansiveness they remain 
entirely political. 
 In an important paper, Ben Anderson argues that the future, while remaining 
undetermined, is not as “open” as some might think.139 In fact, especially when it comes 
to security operations, the fact that the future lacks predetermination is a causal 
mechanism both of the future itself, but also of the present. He writes: 
…processes of securing generate excess, that is they open up futures. Invoking a 
future that cannot be predetermined, that escapes being fully known, is integral to 
the invention, deployment and legitimation of forms of security. This argument 
follows from another – that “the future” is an effect of specific relations and acts. 
How the future relates to the past and present will vary and does not pre-exist 
specific processes of securing and forms of security. With the result that the key 
tasks for work on security, the event and future is… to describe how “the future is 
disclosed and made present.”140 
 
According to Anderson, imagining the future – in all of its indeterminacy – legitimates 
security practices themselves. This is to say that, in a way, indetermination underwrites 
security practices in a tautological loop. As security practices continue to function, they 
invoke the indeterminacy of future events, and at the same time claim security practices 
                                                
139 Anderson 2010a, 228. 
140 ibid. 
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as the solely legitimate arbiter of protection against such events. Hence, the tautology 
goes, “‘the future’ is an effect of specific relations and acts,” by which he means the 
future is constituted by actions in the present. Yet, this is only to bear witness to one sort 
of effect – the effect that the notion of the future has on security professionals and 
practices themselves. The logical conclusion of Anderson’s formulation is that “the future 
is disclosed and made present,” but what he does not say is that it is made present as an 
effect on security professionals and practices themselves. This theme recurs in this 
literature and the tautology tightens the more the emphasis is placed on security practices 
and the practitioners themselves.141 
 In order to shift the emphasis both onto the future as a concept pregnant with 
meaning in its own right, as well as to a more general view, it is important to ask of 
thinkers like Anderson a particular question. When “the future is disclosed and made 
present,” to whom is it disclosed and made present? There is an important way that 
activities in the present unfurl and alter the landscape of what we often refer to as “future 
events.” How is it that expansive institutional activities can be accounted for within the 
same – or at least similar logics – of causality? I will not offer yet an attempt to answer 
this series of questions. But for now I want to keep the focus on the relationship between 
knowledge and material causality in order to reissue the discussion of the coming 
catastrophe. 
                                                
141 Anderson develops his argument with reference to performative strategic games utilized 
by the RAND Corporation in order to game out a “catastrophic nuclear explosion” as carried 
out by an hypothetical terrorist organization (Anderson 2010a, esp. 231-34). See also Aradau 
and Van Munster 2011; Lakoff 2007 and 2008; Collier and Lakoff 2008; de Goede 2008; 
Salter 2008 
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 The epistemological question of uncertainty broadens the complexity of the issue 
of definition. Even more so because so many contemporary accounts of catastrophe and 
security develop their arguments on the premises of the “unexpected” or, more often, 
from the perspective of a critical disposition to “uncertainty.” So much of the response to 
an “uncertain” future results in projects to “think the unthinkable” that there is reason to 
mull the relationship between the improbable and the indeterminate.142 Strange, it should 
seem to Anderson, that such responses reflect less on the material impacts of the results 
of the question. Moreover, often there is an abundance of information that points toward 
some sort of event, yet people – security professionals and the general public alike – find 
themselves unable to believe it, or feel the urgency of what should seem imminent.143 
Here is Jean-Pierre Dupuy, the preeminent philosopher on the subject in France, 
describing a haunting feature of catastrophes that have not yet occurred, the very object 
of so much critical and practical obsession: 
The terrible thing about a catastrophe is that not only does one not believe it will 
occur even though one has every reason to know it will occur, but once it has 
occurred it seems to be part of the normal order of things. Its very reality renders 
it banal. It had not been deemed possible before it materialized, and here it is, 
                                                
142 Kahn 1962a and 1985 are the practical reference points on this concept. Stevenson 2008 
interprets the effect of Kahn’s work. See also Ghamari-Tabrizi 2000 and 2005. 
143 Dupuy argues, even though we almost always cannot anticipate the undetermined future, 
that it is imperative to act as if we could project ourselves into it in order to add salience to 
what may come. Describing this as a “new metaphysics” of “projected time” [temps du 
projet] Dupuy suggests that a main part of the problem with the damage that humans do to 
their habitat is precisely because humans do not believe in the future that may come (Dupuy 
2005, 11.). This is discussed exhaustively in Chapter 5, but for now, the immediate question 
remains relevant: Even when there is adequate knowledge to determine that something 
terrible is somewhat probable, people often don’t believe it, in part because they think the 
uncertain, while possible, is both largely avoidable and simultaneously therefore impossible. 
In short, the uncertainty that leads to disbelief can only be remedied if we can first “render 
credible” its ontological reality as the future (17). In what follows, I inch toward explaining 
how that can possibly make sense in the context of thinking future disasters.  
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integrated without further ado into the ‘ontological furniture’ of the world, to 
speak in the jargon of philosophers.144  
 
The second half of this passage points toward a strange temporal causality inherent in 
imagined catastrophes. On the one hand, a future catastrophe, in order to be truly 
catastrophic, must be unthinkable prior to the event. It must have elements which were 
formally inconceivable and therefore truly beyond total understanding prior to its 
emergence.145  
The point, to caution against objections that of course we can think hurricanes, 
and of course there is a general concern for terrorist attacks, is to say that the phenomena 
that are imagined are indeed thinkable, but only categorically. Their specific 
determination remains shrouded by their indeterminacy. In this sense, a catastrophe isn’t 
about uncertainty at all; it is, taken all together, unthinkable. This partial unthinkable 
feature is from where its spellbinding awe in uncertainty originates. On the other hand, 
the surprise of a catastrophic event results from a strange transformation where 
something unthinkable, because it was thought impossible, transforms suddenly into a 
possibility after the event.146 The implications of this second feature points to the ways 
that catastrophic events often exceed the capacity to be thought in their ontological reality 
before the event; but also the ways that the occurrence of a catastrophic event ushers in 
                                                
144 Dupuy 2008, 11 
145 This insight is reflected in the previous section, when I argued that at least in terms of 
speculations about future catastrophes in the professional world of security professionals, that 
risk analysis has been supplanted somewhat by imaginative activities: whether in scenario-
based exercises (Lakoff 2007 and 2008; Collier and Lakoff 2008); or the deliberate 
reconfiguration of speculative strategy as is the case in conjectural reason (Aradau and Van 
Munster 2011); or in staging imagined events (Anderson 2010a); or in broader, less clearly 
defined, self-imposed (or externally imposed) sense of urgency to undertake imaginative 
practices (de Goede 2008; Salter 2008).  
146 See also Dupuy and Grinbaum 2005. 
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new aspects of reality, new ways of thinking, new strategies for life in the present after 
the event has occurred, which also speaks to failures of anticipatory thinking and activity; 
and, likewise, new categories (and category errors) are produced in relation to this cluster 
of problems for human security.147  
 The key distinction here is between the ontological status of a catastrophic event 
and the epistemological status of considering an event. If one says for example that 
something is catastrophic because it was unthinkable, this claim strangely refers actually 
to an ontological question: It was unthinkable precisely because it was not yet determined 
(ontologically). Conversely, if someone remarks that an event wasn’t yet determined, this 
can only be because the subject had no knowledge of the event before it occurred. It is the 
incapacity to think ontological determination that gestures toward the fact that 
indetermination is an epistemological question. Put more straightforwardly, the event of 
catastrophe manifests in the present precisely at the moment when the unthinkable 
becomes possible, and the impossible becomes thinkable.148  
 In other words, catastrophe in the present is the moment when order is overturned 
and political reality is altered. This definition of catastrophe extends itself to the extent 
that new persuasions of possibility are rendered real, and the newly possible of what can 
be thought show themselves as not only possible, but also present. All of these 
considerations bear on how the future becomes present when catastrophe occurs, but also 
                                                
147 This point seems closer to Anderson 2010a, yet differs importantly in its construction 
because of the ways that Anderson insists that it is through practical exercises that the causal 
change comes to be. For Dupuy it is dependent either on the event, or upon a discursive ruse 
emplaced in a transformative and novel metaphysical approach to time and indetermination. 
148 Hence why so many thinkers will insist that catastrophe operates as a rupture to space and 
time. See Ophir 2010, 61; Vázquez-Arroyo 2013, 741-43; Vázquez-Arroyo 2012, 212; 
Neyrat 2008, 35; Aradau and Van Munster 2011, 3 and 10-11.
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the ways that, so long as the catastrophe remains in the future, it has no reality in the 
present. When considered as a future event, the imaginative element of “the coming 
catastrophe” carries with it a force that renders the onto-epistemological entanglement all 
the more pronounced. 
 Jacques Derrida is instructive in this vein. He makes a distinction between the 
uses of the French words futur and avenir, each signifying “future.” For Derrida, the futur 
is the anticipatable, the imagined, the predictable, the futur antérieur.149 Avenir (à-venir), 
the to-come, carries a different connotation: “That which is to come, which comes to us 
from somewhere else, a place we don’t know or can’t foresee. One step ahead is 
darkness, and the abyss.”150 This might seem a small act of jargonous distinction, but 
what separates the two concepts are their relation to knowledge as imagination, and 
indetermination respectively. Le futur presents the future as an embodied knowledge, as a 
representation resident in acts of foresight and preparation, as a product of thought in 
which we imagine what will come as a species of projective thought. L’avenir, on the 
other hand, that “to come,” blinds us, or “comes from somewhere else,” precisely not 
because it is what we hadn’t really imagined: but because it is the unfolding of 
indetermination in real time. Where future expresses knowledge; the to-come expresses 
ontological duration, irrespective of human knowledge.151 When the two collide, when 
the embodied future being chased by agents beholden to uncertainty come together with 
the surprise of a future not yet determined (avenir), the future catastrophe becomes at 
                                                
149 Relayed in the film Derrida (Dick and Ziering Kofman 2002) and discussed at length in 
Klein 2008. 
150 Klein 2008, 175. 
151 Klein 2008, 175. 
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once an object created by knowledge without ontological reality of its own, and 
something yet to be. When, and if, the future catastrophe ever becomes a present event, 
therefore, it cannot be but surprising. Its ontological element (the to-come; avenir) is 
necessarily separate from thought, which painted their own portraits, that in turn had their 
own realities separate from the event understood as “the coming catastrophe.” 
 It is as if the catastrophic event is always “at once and the same time…probable 
and impossible,” Henri Bergson wrote.152 It is the event that seems as if it couldn’t 
possibly occur because it exceeds human capacities to think it. Yet it is probable because 
the category of catastrophe makes likely that something overwhelmingly disastrous will 
occur – the linkage between the speculative process of thinking and the ontological 
duration of time allows humans to consider the possibility, but never the certainty, of 
future evens. The event of catastrophe, and consequently what to do about it, or how to 
secure against it, exceeds human temporal and causal capacities to place within reason 
that very phenomenon which must be unthinkable in order to carry with it the force of an 
impossible future becoming the reality of the present.  This is why so many people make 
the error in thinking that it is the “future coming to govern the present”: it is not.153 It is 
                                                
152 Henri Bergson quoted in Dupuy 2009, 11 
153 This is an extremely important trend in political writings that concern catastrophes and 
complex emergencies such as disaster. There is an obvious component of temporality in any 
discussion of future events, but a common trend is to either attribute agency to the future—
“the future governs the present”—or to reflect on a transcendent formation of political action 
in which action x acts on y in the future. My argument is opposed to Aradau and van 
Muenster who embody the second sort of argument because it misses the point of politics 
existing in the present despite whatever preoccupations of when the effects of politics might 
occur: “Despite its increasing role in public and professional discourse, catastrophe needs yet 
to be unpacked as a specific problematization of securing the future” (2011, 3). 
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the reality of the enduring present becoming possible – necessarily as separate from how 
it was imagined. It is the indeterminate, finally, having been determined. 
Anticipatory security therefore, at least when dealing with future catastrophes, 
can’t really be about risk, or rational choice, in the calculative sense, for that matter. 
Dupuy continues:  
As an event bursting forth out of nothing, the catastrophe becomes possible only 
by “possibilizing” itself… And that is precisely the source of our problem. For if 
one is to prevent a catastrophe, one needs to believe in its possibility before it 
occurs. If, on the other hand, one succeeds in preventing it, its non-realization 
maintains it in the realm of the impossible, and as a result, the prevention efforts 
will appear useless in retrospect.154 
 
What all of this boils down to is to say that the catastrophe “creates the possible at the 
same time that it creates the real.”155 The possible falls into the category of ontological 
status, and the real into the area of thought (epistemology). And this combination, when 
brought back from philosophical rumination and placed firmly into the materiality of 
protecting human life and infrastructure from the sweeping movement – the emergence of 
a new state of affairs – of catastrophe, that the project of anticipating catastrophe gains 
new levels of importance when considering the persistence of human life in a very 
unstable set of political, environmental, and biological systems. 
The challenge to anticipatory security conjoins two paradoxical elements. One 
side requires knowing success only retroactively (after the event has been prevented) and 
hence not knowing success at all, given that the impossible never became possible.156 
And the other side anticipatory security relies on the necessity to believe in what cannot 
                                                
154 Dupuy 2008, 11 
155 ibid 
156 Dupuy calls this the Paradox of Catastrophism. See Dupuy 2005, 17. This is a central 
motif of Chapter 5. 
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be believed – that the impossible is imminent – which is to say that the future must be 
fabricated. Which is to say, it relies on the unthinkable. Or as Derrida once put it: “What 
comes to pass, as an event, can only come to pass if it is impossible. If it’s possible, if it’s 
foreseeable, then it doesn’t come to pass.”157 Which means in the end that security 
against future catastrophe must be at worst a form of imaginary politics and at best a form 
of writing. 
 
 
VI. Conclusion 
 
The “coming catastrophe,” to the extent that it envelops a wide array of future 
events inclusive of terrorism and other surprise acts of violence, all manner of “natural” 
disasters, economic crises, pandemics and plagues – in short, all imaginable cataclysmic 
futures – clearly encompasses conceptually a future that is not yet determined. The 
emphasis placed in literatures concerning the coming catastrophe, in prioritizing 
uncertainty, strangely expresses an intrinsic symptom of existing in a present so 
transfixed with such futures.  
It isn’t that we ought not think of the inadequacies of human knowledge when 
configuring means of survival. But an interesting question persists about efforts to perfect 
knowledge in the light of uncertainty obscures the very productive mechanism that 
animates such problems. That the future is not determined should surprise no one. That 
we fear what it might bring for failure of our enlightened capacity to outflank it should 
cause some alarm. Why, for example, would not it seem to the observer a form of 
                                                
157 Derrida 2007, 451. Also cited in Anderson 2010a, 227, though clearly our readings differ 
in the implications of how we deploy this idea. 
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madness that the struggle against uncertainty does not unnecessarily focus attention on 
generating knowledge when time and effort could rightly be dedicated to reconfiguring 
actual states of affairs so as to mitigate the potentials of what might come? Does the 
dedication to uncertainty not reproduce a certain form of reactive behavior, in which the 
production of knowledge of potential future revisits the present actor, shifts her behavior 
and, as such, reduplicates uncertainty? To be clear, the invective against the obsession 
with uncertainty creates a reactive mode of security. The emphasis on uncertainty in fact 
reproduces the will to security rather than, for example, proactive measures to stabilize 
political states of affairs, to mitigate climate change, to ameliorate poverty, etc. 
The contemporary style of thinking about future catastrophe is as a result more 
opaque, and yet still more given to the logic of uncertainty – how to cope with it, how to 
reduce it. Much of this expansive literature is encapsulated by writing for the policy 
world, and audiences in business management. But critical work that articulates the 
politics of disaster and catastrophe, from hurricanes to terrorist attacks, also follow suit. 
In this chapter I reviewed the dominance of uncertainty about future catastrophes in 
political theoretic writing over the past half century, and one which bears its marks in the 
present, tying together a fear of a world completely carbonized by total nuclear war to a 
more generalized form of terror resulting from futures still unknown. 
The coming catastrophe clearly occupies a central position in concerns about the 
future, especially with reference to efforts coping with the nature of human survival in an 
era thought to be defined by extreme volatility. But in deploying it as a concept – even 
when simply spoken in casual conversation – the coming catastrophe’s epistemological 
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expression refers so often mostly to inadequacies of human knowledge. Uncertainty, as 
perilous as it might be, animates enunciations of the coming catastrophe; the future 
cataclysm and our failure to know it merge and nearly mean the same thing. But the 
catastrophe to come, to the extent that it will arrive, carries an existence that must be 
registered at the ontological level as well. When we say “the coming catastrophe,” we 
must be reminded that the concept itself blends together different elements of knowledge 
and of existence – even when the existence of the event lies somewhere in the future, 
rendering it only a matter of (im)probability. Most importantly at the conceptual level, it 
should not go unsaid that the notion of the future catastrophe ought remind us that the 
inadequacies of knowledge refer in this case to the indeterminate; and the indeterminate 
encourages knowledge. Without this transaction the question of security makes little 
sense at all.  
 All of this will carry on in the chapters that follow, sometimes explicitly, and 
sometimes as a reverberation. But the ontological force of the coming catastrophe gains 
particular gravity in the next chapter. There I will examine another element of this 
discourse that, rather than obsess over the incapability of human knowledge to fully grasp 
the future, a popular and pervasive trend has emerged that fully accepts the inadequacy of 
knowledge and focuses, instead, on rendering societies more prepared for the inevitable – 
if yet undetermined – catastrophe to come. The discourse emphasizing resilience carries 
with it different problems which will be fully explored in the following pages. But in 
closing this chapter and turning to another avenue of inquiry, it bears repeating that the 
prominence of uncertainty is not all encompassing; some have foregone the possibility of 
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adequate knowledge, nearly, altogether in preparation for an increasingly dangerous, and 
seemingly inevitable, future.  
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From (Pro)Action to Reaction to Acceptance: Logics of Resilience 
 
 
 
 
 
I. Introduction 
This chapter reveals that resilience operates contrarily to many of the future-oriented 
formations of security that I discussed in the previous chapter. Where so many of the 
discourses and practices identified there preoccupy themselves with the relatively 
impossible task of outflanking the future, here I show that resilience marks a remarkable 
departure from such enterprises. As Evans and Reid argue, resilience introduces an 
abandonment of security.1 I argue that where risk assessment (as calculative enterprise) 
and anticipatory models (incorporating more conjectural styles and imaginative 
processes) seek to avoid or protect against specific potential disasters, resilience accepts 
the inevitability of many potential disasters all at once with the hope to persevere.2 But it 
                                                
1 Evans and Reid 2013, 87-91. Claudia Aradau makes a similar argument read through the 
lens of Arendt and Nietzsche, but rather than a mere “abandonment” of security, Aradau 
insists that resilience threatens the very underlying principle that governments offer a 
“promise of security” (Aradau 2014, 83-7). This discussion is revisited in the final 
substantive section below, where I build from Aradau’s thesis to a more cutting interpretation 
of resilience with reference to Evans and Reid’s recent book, Resilient Life: The Art of Living 
Dangerously (2015).  
2 I will show below that the resolve that systemic disruptions are inevitable and “will take 
place” is an inherent part of resilience theory. For example, see Kaufmann 2013, 55.  
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does not do so equally for all within its reach. In sum, I argue that resilience marks a 
departure from anticipatory strategies of protection to acceptance of inevitably 
destructive futures; or, from (pro)action in the sense of active programs to stop disasters 
from occurring, to reaction as an anticipatory activity all of its own. This argument is 
especially important because it helps to show the pervasiveness of the practical response 
to “normal catastrophes” as argued in the next chapter.  
Resilience has become a keyword and conceptual mode of contemporary security 
practices, drawing from a range of other fields, typified by the United Nations Secretary-
General’s High-level Panel on Global Sustainability report Resilient People, Resilient 
Planet: A future worth choosing (2012) which argues for a global project of “sustainable 
development” that “eradicate(s) poverty,” “combat(s) climate change,” among other 
challenges while “building resilience through sound safety nets, disaster risk reduction, 
and adaptation planning.”3 In this short series of quotations one can read the symptoms of 
two important registers of resilience thought for practical considerations.   
In the first one sees clearly how a diverse range of phenomena are unified and 
encompassed as not only possibly addressed by resilience, but also in the same regime of 
resilience. This is because resilience theory aims to reduce vulnerability of a system, not 
its particular vulnerabilities.4 Secondly, one sees the ways that vulnerability is addressed 
not through preventative measures, but through preparing for inevitable disequilibrium.5 
                                                
3 United Nations Secretary-General’s High-level Panel on Global Sustainability 2012, 6. 
4 Adger 2006, 269. 
5 See Lakoff 2008 for an analysis of this language in a different sector of security thinking. In 
his own work, and his collaborations with Stephen Collier, the general argument that can be 
construed across their work represents a shift in U.S. security policy, as they put it in 
numerous places, as a shift from prevention to preparedness (Collier 2008; Lakoff 2006, 
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“Safety nets, disaster risk reduction, and adaptation planning” refer to increasing the 
possibility to survive and sustain loss, not prevent it. But safety nets, risk reduction, and 
planning for whom? Resilience theory contends that the answer is “all.” Even many of its 
critics are romanced enough by this argument to see in it a homogenizing capacity. 
Toward the end of this chapter I will try to show how it might be intended for all, but in a 
very different light than is normally assumed: in a way rendering the human world more 
vulnerable through a re-generalization, a perverse universalization, of the post-colonial 
condition.6  
 In contradistinction to what Aradau and Van Munster call the “P-modes of 
knowledge,” pursuit, prevention, preparation, and protection (to which can be added 
precaution, preemption, and others), resilience assumes the worst is likely – at least in 
terms of what it reacts to.7 Partially accounting for a strategic shift between calculative 
risk assessment and imaginative practices, the last chapter showed how one model of 
anticipatory security aimed to create knowledge about uncertain futures with the hopes of 
preventing the worst-case scenario. Risk assessment and speculative practices are 
constructed by way of probabilities and trying to gain strategic advantage against coming 
events.8 Resilience operates differently. Resilience attempts to engineer measures of 
adaptability and mitigation that take priority over the presumed stasis of risk thinking.9 
Yet, as Walker and Cooper have shown in their landmark critical genealogy of resilience, 
                                                                                                                                            
2007, 2008a and 2008b; Collier and Lakoff 2008a and 2008b). These arguments preoccupy a 
central motif of the next chapter, so I will not further develop them here. 
6 I follow Ranadir Samaddar (2015) in this portion of the argument. 
7 Aradau and Van Munster 2011, 33. See also de Goede and Randalls 2009; Anderson 2010b 
8 Bernstein 1996. 
9 Holling 1973. 
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the initial techniques of resilience were not only drawn from engineering and ecology, 
but also from neoliberal economic theory.10 So one key critical approach to resilience 
policy has been to critique it from the perspective of neoliberalism and its attendant 
governmentality, and as such this line of thinking insists that resilience is a developed 
enough form of neoliberal governance that resistance to it has been subsumed or 
weakened substantially.11 
 All of this is to say that there is no single predominant definition of resilience.12 
Ben Anderson, in a searing response to a special issue of Politics, argues that the critical 
approach to resilience overlooks its many different iterations, to the extent that it 
overdetermines the range of practices, theories, and expectations given to and carried 
within the concept.13 For Anderson the idea of resilience as buzzword points to not only a 
reification of theories arguing about its principal effects – namely influencing 
contemporary subjectivity, and its oft argued inherent link to neoliberalism – but it also 
distorts the force of security politics and its critics.  
This is a welcome critique, not least because so much of the writing concerning 
the idea of resilience seems to tread such similarly trodden ground. Here I want to 
acknowledge the usefulness of that criticism – that we do not approach resilience through 
convenient lenses in order to reduplicate already existing theories for which scholars seek 
new and exciting objects. That said, in this chapter I engage closely with many of the 
thinkers Anderson criticizes, not to take their mistakes more seriously, but to read across 
                                                
10 Walker and Cooper 2011, 148-152; Several excellent critiques of this have been raised. See 
for example, Corry 2014 and Nelson 2014a. 
11 Neocleus 2012; Reid 2012; Joseph 2013; Nelson 2014a and 2014b. 
12 Anderson 2015.  
13 Anderson 2015, 63-4. 
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their strengths. In doing so, I hope to localize an important feature of resilience discourse: 
that it hones in on an important trend in thinking about how to survive future catastrophe 
in ways that thinkers in the previous chapter do not. As such, as the chapter proceeds I 
will make reference to “resilience.” But I am developing an interpretation that, by the 
end, ought to feel very specific; ought to carry with it the variety of applications with 
which I have engaged; and will carry the responsibility of operating as a distinguishable 
concept with an intellectual history that I offer, including important critiques of it, though 
they themselves vary. 
My aim in engaging with this literature is not to turn it on its feet, as Marx once 
put it with a different object in mind, nor to correct it; but to find within it a logic 
different from another dominant mode of thought with which I hope to juxtapose it. 
Which is to say, I aim to find in the discourse of resilience the ways that advocates of 
resilience themselves, and this applies to many of its critics as well, do not suppose that 
the future is something that can be formally known. Instead, what resilience 
acknowledges the near certainty of future failures. This insight is the golden thread that 
runs through the interpretations below that range several disciplines over the past forty 
years. And I attempt in the end to show to what devastating effects it has been deployed. 
I proceed first by tracing contemporary ideas about resilience to the work of C.S. 
Holling, whose systems approach to ecology challenged conventional ideas of ecology by 
challenging how stable such systems really are. For Holling, modes of thinking about 
ecology that were rooted in quantitative modeling – mostly derived from physics – failed 
to understand ecological change because they failed to understand the interaction of 
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systems. As a result, he argued, a new model of thinking qualitatively was necessary in 
order to build theories that could account for how vulnerable systems were, and to what. 
Then I turn to recent work attempting to link Holling’s body of work to that of Friedrich 
von Hayek, which in turn allows scholars of resilience to do two things. First, they are 
able to show the ways that resilience was extrapolated to understanding interactive 
systems across disciplines; in other words, how economies, ecologies, modes of social 
and political organization, interact with one another to create turbulence and 
vulnerability. Secondly, this more unified theory of resilience has fashioned a primary 
critique of resilience in governance: that it is inherently neoliberal. The following section 
shows these connections and reviews the most important critiques of resilience from the 
perspective within the context of neoliberal political economy. I then turn to recent 
writings, primarily organized by a lengthy engagement with Brad Evans and Julian Reid, 
who argue that resilience ought to be understood within a logic of abandoning security. 
As a consequence, they argue, resilience is a force that exposes human beings to hostile 
violence and increasingly so the more vulnerable a population already was before efforts 
to secure it in the conventional sense were vacated. I conclude by summarizing the 
arguments made in this chapter and the previous one in order to reaffirm that there are 
competing modes of thinking about “the coming catastrophe”: one that can be thought of 
in terms of attempts to prevent it; and one that has already given itself over to its 
inevitable occurrence. In the end, I spend a moment pointing to the next chapter, which 
argues that “the coming catastrophe” is importantly unspecific, that the concept renders 
different sorts of catastrophes abstract; and, in this sense, has become utterly normalized.  
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II. Origins of Resilience: Acknowledging the Unexpected  
 
Resilience theory holds at its core an acceptance of disastrous future events. At least 
insofar as disastrous events can be understood through conventional considerations of 
security – extreme systemic disequilibrium, especially caused by unexpected or surprise 
events – resilience in its roots models its theory around the idea that systems – whether 
ecological, social, political, or otherwise – adapt. As a consequence, resilience theory 
stands in diametric opposition to the calculative aims of theories based in risk 
quantification, but also those given to prevention, because resilience views the world 
from the standpoint of the complexly interwoven nature of multiple systems (social, 
political, ecological, economic) interacting to compose equilibria and disequilibria. As a 
result it has found itself incorporated centrally into vastly different regimes of both theory 
and practice ranging from financial and economic policy, psychology, urban and regional 
planning, infrastructure management, development & aid efforts, public health 
administration, disaster preparedness, and national security.14 
 The roots of this theory, the narrative goes, derive from the early writings of 
Crawford Stanley Holling’s radical critique of ecological systems theory that had, until 
his time, been built upon quantitative models adapted from the physical sciences 
(principally, physics).15 The problem with the classical quantitative approach was not that 
                                                
14 Walker and Cooper 2011, 143; Lundborg and Vaughan-Williams 2011; Duffied 2012; 
Bourbeau 2013; Nelson 2014, 1; Anderson 2015; Grove 2013 and 2014b; Aradau 2014; 
Chandler 2014, 1. 
15 I say, “the narrative goes,” because in this chapter I focus on the ways that resilience 
emerged as an end goal of particular modes of security provision. In the literature 
surrounding this phenomenon, C.S. Holling’s body of work serves as a touchstone from 
which many different fields of interest to this literature found a basis for their work and from 
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it lacked effectiveness in understanding the world, for Holling, but that it represented a 
different view of the world.16 For Holling the strength of the quantitative – what I have 
referred to more broadly in the world of security analysis with the signification 
“calculative” – is that it excels in considering systems that are more or less equilibrious, 
and therefore perturbations can be detected, measured, and with the concern in mind that 
a return to equilibrium is not only advantageous, but possible.17 Holling views the 
quantitative approach embodying a worldview in which “individuals die, populations 
disappear, and species become extinct.”18 Such is the ontological reality driven by an idea 
of the world-as-system in which variations to equilibrium (what he often referred to with 
the moniker “stability”) – death, disappearance, extinction – are measured, because 
within this world such effects have measurable causes rendered against a more or less 
                                                                                                                                            
which they drew inspiration. Yet readers in the history of philosophy and political theory will 
notice that many of the impulses resident in resilience theory predate – sometimes by 
millennia – many of the themes incorporated in Holling’s broad thesis: Principally, that 
systems are interactive, often far from equilibrium, and that species within such systems 
embody an ontological will to persist despite disadvantageous conditions. I am currently 
working on an article that searches more deeply in the history of thought for philosophical 
concepts which excavate earlier and more complex ontological ideas about resilience, which 
I do not pursue here. That essay involves readings of Spinoza’s conatus, Bergson’s élan vital, 
Niezsche’s will to power, Freud’s death drive, Deleuze’s desire, and Marx’s species being 
and labor power. Many of these arguments would be germane to such a project, but in the 
present chapter the aim is to hedge closely to the narrative about the place that resilience 
occupies in contemporary thinking about security (and its attendant concerns) toward the end 
of substantiating my main argument: That – quite different from modes of security 
considered in Chapter One, where anticipatory forms of thinking aimed to prevent or outflank 
indetermination – in the present chapter I portray resilience as a different world view. In the 
view of resilience theory, I argue, future calamities defy expectation and we should expect 
them to; as a result, resilience marks a sophisticated acceptance of future catastrophe, rather 
than an effort to prevent it. 
16 Holling 1973, 1. 
17 Chandler 2014, 8. 
18 Holling 1973, 1. 
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static vision of systems equilibrium.19 In other words, in the quantitative view one can 
only measure occasions which demonstrate irregularities to the harmony of the system 
itself: “With attention focused upon achieving constancy, the critical events seem to be 
the amplitude and frequency of oscillations.”20 “But,” Holling continues, 
…if we are dealing with a system profoundly affected by changes external to it, 
and continually confronted by the unexpected, the constancy of its behavior 
becomes less important than the persistence of the relationships. Attention shifts, 
therefore to the qualitative and to questions of existence or not.21  
 
The central problem that resilience theory sought to address in its beginnings in systems 
ecology, to be clear, was that conventional systems theory viewed systems as analytic 
objects that were more or less static.22 When considering more complex relationships – 
between pollution, overpopulation, and ecosystems for example – one cannot assume an 
equilibrious system, nor can one measure from a controlled formal model.23 Moreover, 
stability in a system is not only infrequent. Its opposite is not necessarily instability, but 
multiple modes of stability (multistable states). This clarification leads one not to oppose 
stability-security with instability-insecurity, but the idea of stability with stasis and the 
idea of resilience with vulnerability more broadly conceived.24 So, for Holling, to 
approach systems upon which human beings (and other species) rely for their survival in 
the former, quantitative sense, was not only methodologically flawed from the 
perspective that it advocated a world view which underwrote practical approaches to 
                                                
19 Kevin Grove elaborates similar claims within the context of a biopolitical critique. See 
Grove 2014, 615.  
20 Holling 1973, 1.  
21 ibid. 
22 Walker and Cooper 2011, 145. 
23 Holling 1973, 3-6. 
24 Holling and Gusterson 2002, 50. 
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precisely the wrong problems – it also failed to understand the causal complexity leading 
to important events. Here is Holling drawing the comparison out within the context of 
ecological management and potential extinction events: 
The resilience and stability viewpoints of the behavior of ecological systems can 
yield very different approaches to the management of resources. The stability 
view [which I have emphasized as quantitative and calculative] emphasizes the 
equilibrium, the maintenance of a predictable world, and the harvesting of 
nature’s excess production with as little fluctuation as possible. The resilience 
view [Holling’s view] emphasizes domains of attraction and the need for 
persistence. But extinction is not purely a random event; it results from the 
interaction of random events with those deterministic forces that define the shape, 
size, and characteristics of the domain of attraction.25  
 
Here we see the juxtaposition between the approaches most clearly. The stability 
approach, operating from an assumption of a relatively static set of phenomena, enabling 
it to view the world in such a way where disruptions to that stasis are profoundly 
problematic for modern conceptions of mastery and management.26 One can extrapolate 
from this very clearly to the missions of anticipatory and preventative modes of human 
security. The resilience approach conversely recognizes ontologically at least that the 
level of complexity leading to important events exists importantly not at the level of 
                                                
25 Holling 1973, 21. 
26 Here I have in mind Descartes’ provocation, well before Marx’s Thesis Eleven, that 
philosophy ought to point itself in practical directions (Marx 1976, 3-5). Descartes wrote in 
1637: “…it is possible to arrive at knowledge that would be very useful in life and that, in 
place of that speculative philosophy taught in the schools, it is possible to find a practical 
philosophy, by means of which, knowing the force and the actions of fire, water, air, the 
stars, the heavens, and all the other bodies that surround us, just as distinctly as we know the 
various skills of our craftsmen, we might be able, in the same way, to use them for all the 
purposes for which they are appropriate, and thus render ourselves, as it were, masters and 
possessors of nature” (Descartes 1998, 35; my emphasis). See also Nancy 2012, 33-39 for 
the complex problematization of the ways that the nuclear problem – both in terms of clean 
energy and weapons demonstrates a paradoxical “mastery over nature [maîtrise de la nature, 
36],” including the survival (or peril) of human beings after Hiroshima, Nagasaki, and 
Fukushima. Dupuy 2005 deals with many of the same issues confronted by Nancy six years 
after Dupuy’s book first appeared in French, though Nancy does not cite it.  
 106 
discrete disruption, but at the level of the interaction between different spheres of 
activity; or, more precisely different affective systems.27 “What Holling seeks to define, 
instead,” write Jeremy Walker and Melinda Cooper, “is a complex notion of resilience 
that can account for the ability of an ecosystem to remain cohesive even while 
undergoing extreme perturbations.”28 The classical approach, given to systems stability 
cannot fully grasp the effects of systemic disturbances nor, frankly, for Holling, the full 
complexity of their causes. 
 As a result, the stability approach, when it comes to practical questions of 
management may often lead to adverse consequences.29 From Holling’s point of view the 
ontological question of where one begins – from a more or less stable view of the system 
or from a view that, at best, it is multistable – not only do we derive different data, we 
also will tend to act differently toward stimuli and affective capacities. Put clearly, at 
stake is the potential for massive failure because we misconceive of the system we seek 
to manage. If one begins from the principle that a system is stable, one will likely act in 
order to quash or quell disruptions in that system. If one begins from a point of view that 
the system is inherently unstable in relation to other more or less unstable systems, then 
more caution must be exercised in the practical realm. Holling elaborates this in view of 
mistaken ideas about the nature of systems themselves: 
                                                
27  David Chandler approaches resilience and its complex systems interaction theory 
excellently in his recent book (2014). See especially Part One.  
28 Walker and Cooper 2011, 146. 
29 I review some of the hallmark questions of “unintended consequences” in Chapter Four. 
These may be of service to unpacking some of the critical edges of Holling’s appraisal 
pointing towards the inadequacies of the stability-quantitative approach. But, in order not to 
digress too far from the question of how this relates to security theory, I will not belabor 
those ideas here. Interested readers should direct their attention to the beginnings of §IV 
(Chapter Four). 
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The very approach, therefore, that assures a stable maximum sustained yield of a 
renewable resource might so change these deterministic conditions that the 
resilience is lost or reduced so that a chance and rare event that previously could 
be absorbed can trigger a sudden dramatic change and loss of structural integrity 
of the system. A management approach based on resilience, on the other hand, 
would emphasize the need to keep options open, the need to view events in a 
regional rather than a local context, and the need to emphasize heterogeneity.30 
 
If the goal is resilience – which is to say the mitigation of vulnerability and the survival 
of a (any) complex system, then those who operate from the ontological standpoint of 
stability can make massive mistakes for simply not seeing the trees for the forest, and the 
forest’s place in relation to other systems, as it were. The resilience approach, to the 
contrary, attempts to diversify its vision to a litany of affective capacities, and to 
distribute cause and effect across entire systems. Thus shifting the object from the 
discrete to the systemic, and shifting the emphasis from disruption to the enduring 
possibility of the system itself. Holling concludes this passage, and his pivotal essay, in a 
way that is particularly germane to both this chapter’s argument and to the larger scope of 
the dissertation itself. Telescoping from the science of systems – the principal focus of 
his paper – to a sweeping statement about the stakes of resilience as a form of knowledge 
production given importantly to the management of how systems ought to respond to 
future events, Holling breaks from the often minute language that his writing is 
accustomed to and offers what can only be summarized as a grand declaration of the 
importance of such a set of claims: 
Flowing from this would be not the presumption of sufficient knowledge, but the 
recognition of our ignorance; not the assumption that future events are expected, 
but that they will be unexpected. The resilience framework can accommodate this 
shift of perspective, for it does not require a precise capacity to predict the future, 
                                                
30 Holling 1973, 21. 
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but only a qualitative capacity to devise systems that can absorb and 
accommodate future events in whatever unexpected form they may take.31 
 
Such is the inspiration to incorporate resilience thinking into strategies for considering 
human survival against future catastrophes, crises, and other forms of disequilibrium 
upon the social, political, and economic spheres of human life.32 In a sense resilience 
theory acknowledges a lack of knowledge: “recognition of our ignorance; not the 
assumption that future events are expected, but that they will be unexpected.” It drives the 
impossibility of future-oriented thinking to the brink of its reasonable capacity by fiat of 
its failures to capably understand the complex interactions of systems – which are in and 
of themselves complexly constructed states of affairs. Walker and Cooper agree: “Under 
the sign of resilience, this is an approach to risk management that foregrounds the limits 
to predictive knowledge and insists on the prevalence of the unexpected…”33 Out of the 
promises to outflank the future catastrophe, comes a knowledge that at very least the 
contingent – the accident, the tediously small overlooked detail – emerges not from the 
failure of attention, but from the general incapacity to adequately know the interaction 
between systems.34  
As a response, resilience theory advocates for an entirely different accounting: 
one which knows what cannot be known, which does not attempt to outthink what cannot 
                                                
31 ibid (my emphasis). Holling makes a similar argument linking ecology and economics in 
Holling 1982, 8-15. Nelson (2014a) engages with this in an interesting way within the 
context of arguing for resilience’s role in a neoliberal counter-revolution against labor. See 
Nelson 2014a, 4 and 7-16.  
32 Bourbeau 2013, 8. 
33 Walker and Cooper 2011, 147. 
34 This is also a central theme, though the solutions offered are stunningly different, in 
Charles Perrow’s Normal Accidents, which partly inspires the next chapter. See Perrow 1984. 
 109 
be thought; but instead, to absorb and accommodate the inevitable.35 As a result, practical 
efforts resulting from this epistemological-ontological worldview focus on producing 
systems capable of enduring what can never fully be anticipated: “[resilience thinking 
requires only] a capacity to devise systems that can absorb and accommodate future 
events in whatever unexpected form they may take.”36 This insight is precisely why 
resilience is opposed to vulnerability and not to security. Security presumes protection 
from disequilibrium; resilience assumes the worst will inevitably occur and asks: Then 
how can we alter systems themselves so that they, and consequently, we, survive?37  
 In the socio-political world, such systems may be thought in parallel to how 
Holling conceived ecological systems. Sara Holiday Nelson puts the notion of interactive 
systems (ecological, socio, political, economic) well when she argues: “Ecosystems 
cannot be understood in isolation from social systems, and management techniques that 
enforce stability reduce ecosystem complexity and resilience, generating feedbacks from 
the environment that threaten social systems.”38 For Nelson, the interactions between 
multiple scales of complex systems produce and reproduce not only their interactions, but 
also then the possibility for disruption on one from another. These interactions also 
reproduce crises internally as well as “between the social body and its environment.”39 
 Framed differently, the theory of resilience attempts to account for the complex 
constitutive properties that challenge life worlds. Nelson’s language that I quoted above 
                                                
35 Ibid. 
36 Holling 1973, 21. 
37 A central thesis of many critiques of resilience: see for example Aradau 2014; Anderson 
2015; Chandler 2012; Corry 2014; Evans and Reid 2013 and 2015. 
38 Nelson 2014a, 4.  
39 Ibid.  
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concisely emphasizes the ways that the ecological theory of resilience comes to animate a 
practical ontological perspective from which the shifted focus likewise animates a litany 
of interactive effects, especially in socio-economic matters. In fact, Holling’s own work 
trended in this direction when he co-founded the Resilience Alliance.40 The Alliance 
aimed to theorize the extension of resilience from conservation ecology to a broad palette 
of interacting social, political, ecological, and economic concerns. 41  As such, the 
relatively focused pursuit of resilient systems theory migrated ambitiously from discrete 
disciplinary application to its now pervasive attraction in nearly countless fields of theory 
and practice. 
 
 
III. Resilience & Neoliberalism 
 
In their landmark essay, Jeremy Walker and Melinda Cooper move from the roots of 
resilience theory in C.S. Holling’s early work to its broad operational adoption in 
economics and security.42 Despite the fact that Hayek never cited C.S. Holling, Walker 
and Cooper see homologies in their theories so close that they are able to show the 
migration of systems ecology into what became known as the Austrian School of 
economics and its reasonable philosophical inclusion in what came to be known as 
neoliberal economic theory.43 What Hayek saw in the period when he accepted the Nobel 
                                                
40 The website of the Resilience Alliance shows fairly comprehensively the full scope of their 
work, which can be read symptomatically as well. The confluence of resilience theory with 
neoliberal management cannot be overlooked. See: http://www.resalliance.org/ 
41 Walker and Cooper 2011, 147. 
42 Walker and Cooper 2011.  
43 Ibid, 147. They note that this fact of inclusion is widely resisted by scholars who 
overwhelmingly note the contrary influence of the notably less philosophical Milton 
Friedman. Nevertheless, as they also recognize, Hayek’s Nobel Award added considerable 
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Prize for Economics, which he reflected upon during his acceptance lecture by noting the 
crises of the early-1970s, argued that they resulted from a profound failure in Keynesian 
economic policy.44 Walker and Cooper ascertain that Hayek’s resistance to Keynesian 
policy was on the level of its interventionism, its regard for the aim of regulatory 
principles to induce equilibrium into markets.45 They write, “[Hayek] was therefore 
highly skeptical of efforts to respond to such crises using the very techniques of state 
intervention that he believed had engendered them in the first place.”46 So for Hayek not 
simply the oil crisis, but also revolutions occurring in the imperiled colonies of the 
developed global north – to make little mention of the recent globe-spanning workers 
rebellions of the late-1960s – had come about at least in part because of a failure to 
understand the imposition that Keynesian policy had enforced upon domestic realms of 
                                                                                                                                            
credibility to his theories and created divisions within the broader economic camp that makes 
it far from unimaginable that Hayek’s general thesis was adopted. They write, “It is more 
commonly acknowledged that the reigning influence on financial risk and price modeling lies 
not in Hayek’s hermetic philosophy but in neoclassical finance: some combination of 
Friedman’s ‘rational speculators,’ Arrow-Debreu securities, the Efficient Market Hypothesis 
or the standardized algorithms of portfolio management software, all of which presume the 
formal calculability of all relevant states of risk. Again, however, we would contend that a de 
facto ‘division of labor’ has established itself between the formalism of equilibrium models, 
lending the imprimatur of exhaustive calculability to the design of derivative trading 
instruments, and the implicit cosmology of complex systems theory, which both informs a 
macro-economic vision of market dynamics in general (witness former Federal Reserve 
chairman Alan Greenspan’s encomiums to the creative turbulence and resilience of US 
financial markets) and, in more recent times, justifies the implementation of new crisis-
response strategies at the institutional level. What unites both camps is the insistence that the 
distributed computational mind of the market always surpasses the state’s ability to process 
information” (Walker and Cooper 2011, 152). 
44 Ibid, 149. See also Hayek 1989 
45 Nelson (2014a) offers a profound critique of the prominence of Hayek’s place in this 
discourse. 
46 Walker and Cooper 2011, 149. 
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politics and economics. 47  Such “crises” were only symptomatic of the very 
disequilibrium already resident in their systemicity.48 
 At stake in Walker and Cooper’s argument is not Hayek’s well-known distaste for 
state intervention but a distaste for an arrogance of conventional economics which held 
that markets could be adequately administered by states; or, for that matter, that such 
hypotheses could be adequately tested in the actually existing world. This is a profound 
methodological link to Holling’s presumptions about ecological systems. For Hayek, the 
social sciences in their desire to replicate the presumed indisputably prestigious 
knowledge production of the natural sciences had erred profoundly in their attempt to 
understand their own phenomena.  
                                                
47 Walker and Cooper provocatively claim in conclusion that the pervasiveness of resilience 
in neoliberalism serves to limit critique against it and, hence, is a profoundly depoliticizing 
regime of power. This spirit of thinking can be linked to Wendy Brown’s influential work on 
neoliberalism that argues, among other things, that neoliberalism is profoundly depoliticizing 
(see Brown 2003, 2006a and 2015). Sara Holiday Nelson argues to the contrary in a way that 
I cannot fully pursue here, but is worth noting for its contribution because so often theorists 
and critics see powerful mechanisms of politics and attribute them with the tools of 
disempowerment: “Capitalism, like complex adaptive systems, ‘feeds upon deviations from 
normal reproduction’. The expansion of surplus value requires continual innovation. But 
these forces of innovation are not capitalist in origin – rather, capital must continually 
subsume external forces of alterity in the service of its own reproduction. This subsumption – 
as Virno reminds us – is never complete; the potential revolution is present, if only latently, 
in counter- revolutionary forms. This is, in some sense, a classically Marxian insight: that the 
potential for system change is immanent to the system (capitalism) itself, as labour-power is 
both capital and not capital, in the service of capital and irreducible to it” (Nelson 2014a, 6; 
see also Nelson 2014b). Mareile Kaufmann shares Nelson’s concern, but argues from the 
standpoint that resilience theory in and of itself cannot support such a critique (Kaufmann 
2013, 67). Apart from the critique of capital and labor’s place within it – and apart from 
resilience theory itself, for that matter – I address some of these concerns of depoliticization 
in a different way with respect to Antonio Vázquez-Arroyo (2010) and Aradau & Van 
Munster (2011) in Chapter Four below. 
48 Walker and Cooper 2011, 149. 
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 In the pursuit of advancement, economists (as social scientists) committed an 
error of seeking stability in inherently unstable atmospheres: “…the social sciences, like 
much of biology but unlike most fields of the physical sciences, have to deal with 
structures of essential complexity, i.e. with structures whose characteristic properties can 
be exhibited only by models made up of relatively large numbers of variables.”49 Hayek 
portrayed economic principles as akin to natural rules, as in classical liberal economic 
theory, but introduced into them an order of complexity that was far beyond the tools of 
comprehension used by his contemporaries.50 In their pursuit of stability and what was 
referred to as Maximum Sustainable Yield, Keynesian policies sought to impose order 
upon inherently complex and unstable systems.51 As he concluded his acceptance speech, 
Hayek scaled out to the larger questions of society and management, control and 
complexity: 
If man is not to do more harm than good in his efforts to improve the social order, 
he will have to learn that in this, as in all other fields where essential complexity 
of an organized kind prevails, he cannot acquire the full knowledge which would 
make mastery of the events possible. He will therefore have to use what 
knowledge he can achieve, not to shape the results as the craftsman shapes his 
handiwork, but rather to cultivate a growth by providing the appropriate 
environment, in the manner in which the gardener does this for his plants. There is 
danger in the exuberant feeling of ever growing power which the advance of the 
physical sciences has engendered and which tempts man to try, “dizzy with 
success,” to use a characteristic phrase of early communism, to subject not only 
our natural but also our human environment to the control of a human will. The 
recognition of the insuperable limits to his knowledge ought indeed to teach the 
student of society a lesson of humility which should guard him against becoming 
an accomplice in men's fatal striving to control society - a striving which makes 
him not only a tyrant over his fellows, but which may well make him the 
                                                
49 Hayek 1989. Emphasis in original. 
50 Zebrowski 2013, 167. 
51 Walker and Cooper  
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destroyer of a civilization which no brain has designed but which has grown from 
the free efforts of millions of individuals.52 
 
Thus in his conclusion Hayek makes a final leap from problems exclusively germane to 
economists and introduces several important elements that bring us from economics, to 
systems more broadly conceived, to their hopeful application in the governance of socio-
political life. Hayek here aimed to deprioritize absolute knowledge and prioritize the 
mesmerizing complexity of nature – linking internally economic order and the natural 
order (a link drawn for hundreds of years in classical liberal economics).53 Accusing his 
contemporaries of fundamentally misunderstanding the systemic disequilibrium of 
markets, Hayek made reference to cyberneticist Warren Weaver to claim a literal 
essential complexity that surpasses human understanding.54 It is this move that hedges 
against his contemporaries the most: It should be understood that the state intervention on 
market forces limits severely the capacities of the entirety of actors composing the 
market.55 A key to this understanding is his willful adoption of the science of complexity 
to maneuver both a new model for economics – based on its fundamental capacity to 
govern itself as system – and at the same time to introduce a theory that relied not on 
adequate knowledge, but on the willful limitation of foresight.56 
 Reducing economic vulnerability, in this view, was less about altering structural 
safety nets as it was about “freeing” the market’s capacity to render itself capable of 
provision. As a consequence, words and concepts like “adaptive” and “systemic” made 
                                                
52 Hayek 1989. 
53 Zebrowski 2013, 168. 
54 Zebrowski 2013, 167.  
55 Walker and Cooper 2011, 152. 
56 Ibid.  
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their ways into practical discussions for how to prepare for, and mitigate the deleterious 
effects, of future economic crises.57 But these ideas clearly also migrated to fields 
concerned with security and survival. Their links to what became known as 
“environmental security” cannot be understated.58 They also became enfolded into post-
9/11 discourses about national security in ways that, in part, the next chapter will 
reveal. 59  Their implications for the world of security theory portend alarming 
implications that are only now being fully engaged. 
 
IV. Abandoning Security: (neo)liberalism revisited 
The introduction of resilience into security governance has been widely studied. 
In practice the fashionable nature of resilience theory means that governments engage 
broader ranges of actors – communities, non-profits, aid agencies, etc. – with hopes of 
more fully distributing resources across the political spectrum to ensure greater social 
responsiveness and mitigate vulnerability.60 David Chandler in his sweeping survey of 
the politics of resilience and governance writes: “The key aspects that define resilience 
approaches to policy-making are methodological assumptions about the nature of the 
                                                
57 Walker and Cooper 2011, 151. Hence, also, the fashionable strategies of “stress testing” 
financial institutions: One common critique of institutions that ought not be permitted to be 
“too big to fail” should be referred to this literature. The pervasiveness of resilience theory in 
creating institutions that will endure through crises is in part beholden to the best practices 
that attach to them as capable of withstanding the stresses of crises, rather than their 
capacities to avoid causing them. 
58  Coaffee 2008; Duffield 2011; Grove 2013 and 2014b; Walker and Cooper 2011; 
Zebrowski 2013, are good examples that make use of such a thesis. 
59 Coaffee 2007; Coaffee and Murakami Wood 2006; Coaffee and Rogers 2008  
60 Chandler 2014, 94-5. 
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world, the complex problem of governance, and the policy processes suitable to 
governing this complexity.”61  
Together the assumptions of resilience – the (dis)equilibria of systems, 
encouraging the capacity to bounce back from trouble, the inherent belief that the 
unexpected is bound to occur – are bound up in important recent transformations in 
governance. Much of the analysis of resilient governance compelled authors to draw 
parallels with critical theories of ideology,62 war,63 the post-political,64 governmentality,65 
and biopolitics.66 The searching problem that so many of these attempts seek to address is 
how the theory of resilience configures into broader and preexisting systems of 
governance for which resilience offers a unique solution.67 Critiques stemming from 
(neo)liberalism are the most robust – perhaps because of the prominence given to it in 
Walker and Cooper’s exceedingly popular essay from 2011, which I have made much use 
of here – but perhaps also because in following the rich literature surrounding the concept 
of neoliberalism, critical scholars are able to ask the question of how political economic 
innovations have crept into governance and security; but also how their consequences 
affect contemporary subjects that resilience seems to leave behind. Neoliberalism 
supplies a vast conceptual language for complementing such ideas.68 This is because 
critiques of neoliberal theory enable a constellation of moves – economic and political, 
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subject and structure, power and knowledge – to express an incredibly complex array of 
sociopolitical relations. Consider how Chandler and Reid can so quickly articulate a 
range of important concepts in a recent passage: 
The human subject is constructed within neoliberal discourse as having to accept 
that it is not possible to resist or secure him or herself from difficulties (both 
individually and collectively) but instead learn to adapt to their enabling 
conditions via the embrace of insecurity and unknowability. Within this framing, 
the only role for government is that of facilitation and enablement of more 
adaptive and capable individual choices – a system of techniques and practices of 
so-called ‘good-governance,’ held to enable the better and more efficient use of 
markets and market-based forms of choice-making as a necessary requirement for 
the instauring of adaptive capacities socially.69 
 
In this passage, Chandler and Reid accomplish quite a bit toward establishing a theoretic 
architecture within which to place the individual subject amidst a neoliberal relation of 
the state and capital. What they expose so adeptly illustrates how the logic of 
neoliberalism produces a de facto environment in which the individual him- or herself is 
located, empowered perhaps, to be the sole navigator of their political environment.70 The 
state’s role in this view of neoliberalism is merely to assist in the supposed “liberation” of 
the individual subject, facilitating its self-entrepreneurial mandate toward its own success 
in the political-economic environment.71 In short, neoliberalism excels at reifying the 
individual subject under the supposition that she is master of her own course through life 
                                                
69 Chandler and Reid 2016, 4. Several of my readers questioned whether or not the word 
“instauring” was a mistake. The word appears in Chandler and Reid, and correctly, if not a 
nearly entirely obsolete choice of words. It left regular English usage during the 17th century, 
appearing in Webster’s Revised Unabridged Dictionary for the final time in 1913. It derives 
from the Latin, instaurāre, “to renew, repair, erect, establish,” arriving in English by way of 
the 14th century Old French insaurer (v.) (see further, Oxford English Dictionary). The word 
instaurer still remains in French, meaning, simply to establish, found, institute, or found, 
often with the verb’s subject being some kind of institution.  
70 This is also argued by others; see for example, Joseph 2013, 40. 
71 Brown 2015, 108; See also Kiersey 2009, 2011, and 2016. 
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and helps to recondition subjects as adaptive to misfortune by incentivizing their 
capacities to capitalize on their own uncertainty.72  
Resilience approaches to security – or, perhaps that is no longer the most 
appropriate word73 – in its ontological embrace of contingency, complex systems, and 
adaptivity, is especially well suited to supplant conventional logics of “defense” of 
human subjects precisely because of the ways that it acknowledges the precise 
relationships between uncertainty, the self-determined subject, and adaptivity.74 Jonathan 
Joseph puts this well on his way to an excoriating critique of resilience governance in 
relation to security:  
Resilience fits with a social ontology that urges us to turn from a concern with the 
outside world to a concern with our own subjectivity, our adaptability, our 
reflexive understanding, our own risk assessments, our knowledge acquisition 
and, above all else, our responsible decision making… Indeed a major claim here 
is that the way resilience works, certainly in Anglo-Saxon approaches, is to move 
fairly swiftly from thinking about the dynamics of systems to emphasizing 
individual responsibility, adaptability and preparedness.75 
 
It should surprise no one that security professionals and agencies are recognizing the 
broader range of threats facing civilian populations. But the mode of resilience that 
Joseph imagines here is reflected in the ways that agencies have diversified their 
understanding of who is responsible when disaster strikes. In the form of systems theory 
that I reviewed above, charting C.S. Holling’s enduring influence over resilience theory 
and how it came to animate so many fields of thinking, the way that adherents (and even 
critics that track too closely his own work) tend to imagine resilience is still within the 
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74 Corry 2014, 267-70. 
75 Joseph 2013, 40. 
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confines of systems – or structures, if you prefer – but often miss the target of the ways 
that resilience also acts as a release of agencies in terms of culpability.  
These claims are doubtlessly contestable, but I introduced them for several 
reasons. Joseph’s point relates the neoliberal status of the individual to the 
acknowledgement that security institutions espouse resilience. For him, and for me, there 
are important ramifications of this espousal. It cannot be overlooked that resilience most 
usually replaces preventative strategies with efforts to buttress the capacities for 
communities, as well as individuals, to endure calamitous events. This is the sense in 
which I introduce with sentiments like “release” or “abandonment of” conventional 
modes of security. I will show this with reference to FEMA policy in the following 
several pages., revealing the connections mentioned here while also addressing some of 
their subtler (and not so subtle) implications. What Joseph is able to so ably demonstrate 
here is the radical interaction in the neoliberal model of resilience between adaptivity, 
responsibility and a fairly radical – if not antiquated, or counter to modern liberal ideas of 
the social contract for security – idea about the individual’s role in securing her own 
survival. And Joseph is able to link these relationships directly to prominent modes of 
political economy that are reshaping not only lives, but the nature of vulnerability as well. 
Danny MacKinnon and Kate Driscoll Derickson demonstrate this empirically in the 
context of global capital and climate change, a promissory harbinger of only increasing 
turbulence: “[the] discourse of resilience is that it places the onus squarely on local actors 
and communities to further adapt to the logics and implications of global capitalism and 
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climate change.”76 The sense of vulnerability, the need for adaptivity, fall onto smaller 
units (the individual, the family, the community); and the correspondence of these 
smaller units to enormous political and economic structures therefore require even more 
attention paid by the subjects of neoliberal resilience. 
This is borne out, when considering documents like FEMA’s Are you Ready? An 
In-Depth Guide to Citizen Preparedness.77 While of course FEMA makes no mention of 
the neoliberal revolution in its own self-imagination of effectiveness, the document is 
extraordinarily revealing in terms of its goals and aspirations. And it reminds the reader 
time and again of the necessity for individual resilience, family and community 
teamwork, and the importance of self-administered aid. It, after all, is a pedagogical 
resource that not only lists calamities, but also directs citizens what to keep in their 
homes to increase their preparedness; gives advice on emotional and psychological well-
being and trauma; and even how to carry out cursory inspections of structures to 
determine safe habitability.  
The guide was prepared by FEMA in order to educate citizens on how to be more 
prepared for a wide array of surprise events including technological accidents (hazardous 
materials incidents, household chemical issues, nuclear meltdowns),78 “natural” disasters 
(ranging from tornadoes, earthquakes, hurricanes, volcanoes and nine more),79 and five 
scenarios of terrorist attack (these range from discrete and likely small scale actions to the 
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disastrous event of a nuclear attack).80 That it was issued as a part of a program to 
disseminate citizen engagement training through a new program called Citizen Corps, 
only renders more explicit the kinds of critiques that I was quoting above. It includes 
checklists, general knowledge tips, and concludes each section with quizzes – recall 
Jonathan Joseph, above, observing the concomitant neoliberal and resilience “concern(s) 
with…our adaptability, our reflexive understanding, our own risk assessments, our 
knowledge acquisition and, above all else, our responsible decision making.”81 
Perhaps even more tellingly, in the chapter addressing “Recovering from 
Disaster,” FEMA introduces the subject matter frankly: 
Recovering from a disaster is usually a gradual process. Safety is a primary issue, 
as are mental and physical well-being. If assistance is available, knowing how to 
access it makes the process faster and less stressful. This section offers some 
general advice on steps to take after disaster strikes in order to begin getting your 
home, your community, and your life back to normal. Your first concern after a 
disaster is your family’s health and safety. You need to consider possible safety 
issues and monitor family health and well-being.82  
 
The agent here, importantly, is you. “…Getting your home, your community, and your 
life back to normal. Your first concern… you…” And, as will become more important 
momentarily, FEMA never mentions itself, nor the Department of Homeland Security, 
nor the fire department, EMS, or police, neither National Guard nor military. To see the 
activity of the agent, consider the verbal tenses: Issues of condition and aid “recovering,” 
“safety,” and “assistance” all appear in the present tense; as are all characterizations of 
your responsibility. “You” need to know what to do in the moment of disaster.  
                                                
80 ibid, 145-78. 
81 Joseph 2013, 40. My emphasis. 
82 Ibid, 180. My emphasis. 
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 In turn, the guide then lists who or which agencies might be appealed to in the 
event of one of the seventeen families of disaster, each with multiple possibilities and 
iterations under its family name. It is worth showing in full: 
Direct Assistance: 
Direct assistance to individuals and families may come from any number of 
organizations, including:  
• American Red Cross.  
• Salvation Army.  
• Other volunteer organization.  
These organizations provide food, shelter, supplies and assist in clean-up [sic.] 
efforts.  
 
The Federal Role: 
In the most severe disasters, the federal government is also called in to help 
individuals and families with temporary housing, counseling (for post-disaster 
trauma), low-interest loans and grants, and other assistance. The federal 
government also has programs that help small businesses and farmers. Most 
federal assistance becomes available when the President of the United States 
declares a “Major Disaster” for the affected area at the request of a state governor. 
FEMA will provide information through the media and community outreach 
about federal assistance and how to apply.83  
 
After the fact, after the event, FEMA makes no offer of itself in direct terms. Directly, 
one may seek aid with humanitarian organizations, which make use of their own 
programs of resilience activity and education, it should be noted.84 And, then, there 
remains another step of authorization, of recognition, before first responders at the federal 
level might take action. In their absence, there is you.   
 In a move that is enormously helpful in making sense of this departure from the 
role of the U.S. government – even to claim its primary role – in security, Olaf Corry 
argues that resilience has somewhat altogether supplanted “defense” in the conventional 
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sense when it comes to human security.85 A provocative claim to be sure, but Corry is 
convincing on the level that conventional threats – defined by Ole Waever and others as 
the existence of “an existential threat to a valued object, legitimizing exceptional 
means”86 – no longer solely occupy the foreground of the security imagination.  
It makes little sense to “defend” against catastrophic climate change, pandemics, 
economic meltdowns, or even certain kinds of terrorism, insofar as security 
concerns such as these are based primarily on uncertainty, are located in the 
future, and often lack clear adversaries. Security thus has to take on modus 
operandi other than defense.87 
 
Corry’s central argument operates through the logic that if the range of threats is so 
broad, it makes little sense to overly invest scholarly attention to the relatively narrow 
conception of defense in the conventional sense of foreign enemies who pose threats to 
nation-states. More importantly for my own argument, Corry also provides a useful path 
from the dominance of neoliberal critiques of resilience; but not because they are 
inaccurate – far from it, and I agree – but because “critics of resilience, by interpreting it 
as inherently tied to a metanarrative of neoliberalism, tend to overlook its critical 
potential and functions within other logics of governing.”88 Forgoing the absolutism of 
neoliberal criticism means that a scholar can incorporate the neoliberal machinations at 
the same time as sharing concerns for human security outside of the neoliberal logic. It 
allows research to take stock of the effects of neoliberal order on subjectivities, on 
responsibility, and on the role of the state and capital in each of these. But it also allows 
us to think beyond these phenomena and focus on considerations that more directly 
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impact the practical logic and rationalities of human survival, and how it interacts directly 
with power and discourse, possibly, as a complementary mechanism to neoliberal order.  
At very least, taking this position allows the question to emerge of what might 
offer as a contrapositive: That within the very argumentative logic of critiques of 
resilience as practical neoliberalism, a focus on the non-priority of state action, the 
emphasis placed on communities actually presents a counter-narrative to neoliberal 
individualism within its very imposition upon sociopolitical life.89 MacKinnon and 
Driscoll Derickson see a similar potential in such a reality, preferring the word 
“resourcefulness” to resilience for its progressive potentiality.90 Nevertheless, the point 
ought be made that another social form of politics is also produced that is rarely 
accounted for in laissez-faire portrayals of neoliberal resilience that may serve as an 
important place from which to critique the critique, as it were, of the all-encompassing 
narrative of neoliberal subsumption. The point is, though resilience seems to vacate the 
political, MacKinnon and Driscoll Derickson are correct to argue that the political exists 
at many registers, and can be produced and reproduced through a multitude of 
interactions and forms of political community.  
MacKinnon and Driscoll Derickson’s point is to criticize the fundamental 
conservatism of resilient politics. But in their suggestion that resourcefulness succeeds as 
a useful alternative because it seizes on actually-existing community politics as a form of 
politics, they fall short of elaborating convincingly what the stakes are for the 
contemporary liberal state and its organization of political life. Resourcefulness may 
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indeed involve an even more neoliberal train of thought. To the extent that modern liberal 
governments still offer what Claudia Aradau, carefully framing Arendt’s critique of the 
Nietzschean individualist promise, calls “the promise of security,” it is not clear that the 
promise would be fulfilled by agents of the federal government from the case of FEMA’s 
Guide for the Citizen Corps that I discussed several pages earlier.91 For Aradau, the 
promise of security in liberal governance corresponds to the assumption made by citizens 
in plural that effectively creates a political relationship. The promise of security at all 
levels reinforces a liberal social contract that undergirds the political in times defined 
most clearly by radical contingency and indeterminacy: “…promises presuppose a degree 
of control over the future, through the diminution of ignorance and the role of knowledge. 
To promise means to create continuity from present to future.” 92  
It should be added that, as a consequence, promises are formative of a kind of 
political community. Aradau sees in Arendt an important position beyond the sometimes 
facile way that she is deployed by international theorists, simply as a marking figure 
etching out distinctions between the social and the political as she elaborates in The 
Human Condition and elsewhere.93 The promise extends itself temporally, as an active 
moment of speech that defies the nature of contingency that the future might hold. The 
promise reconditions the figures bound by it against the uncertain future: “The promise 
enacts a limit to contingency and unpredictability, as promises are a necessary political 
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supplement to the unpredictability of action.”94 As Aradau continues this interpretation, 
security becomes once again central to her concern: 
The promise of enlightened knowledge, which is the promise of the security 
speech act, is effectively the voice of authority and certainty. A world that is 
completely certain, foreseeable and predictable is a world devoid of politics. That 
would mean that the politics of promising disappears as it becomes a “calculated, 
programmed datum that can be anticipated in advance.”95 
 
It is the absence of certainty, the strange relationship attempting to gain certitude in the 
promise that creates the political exchange of the promise, and the potential for a politics 
of the promise itself.96 A sort of body politic emerges out of indetermination and the 
uncertainty it begs. A kind of exchange in which promises multiply the range of actors by 
fiat of necessarily being non-individualistic and, as such, create a plurality of givers and 
accepters that only really emerge in the ontological condition of indeterminacy (which 
Aradau refers to simply as contingency). 
 What is at stake in Aradau’s formulation is profound. If promises are a social 
technique of assuring others against contingent futures, and those promises come to 
formulate political community, then the temporal relationship meets the political 
relationship anew in creating the promise of security where otherwise there could not be 
one. This of course does not imply that promises of security are always kept, or are 
somehow impervious to contingency – quite the contrary. It means that the promise of 
security forms a different feature of political community.  
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96 Ibid, 85-6. 
 127 
 In a formulation of security not dependent upon security at all, but adaptability, 
flexibility, or resourcefulness – as is the case with resilience – then “the much vaunted 
resilience of communities when confronted with surprising events forsakes the 
unexpectedness of political action for the anticipation of resilient behavior.”97 In other 
words, in the full embrace of contingent futures, or at least the expectant knowledge that 
contingency exceeds knowledge, resilience does not simply forsake preventative and 
protective modes of security, as Corry insists, but it also forsakes a founding promise of 
the body politic itself. Far from the more hopeful desire to project a radical 
resourcefulness that is found in MacKinnon and Driscoll Derickson’s criticism of 
resilience, Aradau sees only how the evacuation of the promise of security “does not aim 
to constitute the conditions of collective political action, but reverts back upon forms of 
individual or pre-given group action.”98 And yet other forms of political society exist 
besides the familiar state-based society that Aradau seems to long for as she laments the 
ubiquitous and pervasive logic of resilience. But her point is not lost: resilience represents 
an abandonment of certain forms of national security, a fuller acceptance of danger for 
individuals and communities, and replaces the hope for safety with the hope for survival. 
 Brad Evans and Julian Reid have written the most compelling text on this issue, a 
recent book Resilient Life, which undertakes to write a new political philosophy of 
“living dangerously” as it is rendered specific under the phenomenon of (neo)liberal 
resilience governance.99 At root their book attempts to give contemporary human life the 
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character of extreme vulnerability as it occupies a turbulent political world, which 
simultaneously teeters on the threshold of environmental disaster. They share many 
critiques and sympathies with the other thinkers that I have already discussed, but what 
makes their work stand out to me is the way that they further the questions left open by 
the critics who view resilience as a clear expression of neoliberalism, as well as those that 
lament somewhat the abandonment of security (the term as I use it is Evans and Reid’s in 
the first place).100 In confronting both the desire for resilience and at the same time its 
pervasive emergence, they argue that human life in these undetermined times is insecure 
by design: 
…liberalism is aimed today not at solving or preventing the manifestation of 
dangers and threats to security, but at making us forego the very idea and 
possibility of security, through the embrace of the necessity of our exposure to 
dangers of all kinds as a means by which to live well.101 
 
Because in a world of catastrophic surprise, vulnerability becomes the very definition of 
human existence, and so to embrace vulnerability is to redefine life as one’s own, as 
one’s to modify, to adapt to the brink of one’s capabilities.102 The logic of adaptability 
comes to animate every aspect of navigating such a world to the extent that a “game of 
survival has to be played by learning how to expose oneself to danger rather than 
believing in the possibility of ever achieving freedom from danger as such.”103 To 
become resilient, they claim, one must fundamentally accept one’s complete and utter 
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vulnerability.104 In accepting vulnerability to danger they don’t mean living hazardously, 
but instead recognizing the necessity to become nimble in the face of a range of dangers; 
to be resilient is to master dangerous elements of life that threaten persistence, and to 
learn to adapt for fear of injury or death. It would be illogical to embrace a vision of 
security that would curtail the possibility to withstand disastrous events on one’s own. If 
the demise of the promise of security for Aradau meant simultaneously a full embrace of 
resilience and at the same time a removal of the founding possibilities of the political, for 
Evans and Reid the politics of living in dangerous times revolves around a certain kind of 
abandonment as empowerment – in the most perverse way. Here, in a somewhat nihilistic 
passage, is how they organize the notion of exposure around the concept of imagined 
constant vulnerability to the seeming onslaught of disastrous events:105 
Deprived, then, of the potential to ‘at last stand’ upon a terrain whose forms of 
endangerment were known in advance, we continue to walk through a veritable 
minefield of potential disasters of a multi-dimensional nature, not knowing when 
the explosion will happen, with little comfort provided by the intellectual 
comforts of the past, and with no fence on the horizon beyond which relative 
security may be achieved and freedom from endangerment realized. The only 
solution, we are told, remains to expose oneself to all its disastrous permutations 
so that we may be better prepared against those already charged and yet to 
detonate along with those yet to even be inserted into this catastrophic 
topography.106  
 
Resilience commands that its exposed subjects adapt and embrace, at least somewhat, 
their inherent vulnerability. The idea is not liberal in the sense that political society exists 
to grant freedom despite the potential for the individual to become dangerous; but, 
instead, “how the subject might practice freedom so that it achieves exposure to danger 
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on behalf of itself and that population to which it contributes. Endangerment, it is now 
said, is productive of life, individually and collectively.”107   
That the book (and companion essay) were written by white men in the global 
north may seem unsurprising. Their mobilization of French theory (especially) and will to 
universalize their claims to global proportions, as if “resilient life” has colonized every 
corner of human existence, could seem to flatten the inherent hierarchies of the very sort 
of vulnerability they bring to the fore. After all, as many have written already, the 
violence of non-state warfare, the political unrest of fallen states, the starvation and 
droughts threatening agriculture, the worst contagious outbreaks, and the deepest and 
most severe poverty are not felt equally the world around – but most relentlessly in the 
global south.108  
How could vulnerability possibly be so uniformly applied and rendered as to be a 
human condition? Ranabir Samaddar, the postcolonial theorist, recognizes in this very 
language something often remote from northern theory, and is well worth quoting at 
length: 
Evans and Reid of course do not use the term post-colonial life. But the life they 
speak of and discuss is the life that millions in the South live and the life that the 
global managers of capitalist governance want to incorporate in the discourse of 
global governance…clearly whoever reads this book will know this is a critique 
of post-colonial life. After all neoliberalism is nothing if not an ideology and a 
range of policies to make capitalism capable of dealing with a permanent post-
colonial existence, which would mean a long duration of crisis, the domination of 
finance and other forms of virtual capital, dispossession of peasantry, return of the 
primitive mode of accumulation, continuous wars of subjugation, loot and 
plunder, and the securitization of life in its entirety. Neoliberalism, in short, is a 
strategy to overcome the division in the global capitalist order between the 
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developed world and the post-colonial world, if necessary by making life in the 
bourgeois world post-colonial… Resilient Life is a testimony, even though a bit 
oblique, to the fact that the post-colonial predicament is global.109 
 
Here Samaddar registers the important point that, rather than read Evans and Reid as 
universalizing the seeming plight of those whose relatively stable notion of security in the 
global north had been abandoned, he encourages the reader to see a different 
generalization at work. The pleas for resilience in the vulnerable is a spreading of the 
hostile conditions experienced by those who have historically already lived this 
conditions for quite some time. For it is a condition of exposure to be rendered only an 
extractable resource for the profit motive, deterritorialized to become the colonized.110 To 
be forced into such conditions is not anti-liberal, it is the history of liberal capitalism in 
its colonial form, spread further.  
Jean and John Comaroff’s Theory of the South puts this differently, but situates 
the sentiment in such a way that reorients Samaddar’s extension of the resilient subject of 
the north as an extension of the experience of those, historically, in the south in another 
way worth quoting, also, at length: 
…we seek to stress something else: that, while Euro-America and the south are 
currently caught up in the same all-embracing world-historical processes, it is in 
the latter that the effects of those processes tend most graphically to manifest 
themselves. Old margins are becoming new frontiers, places where mobile, 
globally competitive capital – much of it, these days, southern and eastern – finds 
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lives of certain Jamaicans—those living in the garrison’s unfolding disaster—exceed the 
appropriative techniques of community-based resilience” (Grove 2014b, 624). 
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minimally regulated zones in which to vest its operations; where industrial 
manufacture opens up ever more cost-efficient sites for itself; where highly 
flexible, informal economies have long thrived; where those performing 
outsourced services have gone on to develop cutting-edge info-tech empires of 
their own, both legitimate and illicit; where new, late-modern idioms of work, 
time, and value, take root, thus to alter planetary practices. Which is why, in the 
dialectics of contemporary world history, the north appears to be “evolving” 
southward.111 
  
Reading Comaroff and Comaroff in the context of Evans and Reid cannot but highlight 
the clever reversal that Comaroff and Comaroff illustrate in this passage. Their point, 
within the context of critiquing the self-appointed nature of European mastery via 
Enlightenment, acknowledges that in point of fact the global south has evolved all along. 
The south had its own particular desires for freedom and other elements firmly found at 
the center of narratives of European Enlightenment – and often posed as a desire for 
freedom from, quite literally, Euro-American masters, colonizers, and slave owners.112 
Further, the south is responsible for a great deal of “progress” in the sense of value that 
capitalist modernity emplaces upon that loaded word.  
To universalize European accomplishment, and do so in a way that merely 
“marginalizes,” the not-yet developed, is not merely Eurocentric, but an empirically 
erroneous act of historicism.113 Comaroff and Comaroff, in a riveting flourish, place the 
word evolving in inverted commas, exposing the ways that the north is only catching up 
to the south in terms of imisseration at the hands of global capitalist transformation as 
                                                
111 Comaroff and Comaroff 2012a, 13; the final emphasis is my own. For critical reflections, 
see Aravamudan 2012; Ferguson 2012; Obarrio 2012; Mbembe 2012; Quayson 2012. 
Comaroff and Comaroff reply in 2012b. 
112 See Dussel 1993; Sylvia Wynter 2002 and 2003 works along similar critical lines.  
113 Chakrabarty centralizes this point about the “not-yet” in the context of the historicism of 
Enlightened modernity convincingly in Chakrabarty 2007, 8 & 250, esp. 
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perhaps its greatest triumph.114 Reading Evans and Reid in light of Comaroff and 
Comaroff, then, illustrates how their thesis of resilient life – and how I have read it along 
with Samaddar occasionally against the grain – ably shows how the resilient logic of 
exposure, and its spread to the “civilized” north, should be read in terms of the north 
“evolving” to greater degrees of vulnerability within the very same logic pronounced by 
the progress of modern-capitalist-enlightenment-progress.  
 This means, as Evans and Reid are clear to establish in their own terms, that to 
become resilient is not to call forth some mysterious universally human will to persist.115 
Resilience, instead, registers its need within political communities – especially – who 
were already vulnerable, or at very least produced to be vulnerable: “Little wonder that 
resilience is most concerned with those deemed most vulnerable. For it is precisely the 
insecuritization of the most at-risk which politically threatens the security and comforts 
of those who are sufficiently protected from the all-too-real effects of risk based 
societies.”116  
At best, resilience operates differently for different people with different means. 
At worst, it regulates, threatens and exposes those who were vulnerable already because 
their segments of whatever population to which they are seen to belong live less secure 
lives as it is. They make special note of this with regard to the 2012 hurricane, Sandy, 
which ravaged much of the East Coast of the United States. Though the storm actually 
                                                
114 There are grand parallels to be drawn here with Marx’s understanding of fluctuations in 
quality of life in the Industrial Reserve Army according to the General Law of Capitalist 
Accumulation. See Marx 1996, 623-34. For an excellent rendering of these passages in Marx 
with reference to the concepts of relative and absolute immiseration, see Evans 2004, 101 & 
128.  
115 Evans and Reid 2013, 92.  
116 Ibid. 
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could have been much worse, many – especially the poor, black and brown, elderly, and 
disabled – were particularly affected. It was in some ways worse than Hurricane Katrina, 
which ravaged New Orleans in 2005 with a spectacular aftermath of death and 
suffering.117 Yet Evans and Reid, in the similarity between the two storms see the 
apotheosis of the human costs of resilient inequality expressed in such moments:  
Like Katrina before it, those already insured with the financial means and 
capabilities to “escape” impending change in climactic conditions experienced the 
event as a mere inconvenience in the ongoing accommodation to rapid 
environmental change. For those, however, on the margins of existence, those 
populations violently contained within deeply segregated ghettos which offer no 
credible means for escape, the raw reality of the devastation was all too apparent. 
In the absence of social protections, such populations were precisely the ones 
asked to evidence their resilience capacities. There is no resilience asked of those 
who can afford to take flight.118  
 
How haunting that they opt for an ecological disaster to illustrate the redoubled burden 
carried by the poor and marginalized in moments following hurricanes. How stunning a 
way to express the politics of what are often called “natural” disasters. To recall a much 
earlier discussion in this chapter, the philosophical force of C.S. Holling’s critique of 
conventional ecology, the events here are precisely “mulitstable” in the sense that 
seemingly separate systems – ecological turbulence, economic and racial inequality – 
conjoin to render a population even more marginal, even more endangered, even more 
exposed – one may call it “more resilient” if one must.  
In a strange turn of fate – one that Holling’s motivations would hopefully not 
have foreseen, though it is inexcusable that political advocates of his work do not – it is 
precisely the imposition to become resilient that threatened the already vulnerable all the 
                                                
117 At very least, Sandy’s wind speeds were higher. But there is little use beyond being 
obtusely pedantic in actually comparing such things. 
118 Evans and Reid 2015, 88. 
 135 
more. For those already less vulnerable, such approaching disasters were not only 
avoidable, they were altogether foreseeable to the extent that their eventfulness were at 
best a minor inconvenience – or as they sometimes call it in the Gulf area, including New 
Orleans, a “hurrication” – while the descriptions of the catastrophe that looms without 
warning becomes all the more salient for those trapped in attics after Katrina for days, 
sometimes with the corpses of their families, in breathless humidity, waiting to die. The 
same goes for those living without electricity or water in high rises-turned-walkups in the 
boroughs outside Manhattan, exposed, as it were, in full reality to their abandoned 
security. Or, if you like better, their resilience in full, empowered, force.   
 
V. Conclusion 
The dominant view that I have mapped throughout this chapter of resilience 
marks an acceptance of ontological indetermination. And from that acceptance in some 
ways, resilience reacts to the idea of ever-present danger with increasingly pervasive 
logics of resilience. It should stand to reason, then, that it does so in a profoundly unequal 
way. Resilience asks the weight of that inevitable catastrophe to be borne by those who 
have no other choice than to be resilient, which is to say they would have to be resilient 
anyway.  
Walker and Cooper in their now seminal essay argue that the outcome of 
neoliberal resilience is that in its totalizing nature, that it internally limits the capacity for 
critique. In a world portrayed as already vulnerable to the extent that protection is less 
useful than resilience, they argue that to critique resilience is to reinforce it.119 But they 
                                                
119 Walker and Cooper 2011, 157. “In its tendency to metabolize all countervailing forces and 
inoculate itself against critique, ‘resilience thinking’ cannot be challenged from within the 
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hedge very closely to the first two substantive sections above, which trace the ecological 
and economic prehistories of today’s pervasive logic of resilience. In the previous 
section, I tried to show several ways that resilience can be critiqued, and most 
importantly can be critiqued from the perspective that resilience inherently perpetuates 
deep inequalities.  
 If Corry is correct that security has migrated from “defense” to “resilience;” and 
Aradau is correct that the most critical effects of pervasive logics of resilience is that they 
disrupt the founding principles of civil society (at least in terms of the role played by the 
liberal state); then it stands to reason that the effects of this double-move I have 
undertaken is not to create inequalities, but to exacerbate them. Resilience theory may 
very well carry forth the missions of both Holling’s qualitative eco-resilience and 
Hayek’s philosophical economism at the same time. Yet neither, it should seem clear at 
this point, relieves vulnerability, but redoubles it for those that were already left behind. 
This is what it means to evoke the abandonment of security under neoliberal regimes of 
resilience. This is what it means to accept the inevitability of indeterminate futures – to 
react to the certainty that the uncertain is bound, eventually, to occur. 
 We can see clearly that resilience encourages the already vulnerable to be more 
adaptive. But this stems not from an epistemology of uncertainty, but in a deep 
ontological commitment to indetermination: that the future will occur as it will. And to 
move within the parameters of resilience is not to reinforce authoritarian over-
securitization of everyday life, but to accept exposure to danger as fundamental to one’s 
                                                                                                                                            
terms of complex systems theory but must be contested, if at all, on completely different 
terms, by a movement of thought that is truly counter-systemic.”  
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position in everyday life in a political society. And to the extent that, in the world of 
security (whether resilient in form or not), what one survives – or at very least is exposed 
to – is an expansive list of as many specific, if improbable, catastrophes; then it stands to 
reason that the animating force of such a move to resilience is an idea about catastrophe 
that has become altogether normalized, if not abstractly powerful. In the next chapter, as 
a result, I bring the first two chapters together in order to rebuild “the coming 
catastrophe” as one that is altogether, today, extraordinarily normal. 
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Normal Catastrophes: Security Against All Hazards 
 
 
 
 
 
 
I. Introduction 
In the first chapter, I tried to give new life to the abstract, however frequently evoked, 
idea of “the coming catastrophe.” Beyond an effort to show transformations in that 
concept over time – importantly, from the specific to a more general understanding of 
what may come (which is also a central, though more implicit, element of the current 
chapter) – I showed how frequently the coming catastrophe is considered in mainly 
epistemological terms, preoccupied as it is by the influential discourse surrounding 
uncertainty. Partly because many contemporary scholars are beholden to the influence of 
a particular reading of Foucault, or else to the influence of the Copenhagen School of 
security studies who privilege “speech acts” as formative of securitization, so much of the 
analysis given to preparatory security leans unnecessarily toward the work and reasoning 
of security professionals. 1  As an effect, much of the scholarship committed to 
                                                
1 On speech acts in the Copenhagen School and some critiques see for example: Bain 2006; 
Buzan 1983 and 1991; Hansen 2000; Hough 2004; Huysmans 1998a and 1998b. 
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understanding security against future catastrophes focuses on security officials and 
political elites. 
But as I also showed, the centrality of uncertainty to security thinking corresponds 
importantly to ontological indetermination. When left aside, the abstention of ontological 
reflection articulates a profound wedge in the contemporary scene surrounding 
catastrophe and the prospect of human survival. Failures to know correspond to 
ontological indeterminacy as a central theme of human security itself. Hence the 
obsessive preoccupation with uncertainty. Uncertainty obscures the question of 
impossible knowledges produced from the cleavages of ontological indetermination, and 
perpetuates the machinery of preventative, anticipatory modes of security in a nearly 
endless cycle of responding, not to uncertainty, but the struggle to know what cannot be 
known. 
 In the second chapter I focused on a different approach, one that resigns itself to 
the ontological impossibility to hold adequate knowledge about the future. As an effect, 
the ideas animating resilience theory represent a fundamental acceptance of radical 
uncertainty, and carry their own perilous effects.2 In a way the first chapter revolves 
around theories and practices attempting to master what cannot be mastered 
ontologically. As such that chapter re-injects the question of the ontological back into the 
dialogue about future-oriented security practices in order to show the richness of the idea 
of the coming catastrophe and how it emerges from a strict tension between what can and 
cannot be thought and what is yet to be determined. Chapter two, it follows then, is about 
the dismal effects of giving up on that pursuit and aiming toward surviving what is taken 
                                                
2 On “radical uncertainty,” see Dillon 2007. 
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to be inevitable in an embrace of the very same tension that future-oriented security 
attempts to resist. 
 In this present chapter the two ideas converge. Again, this chapter moves from the 
particular to the general; from the singular to the plural; and, likewise, from the concrete 
and discernable to an abstraction.3 The weight of this abstraction, I argue, is pregnant 
with political force. I try to show how “normal catastrophes” present the problem of 
survival to which human security corresponds with a catchall category that feeds back 
upon efforts to cope with both uncertainty and indetermination. But, importantly, this 
abstraction is conceptual to the extent that it strives to encompass ideas of all that might 
come. And it is a concept bearing enormous political force. 
The idea of normal catastrophes, as it were, recombines unlike phenomena and 
fills them with meaning as one – as the coming catastrophe – in a sense that it renders 
their particularities vast enough that a general paradigm of response is required, however 
shaky; or, as Collier and Lakoff contend, however fraught with internal tensions.4 It is 
intrinsic to my thinking about catastrophe that its meaning functions this way in everyday 
language. An attentive reader will notice this frequently when catastrophe stands in for 
the particularity of a distinct event – notice the way that it functions as a categorical 
unifier for unlike events, past, present or future. The word catastrophe becomes 
conceptual through its abstraction, where it renders unlike events (a hurricane, a terrorist 
                                                
3 In using the word “abstraction,” I do not mean to link its meaning to the unreal or 
immaterial. Instead I mean to insist that the notion of probable catastrophe considers disasters 
all and sundry in a means that renders their specificity less important than their probability. In 
this sense I mean to evoke the abstract notion of catastrophe in powerfully discursive ways 
with material effects that I narrate over the course of the chapter. On “real abstractions,” see 
Toscano 2008; and discussions of Toscano’s ideas in Moore 2017, pp. 595 and 598.  
4 Collier and Lakoff 2008, 8.  
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attack, for example) as roughly equivalent in their magnitude. As a result, “catastrophe” 
is a functional abstraction – it functions to unite and render similar a range of events that 
are otherwise unlike. Jean-Pierre Dupuy makes this connection clearly:   
I speak of catastrophe in the singular, not to designate a singular event, but a 
whole system of disruptions, discontinuities, and basic structural changes that are 
the consequences of exceeding critical thresholds. Feeding on one another and 
growing in strength, the calamities we are witnessing today herald an age of 
unprecedented violence.5 
 
For Dupuy, catastrophes (plural) are unified under the singular moniker, the sema of 
catastrophe, because his political rhetoric articulates a belief that human beings are on a 
crash course to their own extinction. 6  For Dupuy, catastrophes link together as 
catastrophe-singular because they all lead to an eschatological end.7 For me, the link 
between the plural and the singular relate similarly, but not because of a telos, instead 
because their differences become semblances under the conceptual work that the real 
abstraction performs.  
The effects of combining threats under the banner of catastrophe are multiple. In 
bringing together the arguments of the first two chapters to bear on the concept of 
catastrophe in general, what I illustrate below is the unique way that the very concept of 
catastrophe serves to create its own autocatalytic loop in which “catastrophe” stands in 
for “particular catastrophes” in ways that offer a new problem for thinking about security; 
                                                
5 Dupuy 2013, 21 
6 ibid. See also the opening pages of Dupuy 2005.  
7 “It is my profound belief that humanity is on a suicidal course, headed straight for 
catastrophe” (Dupuy 2013, 21). For Dupuy, this suicidal course is fixed in the paired belief in 
scientific innovation and progress, because it creates a paradox of a certain kind of humanism 
in which scientific progress has led to the environmental and warring crises that define our 
common present, and portend the contours of our likely catastrophic future. But it is also the 
case that humanity is so wedded to scientism that scientific innovation offers the only 
reasonable solution at one and the same time. See Dupuy 2005, 9.  
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but more importantly, perhaps, offer new urgency within its very conceptualization. 
Many, especially when writing from within the critique of resilience argue, as does Olaf 
Corry (citing O’Malley), that “resilience ‘does not imagine specific scenarios against 
which defenses (or preemptive strikes) must be prepared’ but keeps them open instead.”8 
This point is well taken. But the same can be said of conventional security measures that 
seek, not simply to withstand, but to prevent unknown future destruction and casualties. 
The non-specificity of the coming catastrophe – as it gains force when it is abstracted 
both by advocates of resilience, prevention, and preparedness – is not because of 
resilience but because of the indetermination of the future itself coming to bear on 
emergency management and security institutions.  
In other words, catastrophes are not normal because they are banal. They are 
normal because their particularities – in the future tense – have been homogenized. 
The recent concern on the subject in the discipline of political theory has been on 
the effects of catastrophe on governance – its discourses, rhetorics, and knowledges – 
upon the welfare of its citizens and the ways that such catastrophizations affect the 
possibilities and limits of democratic (or even merely tolerable) contemporary life.9 In 
critical security studies, which can often offer a political theory of its own, the concern 
has focused more upon problems facing experts that result from their own uncertainty, 
leading to transformations in cultures and practices of security provision and its broader 
                                                
8 Corry 2014, 256; the O’Malley passage that he is citing is from O’Malley 2011, 55. 
9 See for example, Vázquez-Arroyo 2012 and 2013; Ophir 2010 
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effects.10 This chapter bridges the first two chapters that focus on the critical security 
literature with the next few that deal with the pervasive conceptual presence of 
catastrophe in contemporary political life and culture; and hence this chapter seeks to 
begin linking what are rarely understood to be points of mutual concern between security 
studies and political theory as understood by the recurrent evocation of future 
catastrophes. 
In this chapter I argue that despite their differences, preparative and preventative 
modes of security operate against a similar phenomenon. Where earlier I focused on the 
future orientation of catastrophe, here I will insist that catastrophe in itself is a 
fabrication, an abstraction that includes a significant list of distinct kinds of events 
beneath its umbrella. As a consequence, the concept of catastrophe emerged from shifts 
in practical security concerns, but its result was far from only practical.  
To show this, I first trace some of the theoretical deployments of the concept of 
catastrophe. This conceptual elaboration shows the flexibility of the concept of 
catastrophe, especially temporally, to illustrate some complications that should be 
associated with thinking about catastrophe in the future tense, but also to separate my 
argument about catastrophe from others working on the concept. Moreover, a 
clarification is necessary because other conceptual accounts of catastrophe insist that 
there are components of catastrophe that inhabit everyday life and therefore might be 
seen as similarly “normal.” I make efforts to show how these ideas differ from the 
concept of normal catastrophes, namely that they suggest different phenomena, as well as 
                                                
10 See for example, Anderson 2010a and 2010b; Aradau and Van Munster 2007, 2008, and 
2011; Adey and Anderson 2012; Amoore and de Goede 2008; de Goede and Randalls 2009; 
Neocleus 2012. 
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introduce the unique temporal, i.e. future-oriented, notion of normal catastrophes. As a 
way to illustrate the origins of normal catastrophes, I turn to scholars who together 
constitute an established historical account of the ways the United States government 
might have practically contributed to the combination of distinct catastrophes into a 
normalize homogenization. Specifically I look at the emergence of practices of “civil 
defense” which, according to Peter Galison, Stephen Collier and Andrew Lakoff, led to 
transformations in the object of security moving from the singular threat of nuclear war to 
a longer list of threats in general. I then return to efforts to articulate a broader conception 
of catastrophe as a way to bridge the earlier segments of the dissertation with the latter. In 
doing so, I perform interpretations that show a stark distinction between the histories 
leading to the formation of FEMA that are tracked in the discussion of Galison, Collier 
and Lakoff’s work that shows how, in the post-9/11 security environment, the category of 
normal catastrophes seems to swell larger and larger. The takeaway for the reader should 
be that the concept of catastrophe is an abstraction representing a range of deadly threats, 
and one that motivates concerns for human security; and, not least, that this real 
abstraction has a material history driving it to the present state of affairs.11  
It will be useful to clarify that this chapter theorizes the emergence of a 
combinative discourse that admits features of both prevention and preparedness. Its 
principal effort is to theorize a harmonization of disparate modes of considering future 
catastrophes. For purposes of scope, the narrative of the chapter focuses on the context of 
the United States since the Cold War, but it is not a work of empirical history. Instead it 
in part engages with empirical studies in order to theorize the conceptual passage from 
                                                
11 Toscano 2008 
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“the coming catastrophe” to its normalization in discourses about security as a more 
general political logic.  It presents a narrative drawn from historical sources to show the 
advent and transformation of an idea. It does so, by making reference of established 
historical writings before performing an interpretation of more recent documents in an 
effort to demonstrate the expansiveness of threats included in the category. Showing the 
way that normal catastrophes homogenize distinct kinds of events was important to the 
previous two chapters, and this chapter aims to synthesize the work done in those 
chapters through the concept. As such the present chapter operates as a conclusion to the 
previous two, by theorizing across what was held apart in their singular instances, and 
points toward the work of the following chapters which try to move beyond them to a 
broader assessment of their implications. 
 
 
II. (Ab)Normal Catastrophes: Past, Present, Future 
Catastrophes are by definition abnormal. They enact a breach in the normal state of 
affairs, leaving behind them not only wreckage but also transformations in all corridors of 
life that they touch. So it cannot seem but odd when I argue that catastrophes – in a very 
particular way – have become utterly normal.  
Many thinkers of catastrophic events insist that from its etymological roots to its 
everyday use in language, catastrophe signifies a disruption – a moment when the normal 
state of affairs becomes punctuated.12 A catastrophe, as Adi Ophir puts it, is “an event 
that transforms both time and space” into a zone of disaster, a new present of turbulence 
                                                
12 This is a common theme in the theoretic literature of disaster. See for example Ophir 2010, 
61; Vázquez-Arroyo 2013, 741-43; Vázquez-Arroyo 2012, 212; Neyrat 2008, 35; Aradau and 
Van Munster 2011, 3, 10-11.   
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distinct from the presumably more tranquil pre-evental past.13 Likewise, Frédéric Neyrat 
argues that catastrophes issue a “partial discontinuity and a relative continuity” in the 
occurrence of such massive events without “radically upsetting historical continuity,” by 
which he means that these momentous events, while disastrous, still allow for the 
continuity of time.14 Antonio Vázquez-Arroyo, borrowing from Ophir, and going further 
than Neyrat, insists that catastrophes have a transformative effect: “…the concept of 
‘catastrophe’ suggests a radical break from ‘what is,’ a diremption in the perceived order 
of things that brings with it destruction and loss, an irreversible transformation of the 
present, a turning point, and a sense of irremediable defeat for those who are on the 
receiving end of it.”15 Or, as he puts it later in the same essay, “the shattering of an old 
order.”16 
Yet, more central to his point of view, Vázquez-Arroyo reminds us that 
catastrophes can also be dreary and sometimes seem like non-events, but nevertheless 
constitute a disruption to those that endure them as these less spectacular catastrophes 
transform landscapes and peoples, obscuring some suffering while attention shifts to 
more fearsome disruptions of everyday life elsewhere.17 This conception, at least on the 
surface, might seem similar to a statement that catastrophes are normal. But Vázquez-
Arroyo, recalling Žižek, has in mind the ways that such dreary catastrophes render 
ongoing pernicious states of affairs commonplace. Vázquez-Arroyo makes use of Žižek’s 
distinction in The Puppet and the Dwarf (who himself is drawing on Terry Eagleton’s modes 
                                                
13 Ophir 2008, 61. 
14 Neyrat 2008, 35.  
15 Vázquez-Arroyo 2012, 212.    
16 Ibid, 213. 
17 Vázquez-Arroyo 2012, 213; Vázquez-Arroyo 2013, 745-6.  
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of tragedy) while discussing 9/11 as transfixing spectacular event that overshadows ongoing 
calamities like the prolonged suffering of the Palestinians.18 The distinction between big-C 
Catastrophes (spectacular events) and small-c catastrophes (long term, malaise-ridden, 
structural events riddled by human suffering) reveals the critical difference between the two 
sorts of events as related states of affairs: “The first mode of tragedy, the figure against the 
‘normal’ background, is characteristic of the First World; while in much of the Third World, 
catastrophe designates the ever-present background itself.”19  
Mostly, small-c catastrophes – colonialism, capitalism, global warming are 
examples – unfold over the long term and seem less like events than injuriously dismal 
states of affairs. They can manifest as “tragedy conceived as an ongoing, dreary condition 
that is sometimes normalized, even explicitly authorized and overshadowed, under the 
auspices of the [spectacular] connotation.”20 That they are “normalized,” for Vázquez-
Arroyo, means that catastrophes can often be structural organizing principles that visit 
great harm on the affected, but perhaps because they embed themselves in the political 
organization of states of affairs, appearing non-catastrophic and simply sad, irremediable, 
unalterable.21 In other words, for Vázquez-Aroyo, small-c catastrophes are normalized 
not because they are normal to those whose lives are disrupted by their states of affairs, 
but because they seem normal compared to the grandiose catastrophes that tend to 
obscure them and make them seem endurable. The distinction between big-C and small-c 
                                                
18 Žižek 2003, 165. 
19 Vázquez-Arroyo 2012, 213; The discussion in Žižek follows a lengthy discussion of 
Dupuy, who I interpret extensively in chapter five. The discussion that Vázquez-Arroyo 
refers to in The Puppet and the Dwarf appears in Žižek 2003, 165; For the Eagleton that 
Žižek is drawing upon, see Eagleton 2003. 
20 Vázquez-Arroyo 2012, 213. 
21 Vázquez-Arroyo 2013, 746. 
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catastrophes can be made less cumbersome: big-C Catastrophes are large-scale events, 
with impactful effects; small-c catastrophes designate ongoing insufferable conditions. 
The latter, to Vázquez-Arroyo, designates such dreary catastrophes that carry their own 
political force in normalizing states of affairs and hence illustrate the ways that 
intolerable forms of life are often obscured by catastrophic events, or how terrible 
circumstances are mitigated by the appearance of harm at another more spectacular scale.  
But what about when they have not yet occurred? What can we say about 
catastrophes that remain matters of speculation, whether spectacular or obscure? Most 
thinkers theorize catastrophe as a historic or already-existing phenomenon.22 There is 
however a broad literature in security studies concerned with anticipatory strategies and 
how they are concerned with catastrophe, as I have shown in previous chapters.23 But this 
literature often obscures what the philosophic and political theoretic project has obsessed 
over. Because of the emphasis in security studies on matters of professional expertise, it 
rarely dwells on the phenomenon of catastrophe itself, nor the ways that catastrophe 
registers effects outside of the security establishment. How does the anticipated 
catastrophe carry political weight?24 What is the catastrophe in question when it comes to 
disasters that have not yet occurred? In aiming to discuss what sorts of politics are made 
possible by anticipating future disasters, we should move beyond the tendencies of 
                                                
22 Walter 2008; Chakrabarty 2008 & 2012; Hugget 1998; Ager 1993  
23 See for example, Aradau and Van Munster 2007, 2008, 2011; and Anderson 2010a and 
2010b. 
24 Vázquez-Arroyo discusses these questions as a matter of political rhetoric and narrative in 
Vázquez-Arroyo 2013. From his perspective, the rhetoric of catastrophe – his take on Ophir’s 
discursive catastrophization – is a deployment by political agents that depoliticizes (745) and 
neutralizes (746) populations. I discuss some of these matters in the following chapter, as 
well as in Kindervater 2017, esp. pp. 100-104.  
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security professionals, beginning with what animates concern for the coming 
catastrophe.25 If the coming catastrophe has a force capable of organizing political life, 
then it is necessary to identify what, in the beginning, is embodied when future 
catastrophes are invoked. In other words, pace Vázquez-Arroyo, I recognize the 
importance of how catastrophes render states of affairs normalized, but in a very different 
way.  
I am interested less with the effects of catastrophes that have already occurred, for 
which we can register their effects, than with the force of catastrophes that have yet to 
occur. Vázquez-Arroyo and others are preoccupied with the ways that suffering develops 
historically to compose the present. I am interested in a separate yet related set of ideas: 
How is it that “catastrophe” stands in for a range of different events? Further, when taken 
from the standpoint of “the coming catastrophe,” how is it that this concept comes to 
blend and abstract many different sorts of possible events into the idea of a future 
catastrophe itself? The notion that some catastrophe, as a conceptual category for a range 
of any number of disasters – the notion that such abstract catastrophe is nevertheless 
likely – means that catastrophes in general have become utterly normal. Put simply, how 
does the singular, highly improbable event of a catastrophe, when taken as all possible 
future possibilities – what is called in the next section “all-hazards” – become altogether 
probable. In the next section, I explore how this came to be. 
 
                                                
25 I link the concept of “normal catastrophes” that I develop in this chapter to a larger set of 
cultural effects in the following chapter. 
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III. Nuclear War, Civil Defense and the Generalization of Threat: All-Hazards 
Security 
The historical emergence in the 21st century of normal catastrophes extends from 
a very particular catastrophic vision in the 20th. As I outlined in the first chapter, the 
notion of complete nuclear annihilation emerged as a conceptual foundation for future-
oriented constructions of contemporary ideas about human security. The speculative 
prospect of nuclear war revised the basis of security thinking from territorial and national 
security to a broader question of existential persistence in a time of rapidly transforming 
technological capabilities.26  
From the possibility of nuclear winter came the totalizing idea that catastrophe 
posed an existential threat that threaded together notions of national security, catastrophic 
possibility, and future orientations to threat of calamitous scales. Yet, now, the 
conceptual ties binding future catastrophe to the singular, the particular, notion of nuclear 
annihilation branch out and encompass such a wide view that it no longer makes sense to 
implicitly link “the coming catastrophe” only to nuclear war.27 Nor would seem anything 
but limiting of the concept, for the concept itself extends far beyond nuclear threats to 
encompass such a wide range of possibilities that it only makes sense to consider them in 
their discursive construction as entirely probable, entirely normal. 
In mapping the progression of “preparedness,” Andrew Lakoff and Stephen 
Collier argue that domestic security in the United States transformed because of postwar 
                                                
26 Buzan 1997, 5.  
27 Perrow 1984, 256-7.  
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strategy of “civil defense.”28 Building on concerns from aerial bombing surveys, the US 
security establishment began to theorize domestic security in more dramatic terms, where 
massive casualties could be sustained in previously unthinkable ways. In this context, 
Peter Galison notes that as the United States began building its nuclear capabilities, it was 
already inspired by its singularity on the world stage. After all, the U.S. was the only 
nation state to have ever deployed a nuclear weapon upon an enemy.29 As such the 
United States projected the threat that it itself imposed on the world, not only against 
foreign adversaries, but perhaps most importantly against itself.30 
In the main, the United States security establishment began wondering what sorts 
of effects it might suffer if its adversaries reached the same capacities that it had. 
Undertaking significant empirical research, the United States developed strategic 
bombing surveys that produced new strategies for offensive war making. But the surveys 
also sparked new interest in domestic vulnerabilities should adversaries gain a parity with 
US aerial capabilities.31 The result was a range of “distributed preparedness” techniques 
which “mapped national space as a field of vulnerabilities” which disaggregated the 
landscape from centralized cores of vulnerability to trying to redistribute infrastructure 
across space in order to limit vulnerability.32 Germinating in the pre-nuclear age, the US 
undertook knowledge creating activities to strategize the impacts of aerial bombing 
                                                
28 Collier and Lakoff 2008, 11. 
29 Galison 2001, 29. 
30 ibid, 30. 
31 ibid 
32 Collier and Lakoff 2008, 8; Galison 2001 makes this feature of decentering the landscape 
the priority of his study. 
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tactics resulting in a more varied view of the focal point(s) of insecurity though from a 
singular threat of intercontinental nuclear attack.  
Key to Collier and Lakoff’s thesis of “distributed preparedness,” which bears 
stark resemblance to Galison’s thesis in his landmark critique of postmodernism from 
2001, they argue that the mimetic influence of U.S. bombing capabilities had remarkable 
effects at home. In essence, because the U.S. was alone in its initial nuclear capabilities, it 
was able to reflect back upon its own territory the possibility that others might gain 
similar potential for attack. Resulting from this view, several results followed. A 
redistribution of resources from federal (centralized) command were reallocated to state, 
local, and private authorities.33 In what they call “emergency federalism” Collier and 
Lakoff note that the 1951 Civil Defense Act repurposed defense from the national level to 
a distributed network of actors.34 This redistribution was not merely a shift in authorities, 
but also from the main seats of political power, highly concentrated urban centers, to 
inspiring a network that disseminated possible effects from foreign attack.  
Peter Galison recognized this a half decade earlier when writing on the same 
theme covering the same period. Emphasizing the fact that the knowledge production of 
the U.S. Strategic Bombing Surveys created meaning about the built landscape, Galison 
argued that, in essence, a new map of civil life was drawn precisely by the U.S.’s own 
self-reflecting ideas about vulnerability. New partnerships between federal government 
and private industry were created to respond to vulnerability maps. And new civil plans 
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were drawn where a less-centralized network of civil life rendered the U.S. and its 
economic infrastructure less vulnerable to singular attacks.35 
As other states became nuclear powers this imagined future gained increasing 
pertinence. But it is important to remember that the threat of nuclear war remained an 
utterly speculative phenomenon; and one that was not only speculative but singular in 
both its presumed scale, as well as its status as apotheosis on the scale of imagined 
human generated catastrophe itself.36 After all, only the United States had ever deployed 
a nuclear weapon on an enemy target.37 And its adversary in Japan surrendered rather 
than retaliated. But as more states leveled the playing field of the nuclear age, the 
question of what nuclear war might look like replaced the merely paranoid stance of a 
state whose civil infrastructure was shifting because it imagined the possibility of other 
states being able to act as itself had already acted.38 As the Cold War loomed, so did the 
nightmare of nuclear annihilation. 
Nevertheless the era of nuclear bombs introduced to U.S. security discourse 
apocalyptic tones of tremendous dystopian color. In a sense, the security community 
reacted to this discourse as much as they did the presence of the capabilities of its 
adversaries.39 But more than what Galison diagnoses as a kind of Lacanian mirroring 
amongst those contemplating life and death after the emergence of nuclear bombs, a 
practical shift emerged as well. In the early 1950s, the magnitude of potential losses from 
a nuclear encounter entered into the discussion of the scale of possible losses. Previous to 
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this moment, national security was the principal conception where the key features to be 
protected were the centers of power, actors occupying its key institutions. With such 
large numbers of casualties for the first time possible, and now in such a truncated 
moment of time, the idea of war was conceived less as a drawn out engagement, as much 
as a tipping point. In a way, the magnitude of potential nuclear war affected conceptions 
of time and speed as much as it did the space in targeting.  
“[A] sudden and devastating attack” married urgency to magnitude.40 In the eyes 
of the U.S. National Security Resources Board, national priorities needed to recognize the 
effect that such attacks would have on “America’s productive power.”41 The economic 
interests of the United States gained prominence in the priorities of thinking about 
national security, but so did the safety and infrastructure surrounding those who create 
such value. To think national security in the air-nuclear age meant to consider the 
biopolitical implications of mass casualties as well as the endurance of critical 
infrastructure as the focus of the productive capacity of a nation state. As such, “national 
security” integrated a more abstruse set of ideals under the aegis of “civil defense.” And 
rather than merely considering the stakes of nuclear war as a matter of “defense” against 
foreign threats, it became clear that new tactics were required that might prepare for 
events so magnificent that to have been unprepared would be to have missed the potential 
of nuclear annihilation in all of its alarming possibility, but also its plausibility.42 
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Peter Galison shows how far reaching this transformation was. The Office of 
Civil Defense drew new lines of vulnerability for the United States.43 New parameters 
were diagrammed, new zoning laws erected, new agreements were forged with industry 
to relocate factories to the outskirts of urban industrial hubs. Preventing nuclear attacks 
was something that could be theorized, and even implemented in diplomatic practice.44 
Mutual Assured Destruction was gamed out and improved upon with hopes that the 
“unthinkable” might never come to pass.45 But there could no absolute certainty, so 
preventative strategy could not responsibly suffice in contrast to the presumed effects of 
strategic failure.  
Civil defense was a proactive measure to reshape the built environment, to get 
ahead of the possibility that the industrial centralization of the United States might be a 
fault line in the mounting potentiality of a future nuclear attack. As the delivery systems 
of intercontinental missiles became more sophisticated, the chances for evacuation 
became less possible and new strategies required radical new conceptions of spaces of 
life and vulnerability. The bombs, in other words, could not be escaped. The question 
therefore became not “how can we survive?” but “how many can survive?” Or, perhaps 
better put, “how many would we need to survive?” 
In a sense, the anticipation of the threat of nuclear war ushered in a new phase of 
the concept of what was at stake in national security. Be not mistaken that the concept 
now involved some kind of benevolence for the lives of American citizens. Rather, take 
from this that the notion of civil defense relocated the centrality of American institutions 
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to include its industrial economy and as a result the productive capacities of its labor 
force.46 And this question or impetus of security endured long after the Cold War ended 
and the drumroll of nuclear annihilation quieted.  
The dawn of civil defense introduced to security discourse not only a shifted 
object toward heightened concern for what now is called human security, but it had a 
lasting effect on the actually existing infrastructure of the United States. The prospect of 
war distilled into an existential threat, reorganizing the way that vulnerability was 
understood. According to Collier and Lakoff: 
The starting point in mapping urban vulnerability was to envision enemy strategy 
in a nuclear attack… In an era of strategic bombing, the question shifted: how did 
the enemy conceptualize the features of U.S. territory as a set of targets? [Civil 
defense planners] assumed that a potential attacker would plan an attack based on 
the same principles of strategic bombing that guided U.S. Air Force doctrine.47  
 
U.S. Civil Defense planners considered the concentration of industry, of populations, 
locations of communications and transportation centers, civil governments, etc. in an 
effort to rethink how much of the critical infrastructure was in play for any given 
prospective attack.48 Constructing “attack narratives” that informed “hypothetical attack” 
problems, imagination crept further into the anticipatory logics of national security, with 
both human security and critical infrastructure rising in priority.49 
One cannot overstate the significance of the role anticipatory imagination plays in 
this process. Writers like Aradau and Van Munster will place imagination at the core of 
post-9/11 security processes under the banner of conjectural reasoning, but already in the 
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nuclearized atmosphere of the Cold War one can recognize the role played by 
imagination in influencing the concerns about what might come about in the event of an 
attack.50 (It should also be noted by how much these transformations predate the birth of 
resilience theory.) The cartographic-literary imagination of security experts cascaded into 
entire discourses about future threats. In the first place they were important in influencing 
partners in government toward policy shifts; but they also became a discursive terrain in 
and of themselves in which city planners and emergency planners shared an imaginary 
produced by these maps.51 
In the mid-1950s, the local archipelago produced by the distributed preparedness 
system of civil defense fostered a new level of ingenuity. Local officials began to realize 
that the cartographic imagination permitted by the vulnerability maps had produced the 
capacity to telescope from nuclear vulnerability to other kinds of vulnerability under their 
direct purview.52 At the time, preparing for events affecting national security that would 
emerge from foreign adversaries existed as the sole purview of federal officials, but 
responding to other sorts of disastrous events fell to state and local officials because of 
the nonexistence of a federal emergency response agency: “At the national level, a civil 
defense system developed earlier than any comparable disaster planning or emergency 
management system. However, at the local level, the prime concern after World War II 
became to prepare for and respond to disasters.”53  
                                                
50 Aradau and Van Munster 2011 
51 Galison 2001, 21-24; Collier and Lakoff 2008, 20-24. 
52 Collier and Lakoff 2008, 24.  
53 Quarantelli 2000, 10. Quoted in Collier and Lakoff 2008, 24. 
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The new endeavor of what became known as “emergency management” seized on 
the landscape transformed by national-civil-human security in the nuclear age. But it 
remained largely a mosaic of interested state and local authorities until the formation of 
FEMA in the late-1970s, where in its founding the young agency enacted a new concept 
of security: “all-hazards” security and preparedness.54 In its foundation by Executive 
Order 12127, FEMA unified previously unrelated agencies. Among others, “The Federal 
Insurance Administration; the National Fire Prevention and Control Administration; the 
National Weather Service Community Preparedness Program; the Federal Preparedness 
Agency of the General Services Administration; it transferred the Federal Disaster 
Assistance Administration activities from HUD; Civil defense responsibilities were also 
transferred to the new agency from the Defense Department's Defense Civil Preparedness 
Agency.”55 The breadth of agencies united beneath FEMAs umbrella was staggering in 
its diversity. 
In short, the formation of FEMA began to generalize what had been initial 
planning strategies produced to react to the notion of nuclear annihilation. In migrating 
best practices from civil defense planning toward a centralized federal agency with 
expertise in what are known as “natural” disasters, as well as a range of other events, 
FEMA inaugurated a vision of security that went beyond the particularity of nuclear 
attack. It began to draw generalizable patterns of preparation and response where disaster 
could be thought, reacted to, and prepared for as a concept in and of itself. 
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Therefore, the concern with “all-hazards” security, as it is called, stems in practice 
from a complex history in US security practice derived from nuclear security and 
diversified to fit a range of future threats. All-hazards, meaning a configuration of 
security preparation that was flexible enough to allow strategists to prepare for crises in 
general, rather than pursuing the range of possible calamities in their individuated 
nature.56 The logic of all-hazards planning found a central place in the formation of 
FEMA as a model of incorporating a range of strategies equipping the new agency to 
respond to anything and everything dangerous.  
After 9/11 the all-hazards approach became a core planning initiative in the 
formation of the U.S. Department of Homeland Security (DHS), which incorporated 
FEMA under its authority. Initially FEMA’s mandate operated within the parameters of 
“emergency federalism,” which sought to create relationships at the federal level to help 
states and local governments respond to natural disasters.57 After 9/11, FEMA’s role in 
the newly formed Department of Homeland Security (DHS) maintained its mandate, but 
its new relationship to national security re-placed its techniques fully within the grasp of 
national security, and therefore folding civil defense into the logic of the war on terror, 
and less merely an agency poised to administrate between sectors of American 
government responding to what is often referred to as “natural” disaster.58  
In this sense, all-hazards security metamorphosed from a generalized way of 
responding to the ways that an array of different American agencies might respond to 
disasters into an all-encompassing technique of anticipatory security pointed directly at 
                                                
56 Collier and Lakoff 2008, 24. 
57 Collier and Lakoff 2008, 14. 
58 Bullock et all 2009, 582. 
 160 
the project of counterterrorism. The irony is that after the failures of FEMA in response 
to Hurricane Katrina in 2005, the agency came under a firestorm of criticism.59 Its 
speciation as counterterrorist technique then migrated back into thinking about all-
hazards again, in the broadest sense, partially responding to the range of ways that their 
failure to prepare adequately to hurricanes were, now, a failure to prepare for all-hazards 
could be seen as a failure of national security, this time as a fully securitized project, 
preparing for all things imaginably devastating – natural, technological, and moral.60  
One touchstone expressing the full integration of such thinking into 
institutionalized aims of security is the 2007 revised National Security Strategy for 
Homeland Security. Its original version was the first such report published in the 
nascence of the formation of the Department of Homeland Security (it was published 
under the banner of the “Office of Homeland Security” and, in part, petitioned for the 
formation of DHS).61 The 2002 report ruminated almost exclusively on the threat of 
terrorism. Regarding the revised National Strategy for Homeland Security (2007), Jeremy 
Walker and Melinda Cooper articulate that “[numerous and varied] ‘catastrophic 
possibilities’ span the divide between military and civil threats, encompassing both 
terrorist attacks and the destructive possibilities of natural disasters, climate change and 
infectious disease in a non-exhaustive ‘full spectrum’ list of contingencies.”62 This 
document, Walker and Cooper argue, most fully (at the time of their writing) 
demonstrates what they understand as the central tension inherent in security theories and 
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practices of resilience. That the union of complex system adaptivity and neoliberal 
economic theory is characteristic of “a governmental philosophy of nature and society so 
all-encompassing and resilient to critique that the effects of political interventions (and 
non-interventions) made in its name, even when catastrophic, seem as inescapable as the 
weather.”63 Their point, to be clear, was to reflect on the impermeability of the structural 
hegemony of this form of security. For Walker and Cooper, because the breadth of threats 
was so vague, resistance against its institutional capacities was at best obscure. But 
lurking in the sentence is a phrase seeming slightly odd, but really not at all given its 
context: “a governmental philosophy of nature and society so all-encompassing” had 
fused the moral (often referred to in the gendered language of “man-made”) and natural 
disaster. This fusion was what was so “all-encompassing” as to unify nearly all threats 
imaginable under the aegis of a new philosophy of governmental security. 
One cannot fault Walker and Cooper for not foreseeing what the next four years 
would bring. But by 2011, a new security directive would further deprioritize terrorism, 
therefore in a sense validating their claim of a “governmental philosophy of nature and 
society so all-encompassing,” but also rendering their critique of resilience shakier for the 
way that they downplay an unfolding fade in the priority of counterterrorism. Consider 
George W. Bush’s 2007 Cover Letter: 
Many of the threats we face – pandemic diseases, the proliferation of weapons of 
mass destruction, terrorism, and natural disasters – also demand multinational 
effort and cooperation… As we secure the Homeland, however, we cannot simply 
rely on defensive approaches and well-planned response and recovery measures. 
We recognize that our efforts also must involve offense at home and abroad. We 
will disrupt the enemy’s plans and diminish the impact of future disasters through 
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measures that enhance the resilience of our economy and critical infrastructure 
before an incident occurs.64 
 
One can read in Bush’s pen an ambiguity in which the president recognizes on equal 
footing the threats posed by “pandemic diseases, the proliferation of weapons of mass 
destruction, terrorism, and natural disasters.” But reading on, one can only see the 
haunting presence of terrorism. It is too difficult to imagine a president taking an 
“offensive” approach to pandemic diseases and natural disasters; and it is unlikely that he 
had anything else in mind but terrorism when writing about “disrupt[ing] the enemy’s 
plans.” 
By 2011, a new directive, the National Preparedness Goal was published with the 
sole aim which “define[d] success as”: “A secure and resilient Nation with the 
capabilities required across the whole community to prevent, protect against, mitigate, 
respond to, and recover from the threats and hazards that pose the greatest risk.”65 
Recognize the equivalence of “secure” and “resilient.” In Chapter Two, I showed how the 
two concepts are more or less incommensurable, with security (the preventative goal 
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society we must balance the sense of optimism that is fundamental to the American character 
with a sober recognition that future catastrophes will occur. The certainty of future calamities 
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challenges (US DHS 2007, 41.).” 
65 U.S. DHS 2011, 1; my emphasis. 
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outlined in Chapter One) still percolating with the desire to strategize for success; and 
resilience recognizing the ever-present possibility of failure against the inevitable event 
unthought. Adding to this, recognize that earlier federal documents had prioritized 
terrorism, even as the all-hazards approach would add other sorts of threats. This 
definition of success names nothing particular – or all-hazards – whichever is a better 
phrase for the very same idea.  
Several pages later, a more detailed list appears outlining the kinds of threats 
national preparedness would likely face: 
• Natural hazards, including hurricanes, earthquakes, tornados, wildfires, 
and floods, present a significant and varied risk across the country. 
• A virulent strain of pandemic influenza could kill hundreds of thousands 
of Americans, affect millions more, and result in economic loss. 
Additional human and animal infectious diseases, including those 
previously undiscovered, may present significant risks.   
• Technological and accidental hazards, such as dam failures or chemical 
substance spills or releases, have the potential to cause extensive fatalities 
and severe economic impacts, and the likelihood of occurrence may 
increase due to aging infrastructure.  
• Terrorist organizations or affiliates may seek to acquire, build, and use 
weapons of mass destruction (WMD). Conventional terrorist attacks, 
including those by “lone actors” employing explosives and armed attacks, 
present a continued risk to the Nation.  
• Cyber attacks can have their own catastrophic consequences and can also 
initiate other hazards, such as power grid failures or financial system 
failures, which magnify the potential impact of cyber incidents.66 
 
One wonders what all-hazards might not mean, especially given the frequency with 
which economic risks appear included in each category. In any case, with such a list, it is 
clear that preparedness means preparing for a full suite of calamitous future possibilities. 
Official U.S. security policy stresses the increasing range of “catastrophic possibilities,” 
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thus creating a comprehensive category of urgent security concern. Instead, a 
comparative case between the 2007 and 2011 strategy documents underscores the 
growing list of “catastrophic possibilities” to encompass fully the range of imaginable 
high impact threats to “homeland security.” Therefore if contemporary security responds 
to all imagined “catastrophic possibilities,” then (i) it is a view of security planning that, 
rather than seeking to prevent future catastrophes, instead accepts disaster as inevitable or 
at least draws the range of threats to the limits of intelligibility; (ii) that security planning 
therefore abstracts particular catastrophic events into the abstract category of 
“catastrophic possibilit[y]”; (iii) rather than presenting a proactive form of security 
strategy, security measures instead are profoundly reactive against a self-constructed 
abstraction of catastrophic possibility. The triad stems from the incalculable nature of the 
coming catastrophe. 
The effects of this are multifold. It means that the “openness” or generalness of 
anticipatory security practices do not result from resilience per se, but from the 
phenomenal ontological problem of governing indetermination.67 It also means that the 
broad swath of imaginable future catastrophes emerged as problems of human security 
were coopted as techniques of conventional national security, and then repositioned as a 
general strategy of security, somewhat released from the task of prevention to a general 
framework of preparedness.68  
The result, far from merely a transformation in the object of security from the 
standpoint of security professionals and their agencies, was in the broadest sense a 
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normalization of catastrophe. Where once the catastrophe was a singular, anticipatable – 
albeit highly improbable -- phenomenon; now, all possibilities included, the future 
catastrophe is all but probable. Something will occur, the future will determine its 
specificity. In enclosing the entirety of possible singular catastrophes (plural) under the 
banner of the coming catastrophe (singular), all-hazards security had transformed the 
highly improbable into the entirely probable catastrophe to come.  
 
IV. Conclusion: Normal Catastrophes and the Future 
 
The groundbreaking work of Peter Galison, Stephen Collier and Andrew Lakoff 
generated incredible strides in recognizing the geneses of actual security practices in the 
West. Their efforts helped to move the needle for understanding national security beyond 
the possibilities monopolized by realists in international relations, and ushered in new 
logics from historical events that created the conditions for normal catastrophes’ 
development.   
Nevertheless, more work was still required to move political theories of human 
security from the singular to the general in terms of the conception of catastrophe as all 
and sundry looming calamity. Andrew Lakoff comes closest to my argument here in his 
essay, “The Generic Biothreat,” in which he argues that transformations in security 
practices with specific regard to contagious diseases gave way to a more general set of 
practices of preparedness, rather than prevention.69 Showing how emergency planning 
through experiential scenarios created urgency for policy makers, Lakoff argues that the 
general concept of “biothreat” became reconceived to the extent that a new apparatus of 
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political power emerged – vital systems security – which came to supplant population 
security (which a reader with some familiarity with contemporary continental philosophy, 
without much effort, can translate as biopolitical security).70 The effects of this shift 
indicate that the idea of biological threat ceased to require a specific response tailored to 
individual types of contagion and gave way to a broad apparatus of preparedness that 
would enable first responders and the security establishment to respond to any contagion 
realized. Lakoff’s is a profound argument. But it remains narrowed by its empirical focus, 
biosecurity, which results in a generalized imaginary of preparedness he refers to as the 
“generic biothreat,” which is at best a synecdoche for what I am calling “normal 
catastrophes,” but less capable of explaining the shifts I attend to in the latter phases of 
the previous section when contagion stands on equal ground as hurricanes and terrorist 
attacks. Normal catastrophes, as the imagined general category for the coming 
catastrophe, is more all-encompassing; and, as a result, more fitting a term animating 
contemporary security imaginaries. 
Lakoff – and this is especially the case in his co-authored work with Collier – is 
only interested in the modes of security that undergird “preparedness” or, as I organized 
it earlier, “resilience” when broadened to comport to emergent trends in future-oriented 
security practices and provision. But there is a clear history running through this period in 
which the largest efforts were certainly devoted to preventing the nuclear war’s 
occurrence. The singular threat, outflanked. Further, Collier and Lakoff are overly 
focused on making the evidentiary argument for preparedness, which simplifies the 
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stakes of the future catastrophe and how it became normalized as earlier chapters here 
have shown.  
Leaving preventative strategies and the desire for protection to the side to focus 
solely on preparedness omits a critical element that broadens the impact of what the 
future catastrophe represents: an all-encompassing problem for human survival, even in 
its lack of reality, that beguiles security on all fronts – regardless if the technique is to 
create less vulnerable vital systems or making attempts to secure them in the more 
conventional sense. None of these is suitable to extend itself as a full account of what is 
at stake with future-oriented security practices. We now see a growing literature in 
philosophy and the social sciences trying to cope with the way that catastrophe seems 
impossible to contain in particular ways.71  
Future-oriented security measures do more than animate preparedness. They also 
show the challenges of preventative, resilience, and preparedness strategies as a whole, 
hence the constant growth of their fields of concern. Rather than undetermined futures 
merely feeding these discourses and inspiring their development, one can see the 
discourses as a whole fabulating (or imaginatively fabricating) the future catastrophe as 
an endlessly expansive problem beyond discrete fields of expertise – with every 
imaginative expansion, so too the problem of future catastrophe becomes less particular 
and more general. As a discursive field future catastrophe registers enormous political 
force, not merely in security practices, but also in reorientations of thought.72 Gesturing 
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once again, but hopefully now with more grounding, where once catastrophic events were 
highly improbable, they are now extremely probable – even entirely normal. 
Of course different catastrophes produce different consequences. Moral disasters 
and natural disasters have significant differences that after the fact renders them clearly 
unique from one another. The purpose of my analysis of the 2011 National Preparedness 
Goal was to show not how the events themselves would be conceived differently if they 
occurred, but the force of anticipation on the way they are conceived before the fact. It 
should stand to reason that the National Preparedness Goal demonstrates, in the eyes of 
the state, how even in their differences catastrophes are normalized as matters of life and 
death. 
After Charles Perrow’s work on “normal accidents,” catastrophes are “normal” 
because they are more frequent.73 Why? For Perrow, “accidents” are more frequent 
because of increasing technological complexity. It’s more difficult to account for all of 
the things that can go wrong. Jean-Luc Nancy recently built upon this argument in 
linking nuclear power to global networks portending increased risk of planetary 
catastrophe.74 That concern remains valid when considering technological catastrophes of 
catastrophic proportions (consider Fukushima or Chernobyl). But catastrophes are 
“normal,” perhaps more importantly, for a second reason. Their incalculable nature in the 
sense that I tried to articulate in the previous chapters – that in the truest sense, future 
catastrophes often escape the human capacity to determine their occurrence – normalizes 
their particularity to the extent that discrete, highly-improbable events become envisaged, 
                                                
73 Perrow 1984 
74 Nancy 2012 
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not as an individual hurricane or terrorist attack, earthquake, or pandemic in all of their 
distinctive capacities – but as, if one can put it this way unironically, as merely 
catastrophes, as a normalized catastrophe whose particularities are less important than 
their scale as catastrophic. Normal catastrophes are precisely that: entirely regular 
because of their categorization, not because of their particularity. They become particular 
only after they become distinctly determined as an event in the present, leaving the future 
behind, transpired.  
Once, in the province of thinking about future catastrophes, a discrete, specific 
catastrophe was thought. Lists and menus were prepared, etc. Now, “the coming 
catastrophe” has largely supplanted this specificity and rendered the looming disaster 
abstract, normal. Not only are they normal, they are expected. Or, as Claudia Aradau and 
Rens Van Munster aptly put it: “Although not present yet, the future of catastrophic 
events seems taken for granted in current discourse: The catastrophe will happen.”75  
 In sum, if we are to understand the politics of catastrophe as it is so often called, 
we must move simultaneously in two directions: We must move away from focuses on 
singular kinds of threats to understanding the discursive affect of normal catastrophes on 
governance; but we also must understand the ways that the emergence of normal 
catastrophes come to preoccupy more than just agents of national security. In other 
words, we need tools to recognize the general effects of the coming catastrophe, how its 
generality renders its effects pervasively as a cultural force; and how those two processes 
shape a contemporary rationality that I will now begin to describe under the banner of 
“catastrophism.” Or, to ventriloquize Hans Magnus Enzensberger:  
                                                
75 Aradau and Van Munster 2011, 13. 
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From the Middle East conflict to a postal strike, from punk style to a nuclear 
reactor disaster, anything and everything is conceived as a hidden sign of an 
imaginary totality: catastrophe “in general.” The tendency to hasty generalizations 
damages that residual power of clear thought that we still have left. In this sense, 
the feeling of doom does not lead just to mystification. It goes without saying that 
the new irrationalism which so troubles you can in no way solve the real 
problems. On the contrary, it makes them appear insoluble.76 
 
                                                
76 Enzensberger 1978, 78 
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Catastrophism I: A Dispositif of Anticipation 
 
 
 
 
 
 
I. Introduction 
 
It is a fact of contemporary life, as Didier Fassin and Mariella Pandolfi put it, that 
“images of catastrophe form part of our everyday surroundings.”1 For so long the 
province of dystopian literatures and cinemas of disaster, catastrophic events have edged 
into the common imaginary with rising frequency.2 Flashes of past storms, earthquakes, 
terrorist attacks, contagious viruses, economic collapses, verging wars surround from 
countless directions. Taken together, a bombardment of calamitous moments 
metamorphose into a compulsion, a political force commanding new ideas and 
institutions of security against a new, and seemingly endless, past and future punctuated 
by disaster.3 From the infrequent and highly improbable discrete catastrophic event 
                                                
1 Fassin and Pandolfi (2010), 9. 
2 One provocative study is Thacker (2011). See also, Paik (2010). 
3 Catastrophe as “punctuation” – especially as it pertains partitioning past, present, and future 
– is a common theme in the broad literature on catastrophe. This owes less to its etymology 
than its persistent importance in the academic discipline of geology, for which a central 
theory of historical change also referred to as “catastrophism” holds that rather than a 
continuous gradual evolution of geological change, episodic, abrupt events led to dramatic 
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emerges an altogether probable expectation, an abstract concept of extraordinary political 
importance: the looming catastrophe.4    
Does the preoccupation with future catastrophes make sense? I do not mean to ask 
whether or not it is sensible to be fearful of unknown futures. Nor do I intend to justify 
politics rooted in securing against abstractions like “uncertainty,” or to ask how to protect 
against the unknown.5 But rather I mean to ask in what ways can we understand the 
                                                                                                                                            
shifts in geological constitution. To my knowledge, none of the political theorists engaged 
here trace this history, which is elaborated more in footnote 26 below. Nevertheless, the 
theme of punctuation and rupture appears frequently in theoretic texts about catastrophe. See 
for example Ophir 2010, 61; Vázquez-Arroyo 2013, 741-43; Vázquez-Arroyo 2012, 212; 
Neyrat 2008, 35; Aradau and Van Munster 2011, 3, 10-11. 
4 Disaster, or rather post-disaster, sociological studies are now a century old. For influential 
sociological studies see: Prince (1968), Sjoberg (1962), and Quarantelli (1966, 1977, 1985, 
1987a, 1987b, 1989a, 1989b, 1992, 1993a, 1993b, 2006). A vast scholarly literature has 
emerged on the imperative to prepare for future disasters of all types. Far-reaching attempts 
to provoke a shift in public consciousness concerning future catastrophes include Flynn 
(2004), Perrow (2007), Posner (2004), and Sunstein (2007). Many of these books attempt to 
create broad introductions that necessitate new ideas about human life in an age of extreme 
volatility. They are distinct from another more scholarly body of literature analyzing the 
social and political landscape as a result of changing security procedures (Adey and 
Anderson 2011; Anderson 2010a, 2010b; Aradau and Van Munster 2007, de Goede 2008; 
Dillon 2007; Ewald 2002). These pieces all seek a perspective on shifting practices of 
security in response to some of the issues provoked by the former group of public 
intellectuals. Yet few contemporary writers have aimed at the notion of catastrophe (or 
disaster) conceptually in a way that can address the conceptual prowess of the term in the 
way that I do in earlier chapters here. This present chapter may be seen as a supplement to 
the chapters preceding it in supplying a way of thinking that complements such a persistent 
trope as catastrophe. Several other recent attempts have been made on this front. Other 
writings with whom I share some sentiments include Lakoff’s notion of the “generic 
biothreat” (2008), except that my aim is to account for the expansive nature of such a 
dynamic concept of catastrophe rather than a specific animating species of it such as is the 
case with biosecurity. In the next chapter I draw on Neyrat (2009), Dupuy (2002, 2005, 
2009), and make reference to Walter (2009) to develop this broader conception of 
catastrophism before bringing it under critical scrutiny. 
5 Aradau and Van Munster claim that this is the central cause of contemporary politics of 
catastrophe, 2011, pg. 6. I contest this claim in Chapter One. Further, Kevin Grove has built a 
provocative research program surveying the implications of insurance, financialization, and 
risk as means of disaster resilience and catastrophic future preparedness. He, like Aradau and 
Van Munster frequently deploys the notion of the dispositif in order to contend with the 
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emergence of a question, or even more so, the logic of a collective disposition. How is 
the sensible concern for possibly destructive future events, not only produced, but 
proliferated? In short, I mean to ask about the cultural orientation to one way of being, to 
prioritizing one question over another, performed in a way that is productive of a politics. 
How do sensible questions manifest politically and in widely divergent corners of life?  
Much has been written lately about the range of ways that the threat of looming 
catastrophes has been seized upon to depoliticize populations,6 about how by way of 
systems of governmentality threats divide populations into meaningful and  less 
meaningful lives who suffer in differing degrees of tolerability,7 and how the spectre of 
the biopolitical usurps life at every sector rendering all and sundry subjects to the 
protective mechanisms of catastrophe management.8 Still more work has been devoted to 
regimes of expertise in which human life has been exposed to mounting danger, 
transforming political life into a life of constant exposure to undetermined calamity.9 
Here, I make an effort to animate the pervasive concern for the looming catastrophe in a 
different way. First, I move away from solely expert knowledge to probe the furthest 
reaching effects of the intersection of fear, anticipation, and indetermination. In this way I 
raise the importance that at that intersection rests a process of meaning-making that 
suffuses political life. Second, I argue that this process of meaning-making, while 
acknowledging the fact of repressive regimes, should be thought first and foremost as 
                                                                                                                                            
broad range of institutions tending to these issues, though frequently deploys it, like many 
others, as an empirical tool which I attempt to build upon below. See Grove 2012 & 2014 for 
examples. 
6 Aradau and Van Munster 2011, 9; Vázquez-Arroyo 2013, 745 
7 Ophir 2010, 62-65 
8 Neyrat 2008, 35-49. 
9 Evans and Reid 2013; Evans and Reid 2015. 
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positive in the sense that it animates a field of political thought, behavior, and orients 
subjects toward their own finitude as a fact of contemporary political life.  
I take as inspiration the following methodological principle, argued by Michel 
Foucault when introducing his landmark Discipline and Punish: “Do not concentrate the 
study of the punitive mechanisms on their ‘repressive’ effects alone, on their 
‘punishment’ aspects alone, but situate them in a whole series of their possible positive 
effects, even if these seem marginal at first sight. As a consequence, regard punishment 
as a complex social function.”10 Central to Foucault’s idea is the notion that to understand 
the penal system only in its function to repress deviant or abnormal forms of behavior 
would be to elide the broader implications of both the conjuncture of meaning-making 
(synchronic epistemological understandings) with the juridical framework, but also that 
focusing only on the repressive nature of the penal system would foreclose the broader 
implications of how such a conjuncture animates a wider mode of thinking. By focusing 
only on the repressive measures of coping with criminality in the period, Foucault would 
not have been able to understand the positive (read in a way marking agency, not 
normative measure) elements involved in what emerged as a concept of the disciplinary 
society.11 I adopt a similar distinction: Here, I am concerned with the ways that 
discourses of the looming catastrophe are not merely repressive, alienating, 
depoliticizing, and so on; but animating, orienting, and politicizing. The hope is that by 
                                                
10 Foucault 1995, 23. 
11 Edward Said deployed a similar methodological principal in introducing the concept of 
Orientalism: “…my whole point is to say that we can better understand the persistence and 
the durability of saturating hegemonic systems like culture when we realize that their internal 
constraints upon writers and thinkers were productive, not unilaterally inhibiting” (Said 1978, 
14; original emphasis). 
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admitting the positive categories of catastrophism that, as Foucault will remark only 
several lines later, and with only nominal adaptations, I can reveal “some common 
matrix… in short, mak[ing] the technology of power the very principle both of 
humanization of the [future-oriented] system [of imagining human survival] and the 
knowledge of [political society itself].”12 
As such, in this chapter I aim to configure the groundwork for a political theory of 
catastrophism as a far-reaching political rationality. I proceed by overcoming some 
conceptual obstacles and beginning to outline the complexities of contemporary 
catastrophism. The first such obstacle is presented by the sparse but rich body of work 
advancing the similar sounding, yet in the end, very different concept of 
catastrophization.13 Though there are many similarities between the conceptualizations of 
catastrophization and catastrophism that I put forth in the following two chapters, there 
are also critical differences. Two come immediately to mind. First, theories of 
catastrophization as advanced by Adi Ophir and Antonio Vázquez-Arroyo involve a 
certain degree of intentionality in the way that catastrophization is understood politically. 
Ophir and Vázquez-Arroyo differ – in brief, Vázquez-Arroyo does not merely deploy 
Ophir, but instead operates from a crack in Ophir’s work building a parallel 
conceptualization – but they cohere around an understanding that catastrophization is a 
process carried out by a political or social authority.14  
Catastrophization in this sense is something that is done; catastrophism, in the 
sense that I want to use it, is more analytic—a diagnosis, if you will. One does not intend 
                                                
12 Ibid. 
13 Specifically, I engage Ophir 2008 and Vázquez-Arroyo 2013.  
14 I elaborate this claim exhaustively in the first substantive section below.  
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to be a catastrophist.15 Importantly for a political theory, moreover, a collective does not 
intend to (re)produce itself as catastrophist. Catastrophism is what I want to name a 
rationality inclusive of a range of different beliefs, orientations, and considerations about 
human survival in volatile times. It is my sense that for both Ophir and Vázquez-Arroyo 
(though slightly less individually agentic in Ophir’s sense) that catastrophization is a 
political practice undertaken in order to dominate, or less so in order to destabilize, and at 
very least in order to maintain a particular mode of privilege or centrality while others 
languish at the margins; or, to use Vázquez-Arroyo’s words, catastrophization 
“depoliticize[s]” by way of “authorizing specific forms of power.”16 Ophir and Vázquez-
Arroyo in short offer a theory of catastrophization that is deployed as a political tactic to 
disenfranchise large populations while securing power for others. For each, therefore, the 
concept is political in the sense that it names a use or abuse of power in the repressive 
sense.  
Likewise, Ophir and Vázquez-Arroyo conceive of the material that becomes 
discursively catastrophized as more or less already extant. Through the process of 
discursive catastrophization as they outline it, the threat of catastrophe represented in 
discourses of catastrophe exists as the condition of possibility for catastrophized speech. 
Plainly put, in an economic crisis for example, discursive catastrophization offers the 
                                                
15 I emphasize that, in the sense that I am developing catastrophism as a concept, one does 
not intend to be a catastrophist. In the following chapter I explore two thinkers, Jean-Pierre 
Dupuy and Frédéric Neyrat, who each in their own ways advocate for a certain kind of 
intended catastrophism. Dupuy urges an “enlightened catastrophism” or “rational 
catastrophism” while Neyrat acknowledges a catastrophism that take the shape of a “légitime 
démence” [legitimate madness] (Dupuy 2002: 216, 213; Neyrat 2008, 35). 
16 Vázquez-Arroyo 2013, 747, 758. 
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choice between economic crisis or economic catastrophization. 17  Discursive 
catastrophization offers no alternative. This may seem a trivial observation, but the way 
that discursive catastrophization operates emphasizes the obvious threat and downplays 
the imaginative. This emphasis will be inverted in my argument. I will try to show the 
importance of creating fictions about future catastrophes instead of merely drawing on a 
current crisis in order to exert political power.  
Claudia Aradau and Rens Van Munster’s important study of catastrophe’s place 
in security culture differs from Ophir and Vázquez-Arroyo in this regard. Recognizing 
that security experts by definition lack important information about potential threats, 
Aradau and Van Munster argue that a “conjectural reasoning” is deployed which 
“constructs an explanation out of apparently insignificant details.”18 In other words, 
where Ophir and Vázquez-Arroyo found their treatments in presentism and historical 
reference, Aradau and Van Munster focus on the ways that security professionals 
necessarily produce ideas about the future, which in turn reflect upon the urgency of 
action in the present. The process by which conjectural reasoning works is productive of a 
wide range of effects within the security community. Not least, they argue, is a general 
                                                
17 Vázquez-Arroyo begins his important essay on the matter with this very example, however 
anecdotally. See Vázquez-Arroyo 2013, pg. 739.  
18 I address this in detail in Chapter One, but its importance differs here. Earlier, the subject 
matter regarded how critical thinkers considered speculation as an important response to 
“uncertainty.” Here, however, I am making reference to the ways that speculation – or their 
more technical conceptualization of “conjectural reasoning” manifests in two ways that are 
important to the work of this chapter: through imagination and also through how they 
conceive of it as depoliticizing (Aradau and Van Munster 2011, 31). With respect to the 
ambiguous relationship between risk and uncertainty, see Best 2008. On imagination and risk 
management see, Salter 2008 and de Goede 2008.  
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awareness of the fault lines inherent in conjectural reasoning because, like discursive 
catastrophization, it too tends toward depoliticizing effects.19 
The notion of conjectural reasoning that Aradau and Van Munster advance allows 
for an analysis that allows for both the imaginative process of inventing future scenarios, 
as well as the heterogeneous ways in which that project is carried out. Deploying the 
concept of a “logic of strategy” derived from Foucault, Aradau and Van Munster manage 
the different imaginative projects undertaken by security experts as not homogenizing, 
but disparate—and remaining disparate—as a means of explaining the core focus of 
contemporary security. Inadequate knowledge of undetermined futures requires a litany 
of imaginative projects carried out by security experts. (It shouldn’t go unmentioned that 
Aradau and Van Munster also think that the rhetoric of catastrophe is depoliticizing, and 
for similar reasons—because it mitigates democratic power—but their emphasis is on a 
different sector of political life.)20 In Aradau and Van Munster, Foucault’s logic of 
strategy allows them to maintain an analysis of the “disparate” motives and iterations of 
security experts in order to show how, despite their different projects, there is a common 
organizing principle. The logic of strategy proves useful in clarifying the community of 
security experts whose work relies on imagination (“conjectural reasoning”) in order to 
produce ways of thinking about future catastrophes as security problems. What is key in 
their text is demonstrating how 1) imagination is central to linking discourses of 
                                                
19 Ibid, 9. 
20 They cite Wendy Brown as their inspiration for investigating the “depoliticizing effects of 
conjectural knowledge and the problematization of imagination and aesthetics within an 
anticipatory regime of securing the future. As Wendy Brown has aptly put it, depoliticization 
involves ‘construing inequality, subordination, marginalization, and social conflict, which all 
require political analysis and political solutions, as individual and personal, on the one hand, 
or as natural, religious, and cultural on the other’ (Brown 2006, 15).”   
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catastrophe to presumptions about security, and 2) how that connection, rather than being 
depoliticizing, could, rather, be extraordinarily politicizing in the sense that it animates 
culture, influences how populations think and about what, and because it creates a more 
totalizing desire for security from a looming phenomenon that, as yet, exists only as a 
matter of imagination anyway.21  
But Aradau and Van Munster’s assessment of the differentiated conjectural 
reasoning of security professionals, while promising as an insight into expert knowledge 
trying to imagine the next terror attack or weather event, is not as far as a “politics of 
catastrophe” can go.22 Thinkers like Ophir and Vázquez-Arroyo have taken us further by 
considering the ways that the discourses of catastrophe carry outside of security 
institutions as realms of expert knowledge. In the body of work advanced by Ophir and 
Vázquez-Arroyo, despite focusing mostly on only one iterative mode of political power 
(authority or domination), their attempt to show the broader effects of catastrophic 
discourse makes an attempt to diagnose more widely how a concern for catastrophe 
produces a “politics” more than, as I would insist of Aradau and Van Munster, a “politics 
of security experts.” To that end I argue that the politics of catastrophe requires a further-
reaching theory that incorporates logics of discourse (as Aradau & Van Munster, Ophir, 
and Vázquez-Arroyo all do in different ways), with an articulation of power that is 
encompassing enough to cast a broad net on a wide scale concern for future catastrophic 
events. In fact, catastrophism as I will outline it treats all that can be imagined as a 
potentially dire threat to existence, to survival, prioritizing one kind of living – resilient 
                                                
21 Derrida 1984. 
22 Aradau and Van Munster 2011, 84. 
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life – over another, a life in common.23 So it isn’t that catastrophism is depoliticizing in 
the sense that it takes issues of inequality and renders them secondary to politics. 
Catastrophism takes one kind of living and renders it secondary to another kind of living; 
it takes survival over equity and commonality. This is a move of utter preemption in 
which the preventative mode of securitization, occludes the emergence of a kind of living 
in which the common is of futile concern when compared to species annihilation, to cite 
only one worst case scenario.24  
The result should be a political theory of catastrophe that can articulate why so 
many – security experts, cultural authorities, heads of state, as well as everyday people – 
are oriented to questions of catastrophe to articulate human well being and survival. As a 
result, I argue that a political rationality (catastrophism) best articulates the zeitgeist of 
the present. And in the end, an effective political theory of catastrophe must rightly be a 
political theory of catastrophism. 
I argue as a consequence that political scientists need to think more seriously 
about the political rationality that orients human beings in their everyday lives toward 
concern about their own finitude. By rationality, I mean the assimilation and reproduction 
of meaning. I mean to think about rationality as the governing discursive mechanism of 
what makes decisions, ideas, and themes about life rational; as constructive of a rationale. 
In short, I want to use this concept to help isolate a process in which meaning is made, for 
what purposes, and how it is received. The process as a result involves both the 
production and the metabolism of knowledge. But rather than going so far as to being a 
                                                
23 See Evans and Reid 2015. 
24 This perspective is the subject of the next chapter. 
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theory of cultural knowledge, I want to examine the presence of certain kinds of 
problems – in this case the concern for catastrophe as a cause of injury and death – as a 
symptom of knowledge production. As a result, when I evoke the concept of rationality, I 
stop short of considering it as a Weberian iron cage, as instrumentalizing the decisions 
and activities of political subjects, and consider it deductively. Where I think we can see 
a diverse set of voices operating through similar logics, I think we can relatedly wonder if 
they don’t share similar themes. In considering the origins and organizing principles of 
these themes, rather than theorizing their points of beginning, I instead use their presence 
diagnostically, almost empirically, to determine their presence. In this sense, I claim that 
because of their presence, I ought be able to at the very least argue that there are shared 
dispositions in common by those who voice concern. This is the link between 
catastrophism – the name I give to this rationality – and what I use in order to link the 
voices across their differences, what Foucault calls a dispositif. 
The connection drawn between catastrophe and finitude, as transmitted and 
associated through a range of discourses, represents a forceful politics of contemporary 
rationality and consequently defines what matters most in political society. We should 
not err in thinking that such a rationality lacks political force because it is not necessarily 
an ideology, or because it works in many different ways, and for many different kinds of 
people, at a range of places on the socio-, economic, ethnic- and racial spectra. Instead 
we should understand precisely how powerful it is because of its differentiation, because 
of how many corridors of contemporary political life that it haunts, because of how it 
rationalizes a set of problems. In turn, another consequence of this chapter is to likewise 
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argue that political rationality should be recuperated as a matter of political theoretic 
contemplation, and toward that end I lay the theoretical groundwork for a concept of 
political rationality that is as differentiated in its application as it is widespread in its 
prevalence.25  I try to present an understanding of political rationality deeply entrenched 
in anticipatory logics, profoundly affected by notions of insecurity, and because of their 
links between danger and survival, fully political in nature. In referring to it as 
catastrophism I distinguish from the usage that some writing in French might mean it – 
which is closer to a doomsayer – and to evoke a geological history of change, that is 
different from the scientific concept of gradualism, a history of surprising events where 
catastrophe drives a planet’s greatest geo-ecological shifts.26 I don’t belabor this point, 
                                                
25 By “as differentiated in its application as it is widespread in its prevalence,” I mean to 
insist that its iterations are vastly heterodox and multiple, and though far-reaching, also far 
from homogenous. In this sense I share much with Aradau and Van Munster’s deployment of 
Foucault’s concept of the “logic of strategies” insofar as their use of that concept has fidelity 
to his critique of dialectics (Aradau and Van Munster 2011, 32). Foucault wrote and spoke of 
this concept many times throughout the late 1960s and early-mid 1970s, but the passages that 
are particularly of note to the way that Aradau and Van Munster (and to me) are those that 
are more methodological in their refutation of dialectics. This because, in a rather Deleuzian 
way, Foucault meant by this term to disavow the move in dialectical reason that, in his 
observation, produces a resolution of contradictory terms within a homogenization when 
confronted with difference. Instead, the function of the logic of strategy “is to establish the 
possible connections between disparate terms which remain disparate.” (Foucault 2008, 42).  
26 Catastrophism is most frequently understood as a technically rooted theory of historico-
geological change resulting from episodic ruptures rather than geological theories of 
development resting on uniform evolution. Put well by Rudolf Trümpy in 1980, “We have 
come a long way from the positivist, ruddy-faced uniformitarianism of ten years ago. 
Geologists are beginning to realize that even improbable events become probable during a 
sufficiently long time span. Catastrophism is probably the wrong word, but episodicity and 
periodicity… loom large in the minds of today’s geologists” (quoted in Ager 1993, xvii; 
emphasis added). For an accessible treatment of the notion of catastrophism from scientific 
standpoint, see Ager (1993) and also Palmer (2010). For a more conceptual history tracing 
changes in theoretical understandings of catastrophism, see Huggett (1998). For an attempt to 
appropriate some shared senses in the way that I use catastrophism in this chapter into a 
political framework, see Lilly (2012). In a radical vein, Negri repeatedly refers to the 
“catastrophism” of Marx in his seminal Marx beyond Marx (1991). Nevertheless, while 
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but I want its history in the English language to inflect the name of the concept. It is an 
excavation of a concept that seems all the more appropriate in the dawning age of the 
Anthropocene.27  
In order to carry this out, this chapter proceeds as follows. First I outline the 
recent interest in “catastrophization” as encapsulated by the writing of Adi Ophir and 
Antonio Vázquez-Arroyo. In this section I outline their various meanings of the term 
catastrophization because it is so close to the word that I will later deploy 
(catastrophism). More importantly, I want to show how important their conception of 
catastrophization is to a politics of catastrophe as I understand it, not least because of 
their attempt to show the broader implications of discourses of catastrophe. In this section 
I offer a partial critique along two related lines of inquiry. First, I critique the thesis most 
clearly represented in Vázquez-Arroyo that discursive catastrophization (the process of 
invoking catastrophe to political ends) simultaneously depoliticizes as it authorizes 
specific modes of power. This critique is leveled not because the claim isn’t true, but 
because it is too narrow to encapsulate a broader understanding of how discourses of 
catastrophe involve entire populations in the sense of restructuring lives toward notions 
of security, a conceptualization that I think is fully political in nature. Secondly, I critique 
this body of work on how it is organized as an either-or construction from immediately 
available discursive materials. This part of the argument means to insist that discursive 
catastrophization based in rhetoric and narrative as put forth primarily by Vázquez-
                                                                                                                                            
Negri’s reading of Marx may be his most indispensable text, his conceptual development of 
catastrophism goes little further than to deploy the everyday French, meaning something 
closer to a doomsayer.      
27 See Chakrabarty (2009) and Dalby (2007), for example. 
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Arroyo addresses a narrower list of particular problems presented by discussions of 
catastrophe. As I show afterwards, catastrophism relies on fictionalization as a broader 
cultural production.  
In the second substantive section, I offer four vignettes offered as exemplars 
intended to show the diversity of cultural production encompassed in my claim that the 
cultural production at the center of catastrophism remains disparate in terms of 
motivation, political orientation, and even manners of expertise. The intention of this 
section is to promote fictionalization as intrinsic to widely varied discourses of 
catastrophe. In so doing, I try to show the ways that very different perspectives will 
deploy similar ideas about catastrophe and security. The texts that I interpret in this 
section were selected because of the ways that they portray, in explicit language, their 
motives. This is not arbitrary. Instead, I have chosen authors whose political positions are 
explicit. Only by reading across their explicitness can the idea that they are truly different 
except for their deployment of catastrophe be understood. My explanation that their 
voices, together, articulate the presence of a rationality depends not on their similarities, 
but on how unrelated they seem, save the way that they seem to require a fictionalization 
of future threats in order to create urgency for their narratives.  
In the third section, I briefly discuss the social scientific theory of “unintended 
consequences” as a way to establish some important differences between how I 
understand the emergence of a rationality of catastrophism. In essence, I try to 
disintinguish between sociological theories that place purpose and intent at the forefront 
of considerations of social order. In distinguishing my thesis from the literature of 
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unintended consequences, I introduce another well known but rarely closely interpreted 
concept – the dispositif – through which I argue that the logic of strategy motivating 
contemporary security discourse – catastrophe – should be understood by way of a 
governing rationality – catastrophism – which is the effect of so many different 
discourses persisting simultaneously in their difference. In the end, I argue that the 
“politics of catastrophe” that authors often isolate can only be understood by way of a 
broader, more cultural production of rationality by way of the discourses about human 
survival in a time when precariousness governs the political question of survival itself.  
This chapter relates different scenes of contemplation and practice meditating on 
the future of human life and its security against undetermined futures. What I want to 
show is a commonality amongst different modes of thought, across different kinds of 
writing, to gather various discourses that exert political force because they rationalize 
certain problems. In so doing, what I hope to accomplish will articulate a logic shared 
across sectors of political thought and practice and will acquaint what seem to be 
disparate modes of writing, united by a common concern for the future of human 
survival. In other words, I introduce various voices of catastrophism. After bringing 
together such different modes of thinking, I outline what Foucault calls a dispositif, and 
consider it with reference to the emergent awareness of catastrophe. Foucault’s well-
known yet underdeveloped concept, which he clearly outlines in an interview from 1977, 
in his own words:28 
                                                
28 The conversation, originally published as “Le jeu de Michel Foucault” in Ornicar? (10 
July 1977), was collectively held between Foucault and Alain Grosrichard, Gerard Wajeman, 
Jaques-Alain Miller, Guy Le Gaufey, Dominique Celas, Gerard Miller, Catherine Millot, 
Jocelyne Livi, and Judith Miller. 
 187 
What I’m trying to pick out with this term is, firstly, a thoroughly heterogeneous 
ensemble consisting of discourses, institutions, architectural forms, regulatory 
decisions, laws, administrative measures, scientific statements, philosophical, 
moral and philanthropic propositions—in short, the said as much as the unsaid.29  
 
Appearing more and more over the past decade, the dispositif succeeds as a notion of 
great utility to writers seeking to portray relationships among diverse phenomena.30 But 
while many deploy the notion of the dispositif, as I will argue later, it is so often meant to 
articulate a kind of theoretic empiricism allowing qualitative thinkers to associate 
relationships across many fields of objective knowledge in order to portray something of 
a unity between systems, discourses, and objects—in short, to determine a causal 
structure. Yet the dispositif is so often only uncritically deployed and rarely interpreted. 
In the final part of the chapter I show how the empirical aspect of this concept—the 
“thoroughly heterogeneous ensemble”—while useful is insufficient, only serving to unite 
what Foucault intends by the “said” in Foucault’s concluding phrase. Failing a closer 
reading, the dispositif only identifies relationships between different things, making it an 
analytical tool of empirical identification.   
What I try to do with the concept insists that the “heterogeneous ensemble” 
indicates an unanswered question: The “said” is often empirically clear enough, but what 
is the “unsaid” that unifies the ensemble? How do the wide range of heterogeneous 
discourses and practices, institutions and objects cohere? Moreover, in what do they 
cohere? I argue that, in the case of contemporary concerns and pursuits to imagine and 
therefore prevent the occurrence of future catastrophes, that the “heterogeneous 
                                                
29 Foucault, M. 1980, 194.  
30 See for example, Agamben 2009; Braun 2014; Bussolini 2010; Dillon 2008; Esposito 
2012; Peltonen 2004; Pløger 2008; Raffnsøe 2008; Shapiro 2011; Shapiro 2013. 
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ensemble” should be understood as only becoming notable as effects of a common 
rationality that renders them necessary; a rationality that I pursue, again, as 
“catastrophism.” Only once we understand the unsaid as catastrophism can we return to 
the empirical order to understand the cyclical reproduction of said and unsaid, cultural 
production and rationality, catastrophe and catastrophism. 
Therefore, ultimately, below I outline only the iterations of a political rationality 
adequate to all the recent attention given to catastrophe. Even unlike minds and subject 
positions share such a rationality; a rationality inspiring and perhaps even governing a 
political order. Catastrophism is, in the words of Frédéric Neyrat, “a legitimate madness,” 
a sensible obsession.31 As such, I join together a range of different writings, which 
occupy different corridors of thinking and different genres of communication, with 
strikingly similar themes and concerns. Ranging from literature to ethical philosophy, and 
from secret programs bringing security analysts together with novelists, and including 
public intellectuals calling for strengthened “national purpose,” we see the deployment of 
catastrophe issued as a distinct possibility, as a common frame of reference. Catastrophe 
thus emerges—is thus invoked—in order to draw readers together. An assumption hidden 
within each of the texts I read below evokes the abstract force of massive disaster and 
appeals to the figment of a reader’s most vivid imagination. A tacit understanding 
intimated, a speculation of a sensible response, a common rationality. I have established 
the political force of experts elsewhere;32 here my goal is to register its broader presence.  
  
                                                
31 “Légitime démence,” Neyrat 2008, 35.  
32 See chapters 1 and 3. 
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II. The Catastrophization of Political Life 
 
In pursuing a political theory of catastrophism, I want to show how the cultural 
production surrounding future catastrophe intersects with, not only desires for security, 
but also political life more broadly. Antonio Vázquez-Arroyo pursues a similar agenda 
that at least on its surface seems analogous in his work to understand what he calls “the 
catastrophization of political life.”33 In this section I mean to distinguish what follows 
from this notion as well as the important work produced by Claudia Aradau and Rens 
Van Munster in their agenda-setting book The Politics of Catastrophe. Each of these 
contributions are groundbreaking in their own right, and with this chapter (and 
dissertation) I intend to build on this pursuit. But my more critical perspective is that each 
is also limited by an emphasis on the process of what Vázquez-Arroyo (drawing on Adi 
Ophir) calls catastrophization. This section elaborates that claim, and following sections 
intend to build upon it through my insistence that their limitations stem from their lack of 
engagement with why the question of catastrophe is supported by a broader political 
rationality that renders their subject matter urgent in the first place. For Vázquez-Arroyo, 
his notion of the catastrophization of political life emerges from an understanding that 
discursive catastrophization is inherently political and aims to disenfranchise – what he 
insists is a “depoliticized” politics.34 In Aradau and Van Munster, their focus on security 
experts and the war on terror is too narrow to account for the broader socio-cultural 
interest that, not incidentally, Vázquez-Arroyo attempts to capture more richly in his 
analysis. Yet both tend toward a more focused regime of catastrophization wherein the 
                                                
33 Vázquez-Arroyo 2013, 745. 
34 Vázquez-Arroyo 2013, 747. 
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mobilization of concern for catastrophic events creates an atmosphere of political 
exploitation. I aver that there exists a mode of cultural reproduction in which there is a 
cycle of discursive production among many sources – the empowered and the marginal, 
the expert and the quotidian – that produces broad-scale social concern for catastrophe 
over other political modes of concern.  
In other words, a political theory of catastrophe must rely at least in part on an 
understanding of the proliferation, pervasiveness, and reproduction of how it makes sense 
to mobilize and fear catastrophic events. Such an understanding must also account for 
how broadly such a concern applies. And in so doing, in order to be effective, such a 
theory must account not only for uses and abuses of discourse in monopolizing power 
relations (as in Vázquez-Arroyo), or the limited, regardless of prominence, force exerted 
by expert knowledge (as in Aradau and Van Munster), but in a broad complex of 
discursive deployment.  
In trying to outline the terms of a wide-reaching political theory of catastrophe, as 
I outlined in the introduction above, I noted the importance of accommodating disparate 
approaches to knowledge production. Aradau and Van Munster do well in using 
Foucault’s “logic of strategy” in order to describe the various approaches to security 
expertise, but they are unable to approach a broader “politics of catastrophe” because 
they are too limited in their scope.35 Vázquez-Arroyo and Ophir attempt this in a more 
ambitious way. Ophir and Vázquez-Arroyo are more interested in arguing for a broad 
scale diagnosis of the effects of discourses of catastrophe. Hence Vázquez-Arroyo’s 
insistence that the discourses of catastrophization so often result in a “catastrophization of 
                                                
35 Aradau and Van Munster 2011, pg. 32. 
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political life.” His interest is thoroughly diagnostic, as Aradau and Van Munster would 
have it, of a “politics of catastrophe” insofar as his notion of the catastrophization of 
political life means that the discourses of catastrophe produce effects to the degree that 
they reshape political life itself. Yet his theory of the catastrophization of political life 
only articulates one mode of repressive political power as it manifests through 
discourse.36 His insistence on the use of catastrophization to authorize modes of power 
that disenfranchise is effective, but only to the degree that it articulates one facet of 
discourses of catastrophe. So, Aradau and Van Munster succeed in showing how 
disparate means of discursive logic can, not only endure, but cohere. Yet their analysis 
cannot show how such a process, itself, coheres in a more general sense because it lacks a 
theory that governs it. Vázquez-Arroyo succeeds in his effort to articulate the ways that 
discourses of catastrophe can reach beyond explicit discourses of security as often 
presumed to be monopolized by security experts, and shape the cultural contours of 
political life. Yet his conception is too narrow in its conception of power-as-repressive 
political authority to explain the complex and broadly persistent discourses at play. We 
therefore require a theory that can account for these shortcomings of limited discursive 
range and assert a concept that improves on these already very productive studies. 
                                                
36 By this I mean that Vázquez-Arroyo commits to multiple connotations in which the 
“catastrophization of political life” takes place, but only explicitly follows one of those 
available paths. As a result, in his essay only the power to dominate and disenfranchise 
receives attention as this mode animates his notion of catastrophization. It could be put 
another way: rather than “dominate and disenfranchise,” there is a sense of opportunism that 
coheres as well in the way that he sees Homer-Dixon’s “the upside of down” motivating the 
process of discursive catastrophization. See Vázquez-Arroyo 2013, pg. 745; and Vázquez-
Arroyo 2012, pg. 212. 
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The recent emphasis on catastrophe in political theory has not avoided the 
question of discourse. Vázquez-Arroyo, for example, asks explicitly what forms of 
discourse accommodate the politicization of catastrophe. Following Adi Ophir, Vázquez-
Arroyo introduces a concept that advances our understanding of the politics of 
catastrophe and how it affects political life itself. Vázquez-Arroyo articulates the 
“rhetorical strategy” of discursive catastrophization and formulates the concept of “the 
catastrophization of political life” in order to give shape to its effects.  For Vázquez-
Arroyo, narratives of catastrophe threaten populations in ways that authorize “specific 
forms of power”:37 
…the imagery of catastrophe is frequently misrecognized and thus deployed as 
part of particular narratives to authorize specific forms of power… the threat of 
catastrophe is a powerful narrative and rhetorical device to invoke and authorize 
otherwise unpalatable political practices and policies…38 
 
At stake here is the relationship between rhetoric, narrative, and threat. From the notion 
of actually existing catastrophic scenarios emerges a political manipulation meant to 
disenfranchise populations by instilling a sense of urgency – without action, emergency – 
and therefore producing the conditions, or even the requirement, for which a path to 
power might not only be taken but also legitimated.39 In other words the rhetorical 
strategy of catastrophe tends toward a narrative that recalls past catastrophes in order to 
serve as an appeal in the present, in order to protect against the possibility of the future 
repeating the past. 40  Vázquez-Arroyo identifies this particular narrative move, the 
rhetorical strategy of normalizing the present as a space for intervention. It is a 
                                                
37 Vázquez-Arroyo 2013, 739.  
38 Ibid. 
39 This argument was made first by Pat O’Malley (2003). 
40 Vázquez-Arroyo 2013, 741. 
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particularly salient locus for the political importance of catastrophization in the discursive 
sense where discourses of catastrophe “encompass the citizen as a labile participant who, 
however powerless, is invited to tacitly authorize those in power to respond to the 
catastrophic menace described, and to render the response legitimate, as part of the 
depoliticized politics that characterize the present.”41  
 Such is the path that discourse takes in establishing narrative as central to 
contemporary politics of catastrophe. Invoking the costs of inaction in the face of 
looming catastrophe becomes a hallmark of antidemocratic, or as Vázquez-Arroyo 
following Wolin will call it, “depoliticized,” politics.42 Narratives of catastrophe deploy 
scenarios that erect parameters: either meet fate with power, or succumb to inaction. Thus 
the process of identifying the political rhetoric of catastrophe does not simply identify the 
discourse of catastrophe; it exposes the political stakes through which the politics of 
catastrophic discourse plays out. It is a question of actors and incentives: “For a political 
theory of catastrophe the central political question of who is deploying a narrative of 
catastrophe in the name of what or whom and to what political end.”43  
 Vázquez-Arroyo considers this discursive process within the framework of what 
Adi Ophir meant by “catastrophization,” a complex conceptual diagnosis of emergency 
politics and governance in the present. 44  In articulating catastrophization, Ophir 
constructs a conceptual framework with the desire to understand how “emergency” might 
                                                
41  ibid, 741-42. It is unclear from passages such as this how Vázquez-Arroyo might 
differentiate such claims from calls for legitimate states of exception, but I cannot pursue that 
here. 
42 ibid, 747. 
43 Ibid, 742. Emphasis in original. 
44 Vázquez-Arroyo 2013, 743; Ophir 2008, 59. 
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operate “in terms free from the discourse of sovereignty and its legal implications and in 
a way that still holds open a certain, limited place for the sovereign decision and 
exception.”45 Catastrophization, for Ophir, thus names a process in which there is an 
increase in the presence (and volume) of evils and a decrease in the possibility to protect 
against them.46 Catastrophization, in material terms, simultaneously names the invention 
of vulnerable modes of political life and at the same time the mode in which life is 
rendered vulnerable: “The population defined by catastrophization is the medium of the 
catastrophization process.”47 
 Drawing the term catastrophization itself from psychology, Ophir allows one way 
of conceiving processes of understanding catastrophe to survive mostly intact from its 
usage by cognitive psychologists. Indicating an anxiety disorder wherein the subject 
exaggerates the stakes of a personal event as “terrible, awful, and unbearable” despite 
their being actually “merely inconvenient or uncomfortable” introduces a subjective 
aspect to catastrophization.48 The “subjective catastrophization” is thus articulated as a 
“cognitive bias.” Rather than doomsaying in the most apocalyptic sense, the subjective 
                                                
45 Ophir 2008, 59.  
46 Ophir’s use of the word “evils” is conceptual and makes reference to his treatise, The 
Order of Evils (2005). An “evil,” according to Ophir is “the occurrence in which a worsening 
in someone’s condition takes place,” and can occur in one of two ways: “when he incurs loss 
or damage (in terms of certain exchange relations) that has no compensation; and when 
someone or something causes him suffering” (Ophir 2005, 327). Interestingly, in the second 
articulation of evil, Ophir elaborates that it can also include “occurrences that worsen 
someone’s condition because they increase the danger that he will be harmed without directly 
causing damage; in this case, the evil comes from the future damage and from the indirect 
loss caused as a result of the need to protect himself from the expected damage.” One might 
refer to this caveat as an “evil by exposure,” something that will help to illuminate his case in 
the essay I am discussing in this chapter. 
47 Ophir 2008, 62. 
48 ibid 
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catastrophization is an act of mediating real events and transforming them into worst-case 
scenarios where their effects are so exaggerated that they bear negatively on the lived 
experience of the subject. In other words, subjective catastrophization describes an 
attitude, or a somewhat distorted orientation to the possibility of discomfort where in 
everyday events and relations, “one is panicked, helplessly, by the misconceived prospect 
of a coming avalanche of evils that one is going to suffer,” though it is important to the 
“cognitive bias” that there be no clear imminence of evils, only a subject lamenting their 
potential.49 
 Ophir’s contribution moves beyond cognitive psychology and suggests an 
“objective” catastrophization. Noting that there often are very real catastrophes, and that 
one needn’t be cognitively biased to fear them, objective catastrophization designates “a 
process in which natural and man-made forces and factors work together to create 
devastating effects on a large population.”50 This objective form of catastrophization 
occurs through “the processes that bring about that very avalanche of evils [suffering and 
losses, humiliation and scarcity, deprivation and neglect] that injure entire populations.”51 
In other words, objective catastrophization indicates the processes through which 
catastrophes (always “man-made”) are created and exacerbated. Objective 
catastrophization, for Ophir, enables an understanding of large-scale processes by which 
harm is exacted and endured, and it is carried out first and foremost through the 
                                                
49 ibid, 60. 
50 ibid 
51 ibid, 60. 
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production of populations of subjects, through a complex articulated by 
governmentality.52 
 For Ophir, evoking governmentality allows for the subjective process associated 
with individuating terror to be supplanted by a broader, discursive paradigm that names a 
vulnerable population at the same time as it comes into existence.53 In other words, where 
the concept of catastrophization derived from cognitive psychology articulated a false 
dichotomy—the subject who exaggerates reality and the objective terms of reality—the 
form of catastrophization rooted in governmentality seizes on the distinction between 
“actual or objective” catastrophization as both a means of governance and event, on one 
hand, and the intellectual production of catastrophization, viz. the discursive mode of 
catastrophization.54 Here, rather than the notion of event and protectorate (objective 
catastrophization), the parallel function classifies what matters, distinguishing “natural” 
from “manmade” events, or as “catastrophe” or “humanitarian emergency.” 55  The 
discursive mode of catastrophization “designate[s] objects to be observed, described, 
measured and analyzed, predicted, and interfered with by and through a certain discourse, 
and they all result from applying certain rules of ‘object formation’ in that discourse. 
These are the discursive means through which the catastrophizing process assumes its 
objective status.”56 
                                                
52 Ibid 62. 
53 Ibid, 63.  
54 Ibid, 62-3. 
55 ibid 
56 ibid. 
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 Adi Ophir rendered the complex concept of “catastrophization” whilst 
considering the ongoing tumult taking place in the Occupied Territories of Palestine.57 
For Ophir, this concept both outlines the ways that a vast interaction between state 
governance and NGOs continues to tacitly sanction the push of the Palestinians to the 
brink of disaster and simultaneously to rescue them from perishing. The active 
component of the concept explains the transformation of daily life into one of ongoing 
catastrophe – “discursive catastrophization may go in two opposite directions and may do 
so simultaneously: creating a catastrophe and mitigating its effects.”58 Yet the concept 
reaches further in an attempt to describe the advent of a governmentality that gives the 
ongoing catastrophe life, as Vázquez-Arroyo puts it, both “an objective reality and a 
discursive process” (though Vázquez-Arroyo makes no mention of the prominence of 
governmentality in Ophir’s argument). 59  In other words, Ophir’s concept of 
catastrophization produces an understanding where in actual policy the catastrophe is 
both produced and mitigated; but in this process, so are ways of thinking about political 
order in the very political landscape that it produces.  
Sympathetically critiquing Ophir’s deployment, Vázquez-Arroyo introduces the 
notion of the “catastrophization of political life” as a means to recast Ophir’s notion of 
catastrophization that allows for the “cognitive bias” of subjective catastrophization that I 
discussed above – the disordered condition of exaggerated anxiety – to bear the role of 
effect in the dialectic between catastrophe as event and catastrophization as process. (I 
wonder if Vázquez-Arroyo’s attempt to conceptualize the conditions that he calls the 
                                                
57 ibid, 77. 
58 Ibid, 67. 
59 Vázquez-Arroyo 2013, 744 
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catastrophization of political life isn’t asserted in the place where Ophir’s treatment of 
governmentality already exists. Where Vázquez-Arroyo indicates that the 
catastrophization of political life bears impacts upon shaping the experiences of political 
subjects, Ophir, albeit quickly, seems to indicate that certain populations are produces 
similarly through logics of governmentality, a passage that Vázquez-Arroyo does not 
interpret, but seems important to however Vázquez-Arroyo’s catastrophized populations 
must come to be.) Where Ophir clearly has a concept for the relationship between 
discursive catastrophization and the production of populations with respect to it, 
Vázquez-Arroyo instead writes in a similar direction under a different name.  
It is worth parsing the dual elements that Vázquez-Arroyo has in mind in 
developing this concept of the catastrophization of political life.  I will return to the first 
momentarily, but in line with how I have outlined his argument thus far, the rhetoric of 
catastrophe and the ways that it tends to depoliticize populations plays a central role in 
Vázquez-Arroyo’s conceptualization of the catastrophization of political life: 
…the rhetoric of catastrophe, its menacing shadows, is deployed to depoliticize 
populations, as well as to legitimize catastrophic situations that are already under 
way. This, in order to establish a threshold in which state power is not only 
exercised but regularized, and normalized, in fundamentally undemocratic ways.60  
 
Here we see a refrain of sorts wherein Vázquez-Arroyo reminds the reader that the 
invocation of catastrophe serves to bolster the authority of those that deploy the rhetoric, 
therein legitimating a political arrangement where the present itself requires rescue. In 
this sense the legitimation of catastrophic situations refers to the objective 
catastrophization, the actual reality of the moment. Discursive catastrophization, in 
                                                
60 ibid, 745. 
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Vázquez-Arroyo’s reading of Ophir, as a political effect, becomes a vehicle by which the 
catastrophization of political life occurs when it intersects with objective 
catastrophization. 61  Accordingly, this passage that I have quoted, the “rhetoric of 
catastrophe” carries with it an air of intentionality where the rhetoric’s deployment 
permits the undemocratic exercise of state power.  
This is certainly empirically the case, often enough, but by his own admission 
Vázquez-Arroyo abandons another process in which catastrophe enters the fray: the way 
that the discourse of catastrophe  
…connotes an increasing awareness of vulnerability to forms of power, the 
pervasiveness of superfluous suffering and destruction, and the need to be 
politically alert to these, in order to mitigate or avert catastrophes…”62  
 
It is interesting that Vázquez-Arroyo does not dwell more on this formulation of the 
catastrophization of political life because it would seem to almost politicize the recipients 
of the rhetoric of catastrophe. There is a way that focusing on this element wherein those 
who are exposed to discursive catastrophization might become conditioned or aware of 
its very process in the sense that they might be “increasingly aware” of their vulnerability 
(or not). But Vázquez-Arroyo only states this part of his formulation, a part that to my 
mind would come closer to appropriately describing the more general sense of “political 
life,” a sense that would be inclusive of entire populations—even only as audiences of 
those who deliver catastrophic rhetoric—but still, the point remains that the themes in the 
passage quoted just above—“increasing awareness of vulnerability to forms of power,” 
“the superfluous suffering and destruction,” “and the need to be politically alert to 
                                                
61 Ibid, 744-45. 
62 Ibid, 745. 
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those”—these themes seem to me to be extremely political. Yet Vázquez-Arroyo 
proceeds, having only named such themes, to the “menacing shadows” or the rhetoric of 
catastrophe before naming its “fundamentally antidemocratic ways.”63 
The larger issue that I find with this formulation is how heavily it relies on 
explicit rhetorical strategies. I do not dispute the presence of political manipulation, 
especially as an if-then proposition, that Vázquez-Arroyo refers to as he makes his 
arguments concerning the uses and abuses of rhetoric to depoliticize populations.64 Yet it 
is symptomatic of the larger structure of Vázquez-Arroyo’s argument that the emphasis in 
his conceptual description of the catastrophization of political life tends toward the 
notions of the rhetoric of catastrophe being deployed to “depoliticize populations.”65 That 
the strategy of invoking catastrophe aims to depoliticize “in order to establish a threshold 
in which state power is not only exercised but regularized, and normalized, in 
fundamentally antidemocratic ways,” reveals the agential animus of Vázquez-Arroyo’s 
conceptualization.66 The catastrophization of political life is a political manipulation, a 
                                                
63 Ibid, 745. 
64 See for example how his essay sets up its argument with example’s of “Barack Obama’s 
invocation of [catastrophe] in 2009, when he stated that without swift intervention the 
ongoing financial crisis ‘could turn into catastrophe.’” Or, more centrally to the ongoing 
arguments of the essay, how Habermas sought to avert one catastrophe while advocating a 
less visible, yet persistent one in Europe. Vázquez-Arroyo 2013, 739. 
65 Ibid, 745. 
66 Take, for example, how he frames another important essay on the politics of catastrophic 
rhetoric with reference to the state: “Herein lays the recasting of the element of answerability 
in the formulation this essay sets forth: from the perspective of a democratic identity, 
answerability cannot be reduced to answering to the State, and its surrogate logics of power, 
which betrays basic democratic principles of participation, equality, shared power and 
accountability; it is rather conceived as response that answers to the need to avoid 
compromising these democratic principles; that is its moment of fidelity. Answerability is 
thus recast as the need to ‘respond to’ rather than as an ‘answering for’ a predicament of 
power. Emphasis is thereby placed on the responses demanded by virtue of inhabiting, as a 
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seizure of power, a pillaging of the vulnerable – even when they are perhaps not as 
vulnerable as the rhetorician might have them be represented. The rhetoric of such a 
catastrophization seeks to disenfranchise and disable and, in the end, has less to do with 
catastrophe than with hoodwinking and sleight of hand.  
In arguing that the process of catastrophization of political life that he insists upon 
is effectively a device intended to “authorize the expansion of unaccountable power” with 
a form of rhetoric “deployed to depoliticize populations,” he mistakes the exercise of 
authority-as-politics for what he refers to as “political life.” In so doing, Vázquez-Arroyo 
only addresses the way that certain rhetorics bolster the abuse of antidemocratic power. 
But when seen as a broader concern—a preoccupation with the future-oriented 
abstraction of catastrophe—we can see to the contrary that a discourse of catastrophe 
works in ways far from depoliticizing populations. Instead we can see a re-
politicization—a re-orientation—of political life to a broad concern about security in 
general.  
The limited notion of the “catastrophization of political life,” as Vázquez-Arroyo 
outlines it, is extremely useful for understanding the ways that political actors might 
deploy nightmare scenarios in order to effect political change, be it by declaration of 
emergency, or even to reach consensus. Yet the notion of the catastrophization of 
political life is less useful if we want to understand a broad cultural production of 
thinking about catastrophe. While Vázquez-Arroyo’s thesis significantly advances our 
                                                                                                                                            
full participant, a scene of power, the locus where one’s responsibility resides. A sense of 
responsibility bound by a sense of fidelity to one’s political identity, but also by one’s 
position in the structure of power relations in this scene, as well as the benefits that one 
derives from it, sometimes just by virtue of being a recognized member of the collectivity” 
(Vázquez-Arroyo 2008, 99.) 
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position in terms of building a critical literature on the politics of catastrophe, I want to 
suggest that an important supplement can be asserted in order to move the effort further. 
For Vázquez-Arroyo, following Wolin and others, the process by which catastrophization 
operates discursively necessarily empowers some while disenfranchising others. For him 
the process articulates a certain kind of political life: one in which rhetorical strategies of 
danger and vulnerability consolidate and “authorize specific forms of power.”67 Yet there 
clearly exists a multiplicity of discourses surrounding the presence of catastrophe that do 
not necessarily only seek to authorize “unaccountable power” with a form of rhetoric 
“deployed to depoliticize populations.”68  
 I agree that discourses of catastrophe enact specific forms of power. Yet the 
concept of discursive catastrophization, and the way that Vázquez-Arroyo extends it to 
shape political life, obscures the very widespread process of fictionalizing; in other 
words, discourses of imagination. This is no small omission. Vázquez-Arroyo 
concentrates on the hierarchical abuses surrounding the politics and rhetorics of fear. As a 
result his notion of the “catastrophization of political life,” explains the process by which 
people are disenfranchised by narrow manipulations of rhetoric by those who already 
wield political power. Instead, however, when seen as a broader concern—as in a cultural 
preoccupation with the future-oriented abstraction of catastrophe—we can see to the 
contrary that a discourse of catastrophe works in ways far from depoliticizing 
populations. Even further, we can see catastrophic discourse emerge from a broad swath 
of populations, many sectors of which are not traditionally conceived as holding positions 
                                                
67 Vázquez-Arroyo 2013, 739. 
68 Ibid, 745 
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of political power. In this sense, we need to develop a theory explaining that we exist in a 
moment of broad cultural production about catastrophe and the way that it shapes our 
lives. To underestimate the importance of this cultural production is to overlook, 
explicitly, how potentially politicizing catastrophic discourse can be. To that end, it is 
clear that the cultural production of fictionalizing—of inventing catastrophic scenarios—
is the effect of a wider ranging political rationality that, after offering some examples, I 
will refer to as catastrophism.  
 
 
III. Four Fictions of Human Security 
 
Here, below, recalling Foucault’s dispositif, the brief passages through four narratives 
(from literature, philosophical ethics, public appeals to security policy, and the 
Department of Homeland Security) operate as varied voices in such a “heterogenous 
ensemble” where writings from different corners of concern for future catastrophes and 
likewise future threats to human survival come to life, not as orthogonal to one another, 
but nevertheless as unique expressions germane to the same rationality, the same field of 
inquiry. Again, by rationality, I do not mean a repressive regime of control, but instead a 
process (and its effects of meaning-making) in which even in their differences, I hope to 
show a shared logic of reasoning. 
The concern for future catastrophe lurks in many kinds of contemporary thought 
about political life in the present, even if and when they justify themselves by way of 
fictionalizing the future. I try to relate those writings by way of their own elements that 
connect them with others, that make them belong with others. I outline them to show how 
 204 
we can begin to see connective tissues between fairly dissimilar sorts of thinking as a 
way of understanding that something unifies what seems at first blush nearly unrelated. In 
reading different texts below, I emphasize more than an arbitrary association. I 
underscore the presence of a sense-making capacity reaching further than the 
preoccupations of security analysts and doomsayers alike. From these vignettes, in the 
next section I outline the organization of a political rationality called catastrophism: a 
rationality orienting the subject, or even entire populations of subjects, toward political 
life by way of their connection to a way of thinking—in this case, both animated and 
petrified by the necessity to account for future circumstance, to imagine future 
catastrophes. 
Together these writings represent rehearsals of catastrophism. They produce 
fictions, claimed as necessary visions of what could come, not what has or what will. And 
subsequently they deploy the catastrophic in order to engage the present. So if in fiction 
is their power, I attempt as a response to read them. 
 
a. Literary Allegory and Catastrophe as Humanist Warning Sign: Oryx and Crake 
 
The narrative present of Margaret Atwood’s novel Oryx and Crake unfolds mostly on a 
barren beach. Scattered with refuse from a lone human’s endeavor to survive, the long 
stretch of sand is all but unoccupied save one biological human being, presumed to be the 
last living human being after an engineered apocalyptic virus that was intended to destroy 
all but its creator and his lover.69 The only other living creatures are a small tribe of 
genetically modified permanent children, bewildered by a genetically modified lack of 
                                                
69 Atwood 2003 
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capacity for fear, who exist in a constant utopia of earnest ignorance, and a litter of new 
animal forms that resulted from corporate science experiments aimed at manufacturing 
more-perfect animals than natural selection could deliver. The setting from which the 
novel’s protagonist and sole known human character to have survived a species-ending 
virus,70 dualistically named both Jimmy and “Snowman,” makes a literary play on the 
desert, the ocean: The beach is simultaneously bleak and serene, at once tranquil and 
dangerous. 71  The white sand stretches out endlessly and Snowman confuses the 
experience of survival on the beach with being “alone on a wide, wide sea.”72 By feat of 
coincidence and lustful obsession, Snowman survived in a babbling, nostalgic accident, 
and the novel consists in its near entirety in his reflections on the causes of his 
predicament as presumably the Earth’s last living human being. Snowman, delirious as he 
is, desensitized from the absence of human contact, context-less in a rolling present form 
of immanent temporality—“zero hour”73—persists emaciated and riddled with insect 
bites, without interlocutor save a small crowd of genetically modified childlike beings, 
reminiscent of H.G. Wells’s Eloi, called the Children of Crake, who are dreamily 
                                                
70 This is an assumption that the reader is forced to make through the course of the novel, 
though in the very final pages, we learn that there may be other humans even on the beach 
itself, though there is no certain way to determine at this point what parts of the narrative are 
“real” and what are hallucinations of Snowman’s imagination (372). Aradau and Van 
Munster, in passing, evoke a similar trope in referencing MacCarthy’s The Road when 
opening their book: “The cause of the event often remains unknown and unknowable –as in 
Cormack MacCarthy’s novel The Road – and the narrative instead enacts a future that invites 
audiences to inhabit a world where the catastrophic event has already happened” (Aradau and 
Van Munster 2011, 2). As a mechanism of dystopian literature, the casual mystery is as 
powerful as it is regular: the question, “How would we have arrived at such a future?” 
encapsulates the desire to allegorize the mistakes of the present, often appearing in dystopian 
landscapes, but also central to satirical treatments as well.  
71 Relating the sea and desert in literary imaginaries, see Casarino (2002) and Jasper (2004) 
72 op cit, 10. 
73 Ibid 3. 
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animated at best, and blearily ignorant to what has been lost, amounting in their banality 
to the logical conclusion of all of human achievement and civilization as the reader 
knows it.74 The Children of Crake were meant to be Earth’s sole conscious inheritors of 
the planet and its new humanless wild, save their originator—the narcissistic scientist 
Crake—who, as the novel continues, takes shape as not only the narrative antagonist, but 
also an allegorical representative of the consequences resulting from the nexus of myths 
of scientific progress and unfettered capitalist ambition – as Posner describes him, “a 
perfectly credible twenty-first century psychopath… One knows men like Crake.”75 
Crake is an unbound Narcissus of modern scientific progress. But his character has a 
particular relationship to genius and scientific knowledge not best described simply by 
fiat of psychosis. As Chung-Hao Ku argues, Crake is not merely “mad” in the sense that 
his character represents mental illness. Crake instead expresses a historical conjunction 
between capital and techne: “Although Crake looks like a cynical misanthrope who 
would fain rid himself of humankind, he is less a ‘mad scientist’ than a product of 
                                                
74 I return to the Children of Crake momentarily. The reference to Wells’s Eloi is from The 
Time Machine by H. G. Wells (2008). There is a strange inversion of Wells’s allegory of 
class conflict in The Time Machine where there is an eternal class struggle, even in the 
seeming (on the surface) utopia of the far-off future. In Atwood, the quest for human 
progress results immediately in bloodlust and the eventual catastrophe in the human present 
of modernity. So the Children of Crake really ought be contrasted with the Eloi, in that sense 
only, because the Children of Crake represent the utopian dream of Enlightenment 
rationalities of scientific progress, but not the reality. Wells’s novel cannot share that 
trajectory because the narrative spells the teleological arch extending to utopia for some, and 
the eternal plunge into misery for the underclasses. Atwood shares no such optimism, if such 
a word might be applied to Wells, because her ruminations on the future of the human 
species involves a total cataclysm of global proportions rather than an amplified perpetuation 
of class dynamics as modern thought understands them. Posner (2003) makes a similar 
argument, but also links Oryx & Crake to a longer list of dystopian works by authors 
including Huxley, Orwell and others.  
75 Posner 2003, 34.  
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capitalist machinery. After all, Crake cannot destroy the world without the conspiracy 
between technocracy and capitalism.”76 As such, rather than merely representative of a 
maniacal modern antagonist, Ku and others argue that Crake represents an ethical 
dilemma signifying both the capitalist imperative to profit, as well as the technocratic 
solution to manage through invention.77 
This is Atwood’s dream of the post-catastrophic landscape: dislocated and 
aimless, a present beyond telos.78 It is a world at once terrible and serene, and it is a 
landscape without focus, sadly occupied by the world’s last person. 79  Atwood’s 
meditation on the post-catastrophic is less a meditation on a solemn world as it is a 
rumination on masculine narcissism and instrumental rationality. I will return to discuss 
the centrality of the novel’s mythic critique of instrumental progress and unfettered 
scientific ambition, but what underlies Atwood’s narrative is a lamentation of cost, of 
what is at risk in the delicate balance between scientific achievement and the potential for 
narcissism to turn sinister.  
In the wilderness of Snowman’s present life, he is left to reflect on the production 
of modernity itself represented in ruminations of love lost and the end of a civilization 
bent on its own perfection through endlessly coextensive scientific experimentation and 
commodity production. Snowman bore witness to the ceaseless attempt to commodify the 
production of a biopolitical utopia.80 The ultimate outcome of the quest to perfect a 
                                                
76 Ku 2006, 119.  
77 Ku 2006, 120; Sanderson 2013, 235; Snyder 2011, 474. 
78 Snyder 2011, 471. 
79 Ingersoll (2004) likens Snowman to Robinson Crusoe as a trope of isolated survival, pg. 
163. Posner performs a similar gesture (2003, 31). 
80 See Haines 2012.  
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biopolitical species alteration as commodity is Snowman’s solitude and status as terminal 
human being, which the reader is expected to lament the end of humanity as it is utterly 
forgotten with its accompanied death of narration.81 (What a strange and uncritical view 
of oral tradition, but I cannot pursue that now.) If the ultimate outcome is Snowman’s 
lonesome death, partnered with the end of humankind, then the penultimate outcome is 
the catastrophe producing the end of civilization itself.  
As the novel operates as a mysterious work of discovery, where the protagonist’s 
nostalgic quests of memory narrate the genesis of the disaster, the reader only discovers 
the source of the catastrophe at nearly the novel’s end. Finding a note that he penned with 
certainty of his own looming death, Snowman addresses his helplessly authored a letter to 
potential survivors that might one day stumble upon his corpse and with it the only 
attempt to explain the ostensible death of humanity. To Snowman, the letter uttered the 
final thought of human history:  
I don’t have much time, but will try to set down what I believe to be the 
explanation for the recent extraordinary events catastrophe. I have gone through 
the computer of the man known here as Crake. He left it turned on—deliberately, 
I believe—and I am able to report that the JUVE virus was made here in the 
Paradice dome by splicers hand-selected by Crake and subsequently eliminated, 
and was then encysted in the BlyssPluss product. There was a time-lapse factor 
built in to allow for wide distributions: the first batch of virus did not become 
active until all selected territories had been seeded, and the outbreak thus took the 
form of a series of rapidly overlapping waves. For the success of the plan, time 
was of the essence. Social disruption was maximized, and development of a 
                                                
81 Cooke (2006) summarizes this well: “We are presented throughout the novel with the 
possibility of the end of the human, and we have this ending systematically worked out 
through the disappearance or diminution of language, the destruction of the technological 
system, as well as the liquidation of most of the world’s inhabitants. Through the entire book, 
we live with this palpable sense of the end.” The end of narration, and its parallel in a 
narrated disintegration of language, come to signify the end of the human capacity to relay 
information, to tell stories, and as a result the novel carries forth in a symbolic dissolution of 
the novel as form in and of itself.   
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vaccine effectively prevented. Crake himself had developed a vaccine 
concurrently with the virus, but he had destroyed it prior to his assisted suicide 
death. Although various staff members of the BlyssPluss project contributed to 
JUVE on a piecework basis, it is my belief that none, with the exception of Crake, 
was cognizant of what that effect would be. As for Crake’s motives, I can only 
speculate. Perhaps…82 
 
Crake’s designed catastrophe grew from his monomaniacal drive to innovate, as such 
emphasizing the collusion between rote creation and capitalist drive. Crake’s insatiable 
experimentation with life becomes vilified by Atwood’s narrator because of Crake’s 
megalomania and the ways that it leads to the worst imaginable scenario, but what is not 
explored as a critical possibility by Atwood is that Crake’s genetic splicing and species 
altering was also a swerve in biological reality that essentially would result in the end of 
humanity anyway.  
 What becomes clear is that the scientific pursuit—though somewhat liberally 
narrated by Atwood as the sole province of the antagonist Crake—tended teleologically 
toward the catastrophe as if the release of the apocalyptic virus were a logical conclusion 
of scientific advancement. Yet this overlooks that it was not merely “scientific 
experimentation,” but the pursuit to augment life through commodified forms of 
biological enhancement that created the conditions of possibility for the virus’s 
dissemination. Crake is not simply determined to invent, but to alter – by way of 
destroying – the fault lines of biological humanism.83 At the very core of the novel’s 
                                                
82 Op cit, 346. 
83 Bergthaller recognizes this as a feature of Crake’s character fundamentally opposed to an 
artistic humanism that he recognizes in Snowman. For Bergthaller, Crake is no mere 
capitalist but, instead, a ruthless inventor against the biological determinism of the human 
itself:  “…it is quite clear that Crake, underneath his veneer of cynical aloofness, nourishes a 
deep disgust of the world he grows up in, and that he is motivated not by greed but by a 
genuine desire to change it. His Paradice project is not a money-making enterprise, but an 
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explanatory device lives a commodified biopolitical utopianism, one met only with a 
moralistic dystopianism: 
It was amazing—said Crake—what once-unimaginable things had been 
accomplished by the team here. What had been altered was nothing less than the 
ancient primate brain. Gone were its destructive features, the features responsible 
for the world’s current illnesses. For instance, racism—or, as they referred to it in 
Paradice, pseudospeciation—had been eliminated in the model group, merely by 
switching the bonding mechanism: the Paradice people simply did not register 
skin color. Hierarchy could not exist among them, because they lacked the neural 
complexes that would have created it. Since they were neither hunters nor 
agriculturalists hungry for land, there was no territoriality: the king-of-the-castle 
hard-wiring that had plagued humanity had, in them, been unwired. They ate 
nothing but leaves and grass and roots and a berry or two; thus their foods were 
plentiful and always available. Their sexuality was not a constant torment to them, 
not a cloud of turbulent hormones: they came into heat at regular intervals, as did 
most mammals other than man. In fact, as there would never be anything for these 
people to inherit, there would be no family trees, no marriages, and no divorces. 
They were perfectly adjusted to their habitat, so they would never have to create 
houses or tools or weapons, or, for that matter, clothing. They would have no need 
to invent any harmful symbolisms, such as kingdoms, icons, gods, or money. Best 
of all, they recycled their own excrement. By means of a brilliant [genetic] 
splice…84 
 
One strange outgrowth of this dialogue between Crake and Snowman is that the 
catastrophe stems from the very same technological advancements that Crake references 
above. In a way this move denaturalizes the biological virus (which isn’t incorrect at all; 
it is borne of a laboratory after all).85 Thus the catastrophe responsible for the end of 
human life as we know it was a material byproduct of the very pursuits of modern science 
to master nature.86 The virus is anything but natural; it is fully, wholly political.  
                                                                                                                                            
attempt to cut the Gordian knot that is human nature, to complete the transfiguration of life 
which art also aims at” (Bergthaller 2010, 735). 
84 Ibid, 305 
85 On the effects of denaturalization, see Huffer 2015. 
86 Paik pursues a similar vein that could further tie such a reading to my conceptualization of 
catastrophism: “…such a fantasy can be shared by perspectives that are normally held to be 
diametrically opposed, such as by transhumanists, who call for the augmentation of human 
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Yet when read more closely, Atwood’s narrator carries out a strange maneuver. 
By reducing the solutions to political problems lurking within humankind, Atwood 
simultaneously depoliticizes political force by way of reinscribing political problematics 
(racism, hierarchy, territoriality, scarcity, desire) to the biological impulses of human 
beings (and not “nature” in a broader scope). The narrative can thus only conclude that 
political divisiveness and partisanship results from biological constructs—from a human 
ecology—leaving as political possibilities genetic determinism in the form of eugenic 
commoditization or catastrophe. Atwood is thus confronted with a strange problem: 
Through biologizing politics (and its potential solutions), the narrative can only conclude 
that in alleviating political problems, the modern aim of scientific progress understood as 
human self-determination leads either to eugenics or to catastrophe.  
 Nevertheless Oryx and Crake carries out a cautionary tale that forewarns its 
readers of the dangers of unbridled ideological commitments to scientific progress in an 
age of capitalist modernity. 87  The novel, thus read, might oversimplify richer 
philosophical works on the matter, but it serves importantly—perhaps more importantly 
than other thematic endeavors that the novel undertakes—to allegorize the problems 
associated with the myth of modern progress as advanced ideologically by proponents of 
modern science.88 DiMarco aptly names Crake an allegorical figure of “modernity’s 
commitment to homo faber—he who labors to use every instrument as a means to 
achieve a particular end in building a world, even when the fabrication of that world 
                                                                                                                                            
beings through biotechnology, and by the antihuman segment of environmentalists, who 
regard the human species as a plague that is devastating the earth” (2010, 120). 
87 Cooke 2010. 
88 Cooke alludes to these themes in reading Atwood’s implicit sympathies with the Frankfurt 
School (2010). 
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necessarily demands a repeated violation of its materiality, including its people.”89 
Atwood’s novel warns of hidden consequences in discovery and innovation, that human 
malice and avarice can as easily be deployed as some Panglossian ethos of advancement 
and progress, as is often the narrative accompanying the goals of scientific quests to heal, 
to cure, and to engineer scientific escape routes to otherwise human-made calamities like 
global poverty and climate change. The upshot serves to remind that Atwood has a 
relatively simple moral: Science can as quickly destroy humanity as it can save it. To 
follow science uncritically is to potentially bring about the end of all human life in a 
catastrophic end, resulting from something as simple as unbridled ambition.  
 
b. Critical Philosophy as Anti-catastrophic Pedagogy: Ethics for a Broken World 
 
Of the possible interpretations of Tim Mulgan’s Ethics for a Broken World,90 one that is 
most tempting but also most off-mark is that it is a book about the future. It is not. Rather 
than writing a book for the future as perhaps Nietzsche had in many of his works, and 
despite a gesture toward “future generations” as a central provocation, Mulgan has 
written a critique of the present, or at very least of dominant ethical and political 
philosophies of the modern age.91 Advancing as a hypothetical set of lectures from a 
history of philosophy course set in the near future, where the contemporary age might 
follow “Early Modern Philosophy” (or anyway where the present time period is 
understood truly as such), Mulgan’s fictional philosophy professor is tasked with 
                                                
89 DiMarco 2005, 170. 
90 Mulgan 2011 
91 Principal among these are Thus Spake Zarathustra (1968) and Beyond Good and Evil 
(1989), which carries the subtitle, Prelude to a Philosophy of the Future. See also Hicks and 
Rosenberg 2003; Metzger 2013.  
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teaching the philosophy of a bygone era—really, a constitutive era of a catastrophic 
future—in which the present moment taking place 50 to 100 years from the reader’s 
present is post-catastrophic; the future, we learn, is the “broken world.”92 Placed in his 
own words: “The idea that we hold the resources of the earth in trust for future 
generations was a very powerful one for many affluent people. They could have applied 
it to their collective decision-making. Unfortunately for us, and for the future of our 
world, they did not.”93 In short, Mulgan’s broken world emerges from a failed ethics, an 
ethics of insurmountably political implications resulting in an earth devoid of expectable 
continuity, borne from a blindness to material outcomes resulting from material desires – 
it is a paradox of contemporary “affluent” thought.  
 In the broken world, a post-environmental collapse of global proportion, Mulgan 
theorizes a new scarcity in which the resources needed to sustain human life lack to the 
extent that survival for all human beings is not even unlikely, it is largely unthinkable. 
Juxtaposed to the reality that future generations of the broken world intuit, the reader’s 
present world is articulated as the “age of affluence.”94 This affluent age is experienced 
by the moderns and justified philosophically by their signal thinkers (namely, for 
Mulgan: Nozick, Locke, Mill, and Rawls), and who when unified in historical memory 
operated under the theses of individual property ownership that advanced a civilization 
whose most perilous blind spot was that it valued its own self-fulfillment over and 
                                                
92 Mulgan titles the course “Ancient Philosophy III: American and European philosophy in 
the age of affluence.” Mulgan 2011, 1. For a more precise summary see, Mulgan 2014a, 4. 
93 Mulgan 2011, 220.  
94 Mulgan 2011, 2-5. 
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beyond a rational (and ethical) responsibility for future lives (even of their own selves 
and offspring).95  
 The motivating comparative work undertaken by conceptualizing the age of 
affluence renders contemporaneous ethical considerations contingent upon its own 
circumstances. Mulgan’s imagined dystopia reimagines the causal force of affluence in 
the present as shaping the very ways that ethical choices are made. As an effect, his 
critique challenges the outcomes of ethics as emerging from non-necessary 
circumstances. For Mulgan the aim of his book is to denature the notion that human 
relationships with a more or less equilibrious environment are not ontologically given and 
upon which a static system of ethics and politics can rest. Rather a vision of ethics and 
politics constituent with existential uncertainty would require asserting the former’s 
contingent relationship with ontological conditions of survival. As Chappell puts it, “[The 
affluent-contemporary] perspective is, historically speaking, a most unusual perspective. 
What reason is there to expect it not to be also a warping perspective? What might moral 
and political philosophy look like, if we tried to get free of the distortions of that 
perspective? If we tried, say, to adopt the perspective of a broken world’s inhabitants 
                                                
95  One would be right in mounting a normative critique against Mulgan’s primary 
characterization of the “age of affluence,” noting that the present era is not uniformly 
affluent, or at least affluence is hardly the defining characteristic representing most human 
lives in the contemporary age. Leaving the particularities of that argument to the side, such a 
critique would need to contend with the difference between an ontological and ecological 
continuity that Mulgan recognizes in the present-affluent age that makes possible a surfeit of 
materialistic components of so-called affluence, and his imagined consequence of collapse 
that would render impossible the ontological equilibrium to so much as carry out agriculture 
or construct permanent settlements. This is truly what Mulgan has in mind when he cites as 
his more important provocation “to highlight the contingency of our moral and political 
ideals,” and why the book is not principally an argument concerning, for example, why 
climate change ought to be considered more seriously (ix).  
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instead, and think about how moral assumptions that seemed entirely naturally to us 
might strike them?”96 This alteration in worldview commits itself firmly as a link 
between the ethical hope to alter the sense in which human behavior can be constrained 
by moral consideration, and as a result it rethinks the sense in which moral considerations 
are contingent upon contemporary states of affairs.97 If, as Mulgan imagines it, moral 
considerations are capable of altering world-modifying behavior, action must be 
realigned with reasons to change. The speculative nature of his book is therefore not only 
ethical, but an imaginative exercise within the project of pedogogy. 
 As a result the responsibility summoned for future generations is not mere 
teleologizing in the sense that the narrative deployed means to insist that the broken 
world is inevitable (in this sense it is only dystopic in the most remote sense as well) – 
what matters for ethical purposes is that Mulgan’s vision is credible.98 For Mulgan the 
welfare of others as ethical consideration ought not merely extend to those in the 
synchronic sense of moral outcomes mattering in the present.99 When considering the 
lived experiences of others, especially those unlike ourselves, the ethical responsibility to 
future people ought be considered with equal footing, if not taken more seriously, as 
ethical considerations of those whose lives share a temporal register. This is because, as 
Mulgan puts it elsewhere: 
Unless something goes drastically wrong in the next few centuries, most of those 
who will ever live are yet to be born. Our actions have little impact on those who 
                                                
96 Chappell 2014, 31-2. 
97 Mulgan 2011, ix. 
98 Mulgan 2014c, 60. 
99 This part of his argument builds on his influential book, a consequentialist treatise 
weighing in on the debate about “future generations.” See, Future People (2006). For critical 
readings of the debate on future generations, see Barry 1978 and Narveson 1978. 
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are dead, considerable impact on those currently alive, and potentially enormous 
impact on those who will live in the future. Perhaps the most significant impact is 
that our decisions affect who those future people will be, and even if there will be 
any future people at all. If we measure the moral significance of an action by the 
number of people it affects and the impact is [sic.] has on them, then our 
obligations to future generations deserve to be the central topic of moral 
philosophy.100   
 
This moderately consequentialist view implores a revision of moral philosophy focused 
solely on ethical dilemmas aiming to abjure infractions against those who might feel the 
results of such infractions most directly. Instead Mulgan urges that a long view is not 
only pragmatic, but ethically paramount. If we have ethical responsibilities, in other 
words, a sound judgment from which to begin must involve the pure ethical mathematics 
that those who might inherit the world will be forced to cope most vitally with the 
decisions of the present human beings than anyone else, if future generations end up 
existing at all. 
Thus in the broken world its denizens are angry with us contemporary moderns. 
We who seem to them as endlessly endowed with affluence of both monetary wealth and 
natural resources are not blameworthy solely because of our collective failure to sustain 
the complicated ecological balances of an earthly climate. That was not our failure, but 
rote environmental destruction for the accumulation of profits was.101 The well-known 
                                                
100 Mulgan 2006, 1. 
101 That the capitalist profit motive is endemic, but less explicit to Mulgan’s critique leaves 
him in a situation where his moral-political criticism observes the right to private property as 
a central motif of his argument. As a result Mulgan’s argument is less capable of observing 
broader structural causes of what might bring about the broken world than what a liberal 
system is capable of outlining. One consequence of this focus on individualism might 
encourage his future-oriented experiment. As Berkey notes, there are observable “widespread 
and familiar types of suffering and deprivation” already affecting existing populations that do 
not require the futurism of climate change-induced instability of future scenarios. What 
Berkey calls “Dire Global Poverty” demands a sensible alternative to inspire a revised ethics 
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critical saturation of carbon particles in the atmosphere subsequent of not only wild 
spirals of industrial production and pollution, but also by the narcissistic consumption on 
an individual level resulting from individualist ontologies of liberal political thought and 
constitution, 102  irrevocably destroyed climate stability for, if not all future human 
generations, then at least the ones of the immediate future that is the subject of Mulgan’s 
experimental book. The resulting broken world, one which would be incapable of 
equilibrium, casts a complicated existential crisis upon this new generation, one in which 
not even seasons can be predicted, let alone rain levels or hours of sunshine.103 While 
some measures of predictive strategy might become possible—including some basic 
agricultural techniques, climate prediction, and fuel efficiency—clear access to potable 
water and fertile ground are scarce or remote or worse. Yet, the most alarming difference 
between a present liberal society and the future societies of the broken world consist in 
the necessity of killing off some healthy citizens in fear of not being able to feed them in 
times to come.104  
Of this future possibility that places human survival into an abject lottery, 
completely given to chance, Mulgan imagines a hypothetical time traveler from the 
present affluent age and what she might find. “Instead of apocalyptic chaos,” Mulgan’s 
philosopher in the future writes, “our traveller would thus find functioning societies 
carving out a living in an unstable, hostile world.”105 Clawing against the quickly shifting 
                                                                                                                                            
that Mulgan’s experimental book is less capable of addressing in what it intuits. See Berkey 
2014, esp. 175-77. 
102 Mulgan 2011, 7. 
103 Ibid 9. 
104 Ibid 9-10 
105 Ibid, 10. 
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conditions of survival, Mulgan imagines the future civilization in a broken world still 
bent toward organizing collective life for, at very least, the betterment of the experience 
of such a terrible struggle to persist. Future people would suffer most directly from actual 
scarcity of resources, not the proposed dearth of resources stabilizing liberal economics, 
where in the limited means of subsistence would cause a direct problem reminiscent of 
Malthusian fantasies represented in the dystopian imaginary of Soylent Green.  
The principal problem of these humans struggling to survive would consist of 
“bottlenecking,” in which there exist too many bodies and mouths to feed, and so to 
imagine a fair mechanism of distributing resources is to misunderstand both the possible 
courses of action and the bare mathematics of it all. In other words, “survival bottlenecks 
are an ongoing fact of life” for the denizens of a broken world.106 Hoisted upon them 
would be the unfortunate circumstance of revising ethical and political questions of the 
affluent age to meet the new contingencies of the broken age. Questions adequate to the 
broken world would require reflection on the necessity to allow some to live and others to 
die, dramatically revising theses prioritizing or even sanctifying individual lives for the 
sake of survival of political society itself. Thus the people of the broken world:  
…often find ourselves in a place where we cannot all survive. The central 
questions of our political philosophy are: how do we preserve society through 
those bottlenecks; and what do justice and ethics require in such extreme 
circumstances? These are the questions that our philosophers struggle with today. 
In practice, every society in our world institutes some “survival lottery.” For 
instance, many societies distribute food partly on the basis of age or health, so that 
people are not kept alive once they can no longer make a productive contribution, 
or when they have little chance of survival even if they are fed. 
These lotteries, and their accompanying systems of entitlement, sanctions and 
rewards, are so central to our social life that we can barely imagine their absence. 
By contrast, our affluent visitor would initially regard any survival lottery as both 
                                                
106 Ibid. 
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morally repellent and absurdly impractical. A survival lottery is a bureaucratic 
procedure that determines who lives and who dies.107 
 
The existential condition of the broken world is thus not only wickedly unpredictable, it 
is also one where individual life is no longer sustainable by its own ontological virtue. 
The presumed solution of survival lotteries presents a solution for the population placed 
in importance well before the presumed rights of the individual and emerges as a political 
coping mechanism derived from an entirely different ethical standard than one found in 
the tradition of liberal political ontologies.108 Such philosophical positions that Mulgan 
deems particularly demonstrative of the modern capitalist liberal democratic mode of 
                                                
107 ibid 10-11. 
108 Arvan argues that, from a Rawlsian position (which Mulgan critiques as contributing to 
the affluent society’s vision of justice), that the very experiment of the survival lottery is 
untenable. “Any person who agrees to a randomizing principle might rethink, revise, and 
want to pursue new life goals that are inconsistent with the randomizing principle’s results. 
We saw this clearly above. It is irrational for the parties to a broken original position to agree 
to a survival lottery—any survival lottery—for the simple reason that they might not want to 
accept its results if they turn out to be on the losing end. Given their higher-order interests, it 
is rational for the parties to seek a better, non-randomizing option, an option that enables 
people to pursue, rethink, and revise, whatever goals they might have, including any anti-
survival-lottery goals they might have” (Arvan 2014, 106). From this perspective the survival 
lottery fails a test of feasibility because it is unlikely that in a society of self-interested 
persons that such a lottery would be implementable. For Arvan, Mulgan simply overlooks the 
notion in Rawls a theory of just society relies fundamentally on the rational agreement of free 
and equal individuals capitulating to an “original position” of fairness. From this standpoint, 
such individuals would pursue social goods rationally and from a position in which their own 
welfare is advanced without reference to others, given their optimal original position of 
acting fairly in that society and therefore could never accept the arbitrariness of a survival 
lottery (Arvan 2014, 98; drawing on Rawls 1999: §3, “The Main Idea of the Theory of 
Justice”). But this objection underestimates the premise in Mulgan where the hypothetical 
future society of the broken world would be entirely contingent upon the complex 
composition of its own present. Mulgan’s refusal to adopt a Rawlsian position relies on a 
scenario in which social primary goods could not, and therefore would not, carry with them 
any ontological guarantee. So, the Rawlsian paradigm upon which the “original position” 
finds its footing is rendered at least contingent on an absolute precariousness of goods in the 
first place. Arvan’s defense of Rawls therefore overlooks somewhat the force of imagination 
in Mulgan’s future scenario, not to mention the prominence of contingency on the moral 
apparatus. 
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privilege are those that are critiqued in his book on behalf of whose predicament is 
largely a direct outcome of such modern priorities. 
 This is not to say that Mulgan overlooks the counterarguments to his composed 
group of influential thinkers of the affluent age, but instead to say that Mulgan stresses 
that in the event that the Earth was to collapse into a dark and broken political ecology, 
that the radicals and revolutionaries (as well as their philosophical critical wing) would 
have utterly failed their own missions. Thus failed critical positions are rendered 
irrelevant in the eye of future generations’ reflections on perspectives leading 
nevertheless to the collapse of sustainable life on Earth.109 
In shaping the monograph as a set of hypothetical future lectures about the 
reader’s present, Mulgan asks more than the usual practical question about political 
                                                
109 Mulgan’s prefatory justification: “…what strands of contemporary philosophy would 
strike someone in the broken world as most representative of our affluent age? Accordingly, I 
have disproportionately chosen defenders (or at least sympathetic critics) of contemporary 
capitalist liberal democracy. While it may seem odd to sideline the myriad more radial critics 
of the Western way of life, I believe my selections bring the differences between the affluent 
and broken worlds more sharply into focus. Furthermore, the premise of the book is that, 
however much they may have talked about radical change, the internal critics of affluent 
society failed to avoid a broken future. They are thus unlikely to be remembered as 
representative of our age” (xi). While Mulgan may be correct in the assumption that the 
“critics” of modernity failed and were thus swept into the dustbin of history, he may overlook 
importantly that such critics also offered importantly different metaphysics, moral systems, 
and pragmatisms that might more adequately inform life in the broken world. This may be 
especially the case in 19th and 20th century critics of what he identifies here as his central 
tripartite problematic—“capitalist liberal democracy”—a triumvirate which is obscured 
somewhat when redirecting future students toward Nozick, Utilitarianism, Rawls, and 
Democracy in the substantive sections that compose the hypothetical lectures. It isn’t that 
Mulgan ought to consider the ways that radical critique may have endured through a 
catastrophe of global proportions, but that such notions as the common, for example, might 
find more traction in a future with different contingencies and a renewed discussion about the 
worthiness and experience of life in an ontologically more volatile age. For a discussion of 
the concept of life in relation to the metaphysics of the common, see Casarino (2008a, 
2008b).  
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societies preventing their own demise. Instead Mulgan tends to political and ethical 
philosophical texts of the affluent society that issued a form of political rationality 
equipped to consumerist overproduction, but also one that mitigated care for future 
peoples (not to mention other peoples in the affluent society’s own political present), and 
thus places the blame firmly in the laps of those advocating the coextensive effects of 
liberal institutionalism and unbridled capitalist desire.110 And so Ethics for a Broken 
World becomes not really a critique of particular thinkers, though that is how it is 
organized; instead it demonstrates the pedagogical power of deploying the worst case 
scenario.  
Where much of writing seeks to deploy catastrophe in service of ulterior 
motives—critique, policy-related suggestion, creating a mystery for a reader—Mulgan 
deploys catastrophe in order to imagine the possible consequences of otherwise rather 
banal, or at least broadly received and impactful, philosophies of politics and ethics. 
Whereas Stephen Flynn, to whom the next section is devoted, will deploy catastrophe in 
order to alarm and thus in order to captivate an audience for discussions of security 
policy, Mulgan demonstrates that utilizing unforeseen catastrophic scenarios can likewise 
cast a critical and even pedagogical force.  In other words, even critical minds often cast 
                                                
110 The democratic legacy of the affluent age remains an open question. For Mulgan, the 
denizens of the broken world would despise democracy for its capacity to foster affluence on 
the basis of its capacity to promote self-interest in theories of justice and fairness. But 
Saunders notices a strange gap where Mulgan does not fully think through its alternatives in 
his thought experiment. Why wouldn’t Mulgan insist on, at least theoretically, separating 
democratic institutions from the fomenting devices of affluence? Why must he conflate 
them? Nevertheless, Mulgan’s as I argue experimental, pedagogical device tells us something 
important about the stakes of future-oriented writing in the present: even the moral view 
often requires a dystopia in order to render its stakes believable. Saunders 2014, 27. For 
making the future real enough to act upon the present, see Dupuy 2005, 104. 
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the speculation of catastrophic disaster into powerful narratives for attempted 
subversions, underminings, and radical reorientations. If only to issue what could be 
disastrously possible in an age ideologically oriented by mundane fidelities to capitalist 
liberalisms, so catastrophe also becomes a tool for the Left in reexamining or even 
disturbing politics leading to more hegemonic outposts of contemporary life. 
 
 c. How to mobilize policy from speculative alarmism: The Edge of Disaster 
 
If Mulgan’s speculative scenario writing is a philosophical thought experiment intended 
to unsettle and denature the character of contemporary ideologies of waste and 
overconsumption, Stephen Flynn’s speculative scenario writing serves to necessitate 
response—policy response—through spectacular violence. From its first words—
“Consider this.”—Flynn constructs a series of scenarios, one in which fleeing families 
suffocate to death in gridlock traffic caused by a chemical attack during a baseball game 
at Philadelphia’s Citizen’s Bank Field111 and another in which Boston and Los Angeles 
ports become targeted by two teams masterminded by hypothetical radical Islamist 
terrorists who were partly able to traverse borders more easily because they held EU 
passports.112 In this latter scenario more than 10,000 Bostonians die within hours of an 
attack upon a massive freighter carrying 30 million gallons of liquid natural gas, which, 
being six hundred times as dense as its normal gaseous volume, carried with it the 
possibility of being an improvised incendiary device of historic proportions.113 In an 
attack carried out simultaneously in the greater Los Angeles area, two men navigated a 
                                                
111 Flynn 2007, xi-xv. 
112 Ibid. 24. 
113 Ibid, 27.  
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Zodiac boat armed with an IED, which the men learned to construct in Iraq and detonated 
on the hull of a 300,000-ton ship, the Panamanian-flagged Mercury Glory, and, though 
failing to actually sink the ship, spilled thousands of crude oil into the Long Beach 
Channel.114 Despite failing to sink the ship thanks to the “quick action of the [ship’s] 
pilot,” and thus clog the channel for weeks, the Mercury Glory attack managed to 
simultaneously cause the single “worst maritime environmental disaster to hit the United 
States since the grounding of the Exxon Valdez in 1989.”115 Both attacks “soon had 
national and global reverberations” that extended far beyond Boston and Los Angeles, 
causing an ongoing catastrophic event where… 
Energy prices surged on global markets, rising to more than $100 per barrel. All 
of the nation’s ports were put on their highest alert, effectively closing them to all 
inbound traffic. Given the absence of spare refinery capacity and the limited 
supplies of available refined fuels, gasoline prices quickly rose above $6 a gallon. 
The container ships that crisscross the Pacific Ocean and Atlantic Ocean with the 
supplies that support the global manufacturing and retailing sectors began to fill 
the anchorages on the West and East coasts. Many could not be rerouted, since 
they are too big to transit through the Panama Canal and only a handful of 
megaports can accommodate them. Since 60 percent of the world’s container fleet 
is at sea at any given time, the port closure generated a domino effect. With so 
many vessels unable to discharge their cargo, overseas terminals recognized that 
they must not compound the problem and stopped loading ships destined for the 
United States. Since those terminals had no place to accommodate the scheduled 
deliveries of arriving cargo, they closed their gates to incoming trucks and trains 
and stopped servicing inbound feeder vessels. These conveyances become 
stranded outside the terminals, weighted down with shipments they could not 
deliver. Around the world, goods start piling up at factories and warehouses as the 
global transportation system became gridlocked.116 
 
Here Flynn extrapolates from the hypothetical discrete event to the hypothetical global 
calamity. From two principally focused attacks of terror, deployed conceptually in order 
                                                
114 Ibid, 34-5. 
115 Ibid, 35. 
116 Flynn 2007, 35-6. 
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to demonstrate the proposed vulnerability of U.S. ports, Flynn makes quick work of the 
entire global commodity trade network, effectively shuttering the entire system of global 
commodity exchange as it is presumed to be anchored by American consumerism writ 
large. In deploying such a scenario, Flynn has in mind to prepare the discursive ground to 
argue for a more resilient form of national security that emulates “ordinary Americans at 
their very best” in producing a more suffused and securitized apparatus of national 
security that at once more widely distributes responsibility for security to its people and 
at the same time supplies a heightened sense of “national purpose.”117 
Published just eighteen months after landfall of Hurricane Katrina, Flynn 
characterizes the attacks above as different, not because they are agentic or human-
caused, or because they result from geopolitics rather than failed levies or faulty 
engineering.118 Flynn rather wants to separate his fabricated nightmare scenarios from 
natural disasters because, unlike natural disasters, terrorist attacks seem to have no end. 
Hurricanes may be devastating, but the phenomenon of terrorism is different for Flynn; it 
is ceaseless. 119   
                                                
117  (Flynn 2007: “ordinary Americans,” 13; “national purpose,” 180.) In part Flynn’s 
pessimism results from a concern for a present lack of capacity to protect, and in place of 
protection, Flynn argues with many others that regimes of resilience and preparedness ought 
to supplement what cannot be confronted by conventional modes of security. Mueller (2010) 
argues that such promotions of operational resilience – even at the level of preparing 
populations for broad scale emergencies – distracts from the work of identifying a scale of 
vulnerability for which principal actors (military forces, first and foremost) might decide 
upon as a range of targets to best protect. Key to their disagreement is the scope of 
vulnerability: Mueller sees hard targets; Flynn sees entire populations by way of critical 
infrastructure and global institutions (Stockton 2007). 
118 Alderson, Brown and Carlyle 2015. 
119 Flynn 2007, 36. This is a part of Flynn’s argument that makes the least sense given the 
frequency of natural disasters.  
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Moving to a broader discussion of U.S. security policy issues and making 
suggestions for the installation of a more resilient form of securitization underwritten by 
new relationships between federal, state, and local government programs and their private 
sector partnerships, Flynn warns that, though his discussion for much of the first half of 
his book focuses upon the alarmingly broad range of possibilities for different sorts of 
terrorist attack, terrorist threats are not the defining threat of our age.120 Instead, Flynn 
suggests that terrorism occupies only one place among many threats that, taken together, 
could potentially visit calamitous ruin upon civilization as we know it. In fact, Flynn 
wants to limit the conventional reach of militarized defense programs and promote 
defense policies generating a capacity to contain “cascading consequences” in the 
inevitable event that, whatever the threat, it overcomes security measures.121 
 The real program of The Edge of Disaster persists in the form of a policy 
prescription where Flynn’s most focused argument insists that offensive techniques of 
“taking the battle to the enemy,” as is the case in the war on terror, is counterproductive 
and misguided, as well as exorbitantly expensive.122 In its stead Flynn wants a better 
defense that builds the U.S. “immune system” because, as he says, while “living with a 
                                                
120 Ibid 93. 
121 Ibid. Such arguments are particularly bothersome to realists such as John Mueller who see 
advocating for such broad ranges of “inevitable” future calamities as potentially becoming 
tactical abstractions in themselves. For an explanation of protection versus resilience-
preparedness as he sees it, see Mueller 2010, but also (1994) where Mueller complains of 
how a “catastrophe quota” obfuscates actual threat in a catch-all category including “trouble, 
chaos, uncertainty, unpredictability, instability, and unspecified risks and dangers” (quoted in 
Aradau and Van Munster 2011, pg. 3).  
122 Flynn 2007, 95. This may very well be the case, but some (Blackstone, Buck, and Hakim 
2007) have shown that preparedness carries its own exorbitant costs where false alarms 
amount to an enormous sum that distracts from resources of first responders. These findings 
do not show the added costs of surges during large-scale emergencies but point to an intrinsic 
cost that Flynn himself does not consider. 
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chronic illness may not be ideal, . . . if it is treatable, a person can adjust to it and 
continue to have a fulfilling life.”123 It is as quintessential a biopolitical metaphor as 
possible, yet nevertheless something of an understatement when appearing aside earlier 
passages where out of his imagination alone children’s lungs close and eyelids burn 
amidst a terrorist attack that never occurred and maybe never will.124  
 Flynn wants a more adaptive and responsive body politic. A nation that requires 
less the promises of a constantly overreaching state will be more readily prepared to meet 
the needs of fellow citizens more responsively, but the matter remains unsolved from 
where adaptiveness emerges. Flynn’s main aim is to convince informed American 
citizens that while a new age may be upon them, they must ultimately adapt and augment 
their already existing biopolitical reality:  
Just as we have accustomed ourselves to living with the chronic risk of natural 
disasters, so too must we learn to live with the threat of terrorism. Rather than 
myopically and futilely trying to cleanse the global system of this threat, 
Americans need to take a deep breath and recognize that terrorists cannot destroy 
us. However, if cooler heads do not prevail, what terrorism can do is lead us to 
attack our own immune system.125 
 
The solution? Focus on preparedness. Muller recognizes rightly that such attempts to 
portray the urgency of the threat is part and parcel with deploying threat as a “new 
reality.”126 Flynn doesn’t disagree. He argues that far from the future of U.S. “immunity” 
to the litany of hazards facing civil society, the true act of citizenship in the age of a 
horizon darkened by all hazards that one can imagine (and likely more) is to prepare for 
                                                
123  Flynn 2007, 108. 
124 Flynn 2007, xv. For work concerning the biopolitics of resilience, see Zebrowski 2009; 
Reid 2013; Grove 2014. 
125 Flynn 2007, 109. 
126 Muller 2010, 58.  
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the worst.127 Do not rely on the notion that someone or some institution may save you. 
After all, according to a Department of Homeland Security (DHS) report from 2006, and 
cited by Flynn, “only one quarter of state emergency operations plans and 10 percent of 
municipal plans are sufficient to cope with a natural disaster or attack.”128 Yet rather than 
critique the utter lack of preparedness of the U.S. federal government to provide adequate 
emergency response to its citizens, Flynn argues the following:  
…preparing ourselves for disasters is an act of good citizenship. Every 
community has serious limits on the amount of emergency resources available to 
help people in real need. In a major emergency there will likely not be enough to 
go around, at least initially. Some people will suffer or die as a result. If we do 
things to reduce the odds that we will be among those demanding those services, 
we may be making the potentially lifesaving contribution of freeing up 
overstrained services for someone else who is truly needy. In other words, one 
reason we should prepare is not to be part of the problem.129 
 
In place of a critique of government’s role in disaster response and inadequate planning, 
instead of arguing for resources to be allocated to underprivileged and marginalized 
communities, Flynn argues that “good citizenship” means precisely not making demands 
of government for security. Decidedly and explicitly, Flynn makes the poor the 
“problem,” thereby replacing critique of emergency management institutions and 
government with a criticism of those who are “truly needy.”130 In the end Flynn’s 
                                                
127 Mueller and Stewart (2011, 166-7) point out that, in fact, the “worst” might be state 
overreaction to statistically insignificant events. In this sense, they find that Flynn’s argument 
for social engagement, while misguided in its emphasis of resilience, might actually help to 
mitigate government overreaction to attacks that are less significant than often citizens 
perceive them to be. 
128 Flynn 2007, 5.  
129 Ibid,155. 
130 Julian Reid and Brad Evans show powerfully how theories of resilience often consign the 
most responsibility to the poor and vulnerable: “Little wonder that resilience is most 
concerned with those deemed most vulnerable. For it is precisely the insecuritization of the 
most at-risk which politically threatens the security and comforts of those who are 
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solution is that if individuals are able, they ought to take the onus of disaster preparedness 
upon themselves, removing the burden from emergency management agencies.131 This in 
no uncertain terms equates to the full-scale acceptance of catastrophic futures that results 
from the transformation of understanding the highly improbable threat of a single future 
disaster to the altogether probable event of a future catastrophe abstracted into a resilient 
system of all hazards preparedness at the social scale. 
 Yet it is not enough to make a concerned plea as a public intellectual that citizens 
rise to their duty to one another and unburden governments of the massive responsibility 
to protect their citizens. 132  Flynn deploys several brutally constructed, entirely 
hypothetical fictions in order to support his argument. My critique is not that his 
argument is tautologically cyclical—though it is—but that the rhetoric of disaster, the 
spectacle of catastrophe, comes to underwrite his project for enhanced “national purpose” 
                                                                                                                                            
sufficiently protected and excluded from the all-too-real effects of risk-based societies” 
(Evans and Reid 2013, 92). The point is that resilience programs often ask the most 
vulnerable to also be the most resilient; those who are by political-economic fiat already less 
vulnerable have less imperative to be resilient. 
131 Although pursuing a different literature, Jonathan Joseph offers a critique of such logics 
under the united banner of governmentality and neoliberalism (Joseph 2013). See also 
Zebrowski 2009 and 2013. 
132 Stockton (2007) points out that Flynn’s proposal relies on adequately persuading citizens: 
“how the American public can be persuaded to support investment in resilience. First, we 
should emphasize that such investment ‘has the potential to help generate economic growth’ 
and ‘strengthen the competitive position and quality of life for current and future generations 
of Americans.’ Second, building the resilience of U.S. infrastructure ‘supports the national 
security imperative of confronting the ongoing terrorist threat.’ Flynn argues that making our 
infrastructure less vulnerable to attack (and less likely to cause massive economic dislocation 
and casualties infrastructure if struck) reduces the attractiveness of such attacks to terrorists, 
and therefore reduces their likelihood. Investment in infrastructure benefits both security and 
economic growth. Framed in this way, embracing national resilience ‘can engender 
widespread public support.’” Mark Salter, more critically, insists nevertheless that in order 
for resilience to work efficaciously, that it relies on “informed and engaged individuals” 
(Salter 2013, 42). 
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and a call to redefine democratic citizenship that leaves beyond protest, critique, and 
other historical avenues for human beings to argue that they ought not be left behind by 
their governments because of strained resources, while the same governments prosecute 
far-reaching offensive foreign wars also against largely unknown threats.133 Such a 
critique may be possible from the public intellectual in any event, where an argument is 
made that forceful social movements ought to undertake efforts to coerce governments to 
care for their most vulnerable in their time of need. Yet this is not Flynn’s argument. His 
argument is that the coming catastrophe—be it terroristic or “natural”—is inevitable, and 
citizens of the United States had better prepare for the worst. His argument hinges on the 
reader’s response to the visceral opening, the deployment of the nightmare scenario of 
infrastructural breakdown, of a massive dirty bomb’s explosion near a massive public 
event. His book hinges on the reader’s anxiety, the reader’s visceral orientation to danger, 
and thus the reader is prodded by the carnage that Flynn deploys only to turn to quiet 
pragmatism and discussions of how “we” ought to be “tapping the private sector”134 in 
our efforts to plan for what, now beyond doubt, may cause a final and fatal blow to 
national security apparatus’s “immune system.” Flynn’s argument rests on a presumed 
                                                
133 This is a point where Flynn and I agree, but only momentarily. Nevertheless, he fails to 
understand the ways that his arguments replicate a neoliberal logic founded on myths of 
scarce resources, resources which had either been allocated to other means or were deemed 
unworthy of considerations. “Citizenship” may well consist of caring for one another, yet 
splintering and distributing through civil society the onus for disaster preparedness amounts 
to distributive securitization—a practice that only becomes necessary once avenues for 
adequate dissent have been rendered impotent at best. This is hardly a recipe, in other words, 
for true democratic citizenship but rather an avenue for further disenfranchisement, not to 
mention the further vilification of the poor.  
134 Flynn 2007, 149 
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affective play on the emotional response of the reader.135 Without the fictions of Flynn’s 
nightmare scenarios, it is merely a book asking American citizens to overlook the failures 
of FEMA and the DHS and to burden themselves with more responsibilities of their own 
securities. It is a book that only makes sense in an emergency, and since he hadn’t one 
that was general enough, Flynn effectively constitutes them himself. 
 
 
d. Homeland Security and fictional terror: The “Analytic Red Cell” Program  
 
Simply because Stephen Flynn requires fictions in order to affect public perception about 
national security measures, we ought not think that creating nightmare scenarios is 
related to national security only from the outside. Fictional catastrophes exist at the center 
of security programs as well. Less than one week after plans to detonate bombs on ten 
transoceanic flights from Heathrow to the U.S. were thwarted, an attack that London 
Police Deputy Commissioner Paul Stephenson called somewhat strangely a plot to 
commit “mass murder on an unimaginable scale,”136 CNN aired a program in which the 
thriller novelist Brad Thor noted the aporia involving surprise and its relation to threat—
that large scale disasters are often unimaginable prior to their occurrence: “A lot of 
people said that 9/11 was a failure of imagination.”137  
                                                
135 Nacos, Bloch-Elkon, and Shapiro recognize this as well, see their Selling Fear 2011, pg. 
152. 
136 BBC News, 10 August 2006: http://news.bbc.co.uk/2/hi/uk_news/4778575.stm 
137Aired on August 11, 2006.  
Transcript: http://transcripts.cnn.com/TRANSCRIPTS/0608/11/sbt.01.html This claim that 
9/11 was a “failure of imagination” was also a central critique of the 9/11 Commission 
Report (National Commission on Terrorist Attacks upon the United States 2004, 344; quoted 
in Aradau and Van Munster 2011, 8).  
 231 
The Showbiz Tonight story was covering a secret program within the DHS, known 
as the Analytic Red Cell Program, in efforts to expand its imaginative capacities.138 The 
program developed by the DHS employs a diverse group of creative professionals to 
accompany security analysts in hypothetical scenarios.139 The groups of around 20 
participants collaborate for daylong sessions where the groups are provided with specific 
scenarios or questions that target events or kinds of attacks (even non-events) in order to 
capitalize on the creative capacities of members to speculate previously un-thought 
scenarios.140 Several of the reports have been unclassified to date, and then entered the 
public realm via the Internet.141 In one report, a diverse group was asked to consider what 
possible outcomes might be possible if an “Al-Qaida-like” cell were capable of attacking 
the U.S. with a dirty bomb (RDD attack). The report was composed of the speculations of 
two separate groups, including an immensely diverse set of participants such as agents 
                                                
138 The Washington Post had reported on the program as early as 2004, in a feature article 
focusing on the involvement of another well-known author of popular thrillers, Brad Meltzer. 
http://www.washingtonpost.com/wp-dyn/articles/A50534-2004Jun17.html Cited in: Jackson 
and Frelinger 2009, pg. 3. Returning to Aradau and Van Munster’s book, upon revising an 
earlier chapter, I noticed that they mention in passing a similar program to the Analytic Red 
Cell program, the National Intelligence Council, which also outlines scenarios for the future 
in ways that might be very similar (Aradau and Van Munster 2011, 9). 
139 “The Analytic Red Cell Program uses an approach that exploits the talents of individuals 
from various fields—including screenwriters, best-selling authors, psychologists, 
philosophers, academics, various terrorism experts and employees of the CIA and FBI—in an 
attempt to bring fresh insight to problems outside their respective disciplines. Participants 
draw on their life experiences to think like terrorists and paint a picture when there are no 
specific dots to connect.” (Davies et al. n.d., 8). 
140 “Typically the Red Cell team assembles 20 or so participants for a day-long session at 
leased offices in the Washington area. Each session divides into smaller groups and takes up 
a different question, such as: If you were a terrorist, how would you target the G-8 economic 
summit, held last week in Georgia? Another recent topic was: Why haven't terrorists hit the 
United States since Sept. 11, 2001?” (Mintz 2004). 
141The program allegedly dates to the 1970s, when some elements of Cold War strategy were 
revamped by bringing new minds into the strategic process. There were approximately 16 
such reports completed in 2004 alone. Ibid. 
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from DHS, the Department of Energy, and the Nuclear Regulatory Commission; agents 
from the Highway Watch Program and American Trucking Associations; a “Technologist 
from a Fortune 50 company,” an “Information Technology expert,” and a novelist. The 
group was asked to prepare the likelihood and scenarios for two terrorist organizations: 
one “well-resourced” and one “poorly-resourced” cell.142 Consensus was reached by the 
two focus groups who determined that there was reason to “believ[e] an RDD attack 
would be relatively easy to prepare and mount and could have wide-ranging physical, 
psychological, political, and economic impacts. The group believed radioactive materials 
would be easy to procure, especially from abroad, and found a variety of potential targets 
across the country. Participants expected that public distrust of official guidance would 
heighten fear and panic.”143  
More interesting is how opinions culled from the report, appearing in the previous 
quotation, are drawn from fictions produced by the groups themselves in order to reach 
levels of certainty that could allow them to judge the confidence in their 
recommendation. Just one scenario, deemed a “nightmare” scenario, bested other 
speculative attacks on Wall St. as well as Penn Station, which were deemed plausible, but 
not “nightmare” status:144   
A terrorist organization launches an initial attack using an Improvised Explosive 
Device (IED) enhanced with a radiological source. Authorities quickly identified 
the attack as a RDD attack. Shortly thereafter, the terrorists explode conventional 
IEDs along escape routes from the affected area (e.g., bridges), and anonymously 
                                                
142  Others reportedly participating were: Sandia National Laboratory, Defense Threat 
Reduction Agency (DTRA), Monterey Institute, Center for Nonproliferation Studies, Center 
for the Study of Traumatic Stress and Department of Psychiatry (Uniformed), Services 
University of the Health Sciences, Applied Marine Technology Inc. (DHS 2004, 2, 3). 
143 DHS 2004, 1 
144 DHS 2004, 5 
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(and falsely) alert the media that all of the explosions have dispersed radiation. 
The terrorists then detonate other explosive devices, some of which actually are 
RDDs, every week in a different city and send anonymous tips to the media that 
each explosion has dispersed radiation.145  
  
Of the four reports that have been made public, the one cited above and one from 2005 
seem the most realistic.146 The 2004 report focuses on the ways that an ambitious non-
state assembly of militants might maximize their capacity to strike at their enemy’s 
largest metropolis. Likewise, the 2005 report coheres around the question of public transit 
vulnerability and other “soft targets” such as “shopping malls, hotels, schools, and other 
public gathering places.” In the 2005 report, two sorts of “soft targets” were listed as 
primary objects of interest. Either they were sites that would have elevated amounts of 
“shock value” like police departments or schools, for example, or the Red Cell 
considered that the highest priority might be “Shopping malls, hotels, convention centers, 
and other economic targets with retail themes…because of their high population densities 
and lesser security measures.”147  
 The two reports discussed here have practical and pragmatic reasons and 
implications. The first was concerned with the facility and ease of procurement of a 
weapon of mass destruction, the second report with the vulnerability of so-called soft 
targets to a range of attacks within U.S. territorial jurisdiction. Another report from 2006 
inquired into the potential to weaponize avian influenza as a means of creating a 
potentially highly accessible mode of chemical warfare utilizing biological contagion. 
This report showcases some of the more surprisingly creative potentials of the Red Cell 
                                                
145 DHS 2004, 6 
146 DHS 2005, 3 
147 DHS 2005, 3 
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project suggesting, for example, in an act of thought that would rival the central story of 
Oryx and Crake, that:  
the least likely, although potentially most damaging of the […] potential 
scenarios, would be for a malicious actor with virology skills and equipment to 
modify the current strain to sustain transmissibility in humans. […] The scientists 
consulted also described less sophisticated methods terrorists could use to attempt 
to create a dangerous virus.148  
 
The experts imagined that “terrorist ‘suicide sneezers’ could intentionally infect 
themselves with the virus, travel to the United States, and spread the virus by sneezing in 
crowded, poorly ventilated areas, such as airliners or trains, shopping malls, schools, or 
theaters. Dissemination tactics would be as elementary as sneezing into one’s hands and 
spreading the resulting contaminated mucous particles by touching doorknobs, handrails, 
or bathroom faucets.”149  
 Regardless of the sometimes bizarre nature of the reports’ speculative results, 
what emerges when looking across them is certain: DHS employs, at least in part, a wild 
series of sessions that brainstorm possible scenarios in order to construct reliable 
scenarios concerning terrorist activity. In part that the process through which national 
security operates is fictional, but also (in a somewhat less sensationalist sense) a mode of 
knowledge production that would be demonstrably similar to any meeting in which 
people anxiously speculate.  
 When nevertheless seen in conjunction with the other representative texts above, 
the Red Cell program tends to shed light on a larger phenomenon that is twofold: First, 
there is a widely interested intellectual community whose focus is on preventing future 
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events that must be imagined before they can be secured against, and, second, though 
these writings spring from extremely varied quadrants of intellectual production, future 
disaster or catastrophe is what is on the minds of many. This clustering together of 
diverse discursive phenomena, I will now argue, constitutes in part the basis of what 
Foucault called a dispositif.   
 
IV. An anticipatory dispositif 
 
 
Thus far I have endeavored to show a representative edifice, a possible cartography of 
different rhetorics of coming catastrophes. Atwood’s allegorical warning shot, taking the 
literary shape of a relatively instrumental critique of instrumental rationality and the 
modern myth of scientific progress; Mulgan’s powerful pedagogical critique of the 
irresponsibility of modern liberal capitalist democratic thought; Flynn’s speculative 
storytelling to reinforce hypersecuritized nationalist policy recommendations; and the 
DHS’s secret program involving fictionalists as a central part of scenario-writing for 
future attacks: All of these forms of writing, independently, mobilize the shared 
conceptualization of bleak futures in order to advance their goals. In part, the work I just 
interpreted differentiates from previous chapters importantly because it shows how 
authors outside the state share in similar discourses as those who operate within the state. 
This is not a binary opposition, but informs and builds upon the work earlier in the 
dissertation with hopes that the reader will see how, if a rationality exists, it is not shared 
solely by agents of the state, but can be found in a much broader set of sources. 
 236 
In this sense, while it is possible and potentially interesting to view these as 
individuated voices remarking on the same problematic—the problem of future events 
potentially destroying significant human life—I want to urge that viewing their 
similarities is only possible given a more or less synchronic rationality that renders such 
notions commonplace. By showing the percolating concern for the future of human life in 
different ways, across diverse zones of interest, among varied modes of thought and 
writing, what I want to bring together edges toward what Foucault left more or less 
unelaborated; namely, what inhered in the dispositif. Similar perspectives and kinds of 
knowledge serve as the sine qua non of a rationality common to a dispositif: what is 
asked, what makes sense. For this reason I make no claim to comprehensiveness in these 
evocations in situ. Yet earlier chapters here ought to surface in a different way under the 
light of the dispositif, for their focus as institutional discourses—whether originating 
from within the security establishment, or seeking to encourage policy, or critiquing the 
political establishment, or constructing critical orientations toward future-oriented modes 
of securitization—means to collaborate in what now emerges (and be fully articulated 
and critiqued in the next chapter) as a rationality of catastrophism.150  
Yet these writings also remain distinct. Their differences are what interest me 
now, or rather what connects them as related in discourse despite their differences. 
Readers who are familiar with the philosophy of social science might assume that the 
                                                
150 Aradau and Van Munster (2011) discuss a similar set of relations deploying Foucault’s 
methodological concept of the “logic of strategy” (31-3) that they relate to the varied ways 
that security experts operate within an imaginative procedure animating conjectural 
reasoning. I explore their work on this issue more fully in Chapter 1, and so will not dwell on 
it here especially because their focus remains on the activities and necessities of security 
professionals and, as such, the theoretic work they introduce is ill equipped to telescope 
toward a broader set of implications. See also de Goede 2012. 
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notion of “unintended consequences” might inform what follows because of the way that 
this particular mode of inquiry attempts to inform the various outcomes of action. The 
theory of unintended consequences copes with making sense of the sociology of 
purposive action.151 As such, one might read in the vignettes above various accounts of 
trying to persuade readers to agree or disagree, to become alert to the dangers that the 
future might hold. The complex theory of unintended consequences attempts to outline 
what, in the end, is hardly disputable: that sometimes purposive actions have outcomes 
that were not anticipated by their actors.152 So, one might conclude that I am arguing that 
despite their intentions, together various literatures have the unintended consequence of 
assembling a discourse with wider ranging effects than they had anticipated. I will refute 
this idea in course, but first will briefly outline some of the more complex ideas outlining 
how unintended consequences operates as a theory and why – despite its social scientific 
prominence as a mode of causal explanation – it is ill-equipped to explain what I am after 
here. 
The central notion of unintended consequences is simple enough to grasp when 
considered on a discrete level. If an actor x means an action to have outcome y, there 
stands to reason every chance that y may not occur, but instead z (or a nearly infinite 
other outcomes may occur).153 But the more sophisticated question made visible by the 
problem of unintended consequences emerges when extrapolated to the problem of social 
order resulting from a cacophony of actors. Baert (1991) isolates four important 
considerations in the case of the pluralized question of applying the problematic to social 
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research. First, one must assume that the intentionality of purposive action must occur 
prior to its outcome. One must account for intention and self-reflection in order to claim 
that an outcome was intended. Second, considering that an action has nearly infinite 
outcomes in the social environment, problems of how to delimit the scope and selection 
of research emerge. Over time, it becomes more difficult to assess the direct link between 
an action and an outcome; and as outcomes interfere with one another, it becomes more 
difficult to select between production and reproduction of outcomes and new causes. 
Third, purposes and motives are much more clearly assessed retrospectively, introducing 
the possibility that the assessment of purpose or motive only rationalizes the action, 
rather than actually being endemic to the initial decision. Fourth, it can easily be taken for 
granted that the purposive action was actually intended.154 
Taken as a whole, there are many methodological questions that emerge about 
how to isolate discrete actions when attempting to understand the constitution of socio-
political order. But more interestingly, the aperture of unintended consequences invites 
considerations of who contributes to the constitution of that social order. Pace Karl 
Popper, writes Richard Vernon in 1979, unintended consequences accomplish a dual feat 
of “methodological individualism” in his explanation that opens a view wherein we can 
see a cumulative effect resulting in order outside of the direct intentions of individual 
intentions:  
Qua “unintended,” they do not fall in the domain of psychological explanations of 
intending, willing or so on; qua “consequences,” they arise from individual 
actions and from coincidences and collisions among them. At one stroke, then, the 
stress upon unintended consequences banishes the twin dangers of psychologism 
on the one hand and “holism” on the other: they are specifically social things, and 
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hence irreducible to individual psychology, yet they do not involve any fallacious 
appeal to “social wholes” or the like [as he reads in Hegel and Hegelian 
Marxisms].”155 
 
Given an example, Popper proposes that the reader consider that someone wants to go to 
the mountains in order to enjoy some time away from the busyness of everyday life. If 
enough people develop a desire to retreat to the mountains for solitude, then no one will 
be able to enjoy the mountains in solitude because they will be too crowded.156 In this 
example rests the variation that Baert does not hone in on: that “[u]intended 
consequences may arise as the cumulative outcome of similar actions performed 
simultaneously or consecutively by a number of actors.”157 For Baert, in order to assess 
the outcome of social order, one would have to retreat and ask why it is that each 
mountain goer intended purposively to visit the mountains; and the outcome could only 
be paradoxical: they intended solitude and were frustrated by so many others’ similar 
desires. The actors’ intentions in other words to not identify or isolate how it is that 
people wanted solitude, but instead only that their lack of solitude was unintended.  
 Vernon turns to Hayek to think further through this problem. Hayek’s theory of 
economic order depended on a theory of “catallaxy,” in which he offered in place of 
“economy,” which could account for a select arrangement of business engagements, but 
failed to describe the larger social order appertaining to large scale configurations of 
economic order. For Hayek the underlying conditions of capitalist exchange instead 
                                                
155  Vernon 1979, 57; emphasis in original. Vernon explores several other modes of 
explanation surrounding the thesis of unintended consequences, but Popper’s is most usefully 
proximate to the way that I will establish a difference between that mode of thinking and my 
own deployment of Foucault as an alternative. For Popper in his own pen on the subject see, 
Popper 2002. 
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depended on something other than an organized hierarchy, but much more a spontaneous 
order emplacing disparate actors in a system in which they interacted according to logics 
of exchange. Leaving aside the various critiques of this vision of economic order, it 
would follow from Hayek’s distinction between the economy of an organization and the 
catallaxy of order, that despite the spontaneity of catallaxy, the general outcomes of 
capital would be devoid of intention – they would result as unintended consequences of 
the individual actors inhabiting the system.158 In other words, catallaxy names an order 
“which is essentially ‘abstract,’ [and must] be distinguished from whatever ‘results’ may 
contingently emerge from it.”159 Assigning an internal logic to Hayek’s catallaxy, Vernon 
insists that the “order” then must operate along the lines of a “code” in which the 
individual actors inhabiting the economic system must be able to read, respond to, and 
understand the rules of its order. In this case, then, the “orderliness is not at all an 
incidental outcome of individuals’ behavior but simply a re-statement, in a larger context, 
of the individuals’ own disposition. [Social order] is, in other words, simply a cumulative 
effect,” however intended or unintended, one might add.160 
 What is at stake in this seeming digression is how individual intentions do or do 
not accumulate to inform social order. According to the theory of unintended 
consequences, any theory, such as the one that I will in turn propose, that attempts to 
posit a rationality should have to contend with the question of whether or not the 
intention of its discursive contributors intended to orient subjects toward their rhetorical 
outcomes. What Vernon’s adaptation of Hayak’s theory of catallaxy allows is for a 
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cumulative, and spontaneous, arrangement of unintended consequences to supersede the 
intentions of its actors. But Hayek’s theory of spontaneous cumulative order rests in fact 
on a contractualist agreement, calling into question the profundity of his argument for 
spontaneous order, but not Vernon’s mission with it. Vernon, in the end, shows 
effectively how social order can be produced from spontaneous consensus, despite the 
fact that Hayek must resort to a social contract in order to harmonize his social 
observations with his economic intentions.161 What neither is able to show adequately is 
the rationale that unifies disparate actors in their readings of social order:162 What is it 
that drives Popper’s mountain-goer? What is it that emplaces homo economicus rationally 
in the catallaxy of economic exchange? What is it that unifies the authors and their 
readers that I interpreted in the previous section of this chapter?  
For Atwood, Mulgan, Flynn, and DHS as catastrophic fictionalists, there are 
obvious similarities of concern—the most obvious being the concern of securing human 
life from events that, by definition, must be speculatively constructed in order to be 
understood—but their differences help to articulate what Foucault calls a dispositif, or an 
                                                
161 Vernon 1979, 66-67. 
162  Merton (1936) in the first substantial investigation into the matter of unintended 
consequences argues explicitly that “it must not be inferred that purposive action implies 
‘rationality’ of human action (that persons always use the objectively most adequate means 
for the attainment of their end). In fact, part of the present analysis is devoted to the 
determination of those elements which account for concrete deviations from rationality of 
action. Moreover, rationality and irrationality are not to be identified with the success and 
failure of action, respectively” (Merton 1936, 896). In this important clarification, one might 
read that my immediate move from unintended consequences to an argument for rationality 
might overlook Merton’s insistence that the two be separated. But I am explicitly moving 
beyond the theory of unintended consequences and establishing that a theory of rationality is 
imperative for understanding what animates discourse and, as a result, certain kinds of 
actions. In short, I am after a rationale, but not of purposive action; instead, a rationale that 
orients subjects to particular kinds of political life. While, in other words, the rationale may 
be present, and may have effects, it is not, in other words, instrumental. 
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apparatus which captures different practices and modes of knowledge production. In 
short, a dispositif is a collection of different forms of living practice in a coincident 
moment, brought together by a common proposition. In Foucault’s terms, the nature of 
connection across seemingly different practices and uses of knowledge are united by 
discourses that, in a way, animate them: 
…a particular discourse can figure at one time as the programme of an institution, 
and at another it can function as a means of justifying or masking a practice which 
itself remains silent, or as a secondary re-interpretation of this practice, opening 
out for it a new field of rationality. In short, between these elements, whether 
discursive or non-discursive, there is a sort of interplay of shifts of position and 
modifications of function which can also vary very widely.163  
 
Contained in this passage is Foucault’s expectation that, despite there being present in a 
given time a variety of actions, practices, ways of thinking, etc., there are also discursive 
ligaments that bind together a range of different modes of existing in a given moment. 
This discursive rationality spans across seemingly unlike orientations to a problem as 
what animates a dispositif:  
What I’m trying to pick out with this term is, firstly, a thoroughly heterogeneous 
ensemble consisting of discourses, institutions, architectural forms, regulatory 
decisions, laws, administrative measures, scientific statements, philosophical, 
moral and philanthropic propositions—in short, the said as much as the unsaid.164 
 
It is easy to see that in a sense a set of practices share a common cohesion, that the so-
called “heterogenous elements” can inhere in a larger structure of power, knowledge, 
institutions; in short, that political society can be organized despite a lack of lockstep 
coordination and homogeneity. But it bears repeating that such a dispositif marks a 
governing rule, a logic, which articulates concern. It is easy to look at such a passage and 
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see only heterogeneity, to read into Foucault’s description only observable differences 
unified somehow, mysteriously by the position of the observer, writer, or thinker. Yet 
there emerges from their harmony, their coextensive nature, something that collects them, 
renders them knowable to one another.  
When a range of institutions and practices, as different as they seem to be in the 
empirical sense of their external curvatures, is nevertheless brought together as a 
constellation that is more than merely evoked in the same breath one must decipher how 
they inhere. The dispositif, as a series of “heterogeneous elements,” is unified by what 
each element itself cannot say. Foucault knew that it could not be enough to merely 
observe the empirical elements of a given problem, “institutions, architectural forms, 
regulatory decisions, laws, administrative measures, scientific statements, philosophical, 
moral and philanthropic propositions.” The “unsaid” indicates a question: What makes 
these specific institutions, viewed empirically stand in relation to one another? Moreover, 
what makes it possible for an observer to see their relation? Together the sum of 
heterogeneous elements indicates the presence of something that they themselves do not 
present, or cohere to as a matter of belonging, but instead as a matter of being oriented to 
similar problems, occupying its own smaller roles in confronting a problem not named by 
it but by a rationality (or at very least a rationale) that governs the emergence and practice 
of each element as a knowledge producing part of the dispositif.  
 The concern articulated, an emergent rationality of the “said as much as the 
unsaid,” means more than a dichotomy of what is explicit and what is rendered implicit. 
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Far from standing only as a skeletal map, the dispositif operates as much as a logic of 
rationality as it does a cartography of its inherent different projects and processes.  
The heterogeneous elements that make up a dispositif can be understood more 
systematically as rationalities and technologies of government. In modernity, all 
forms of government have attempted to “rationalize” themselves, to account for 
the “authority of their authority.” Rationalities appear therefore as knowledgeable 
discourses that represent objects of knowledge, confer identities and agencies 
upon social and political actors, and identify problems to be solved (Dean and 
Hindess, 1998). Put simply, rationalities are ways of thinking about a social 
problem that will make its management practicable. Technologies are the means 
of realization of rationalities, the social practices which are aimed at manipulating 
the social and physical world according to identifiable routines (O’Malley, 1992: 
269, n. 2). Governmental rationalities and technologies affect behavior and 
“construct” forms of ordered agency and subjectivity in the population to be 
governed as part of the social problem identified.165 
 
In this passage, Aradau and van Munster connect the nature of rationality to the question 
of rationalizing problems through governance. Further, they adumbrate the ways that the 
rationalities of governance participate in the production of subjectivities within the 
language of “ordered agency,” which I refer to with a softer tongue as “orientation.” Yet 
even in this sophisticated elaboration, Aradau and Van Munster, while seizing on the 
interrelations of rationality and governance and how that interrelation branches out to 
subjectivity, still in their larger explication remain preoccupied with the explicit, with the 
empirical. What they do not see, or rather leave implicit, are the range of ways that the 
dispositif organizes a set of questions and mediates a set of truths that demonstrates how 
the dispositif in organizing the “said,” the empirical, also organizes its own organizing 
principle, “the unsaid.” It seems from this passage that Aradau and van Munster deal with 
this issue by imparting a kind of purposive action, the rationalities are “manipulated” and 
populations are governed intentionally. To be clear, I acknowledge intention in political 
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life; but the usefulness of the dispositif as I read it helps to explain across intentionality. 
The dispositif allows a common logic to appear that admits political difference within a 
common logic. 
Spinoza, writing about the extrinsic relationality of truth, brings this point to the 
foreground well: “…just as light manifests both itself and the darkness, so truth is the 
standard both of itself and of the false.” 166 The accepted and therefore dominant 
coherence of truth for Spinoza governs falsity absolutely because falsity has no features 
independent of a regime of truth. So the same belongs to Foucault’s dispositif, in which 
the regime that governs all of its disparate yet constitutive elements also governs what it 
is not, explicitly. All the discretions, the wrinkles and deviations, that are not explicitly 
accounted for by the dispositif become part of the dispositif nevertheless—the unsaid 
within the “said” of a discursive regime.  
 Despite the many commentaries on the dispositif that focus on its architectural 
elements—that is, the elements that are made visible by the concept’s capacity to 
demonstrate parallel and heterogeneous actions, productions, etc.—the concept is often 
only deployed as a Foucauldian mechanism akin to what Gilles Deleuze often called an 
assemblage.167 That is, the concept is so often deployed as an analytical mechanism with 
                                                
166 “Sane sicut lux se ipsam et tenebras manifestat, sic veritas norma sui et falsi est” 
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167 Some of the better recent efforts to understand or deploy this more complex vision of the 
dispositif include Shapiro (2013, esp. 71-85); Peltonen (2004) has written an essential 
interpretation of the concept, as has Bussolini (2010); while departing considerably from an 
exegesis of the dispositif, Raffnsøe (2008) emphasizes early some common 
misunderstandings that result for those that rely on Dreyfus and Rabinow for their 
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which to articulate force relations between a range of diverse practices and productions of 
knowledge. In other words, the concept is very often treated as a grand association of 
synchronic things, or a catchall at worst. Nevertheless, the concept in the hands of many 
tends, analytically at least, to come as an empirical attaché that recodes existing matter 
into a coherent set of phenomena for a writer. See for example Agamben’s revisionist-
normative interpretation:  
…I shall call an apparatus [dispositif] literally anything that has in some way the 
capacity to capture, orient, determine, intercept, model, control, or secure the 
gestures, behaviors, opinions, or discourses of living beings. Not only, therefore, 
prisons, madhouses, the panopticon, schools, confession, factories, disciplines, 
juridical measures, and so forth (whose connection with power is in a certain 
sense evident), but also the pen, writing, literature, philosophy, agriculture, 
cigarettes, navigation, computers, cellular telephones and—why not—language 
itself, which is perhaps the most ancient of apparatuses—one in which thousands 
and thousands of years ago a primate inadvertently let himself be captured, 
probably without realizing the consequences that he was about to face.168 
  
This approach seems to me ill-fated at best. If one deploys the concept, one must consider 
that what makes the concept useful is not that it allows one to draw connections between 
heterogeneous elements of thought and practice. Instead one must show what is somehow 
absent from the concept despite its empirical capacity to represent different elements. In 
short, what gives the dispositif its conceptual power is that it suggests—rather emptily, 
really—that there is a coherence between differentiated elements and places the onus on 
the writer to discover what motivates, drives, or animates any given dispositif. The 
dispositif is a methodological tool that takes evidence – in my case, writing – and posits a 
signifier as vehicle to a question: What makes these different institutions and ideas 
                                                                                                                                            
interpretation of the dispositif. Tina Monaghan also has a very useful paper, “We All 
Dreamed It,” forthcoming.  
168 Agamben 2009, 14 
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connect? It is more, however, than a vague interpretive license, and it is not an arbitrary 
assertion. Recognizing the presence of different voices, or different institutions, “a 
heterogeneous ensemble” demands that they exist synchronically, and that their 
association is not arbitrary in a system of knowledge imbued with power. The presence of 
the dispositif requires the writer to ask not how are these empirical elements related, but 
what made these elements come to be and make sense all at the same time. In short the 
dispositif animates a view of how disparate elements unite, but through a sensible logic. 
It enables a view of social constitution involving discourse, but not limited to it because it 
shows the way that discourse is also animated by it.  
This last bit, the bit about sensibility, is why the dispositif requires a notion of 
rationality: The dispositif requires sense-making. “Why else would so many different 
practices be united in a dispositif?” the empiricist asks. But the question closer to the 
most useful interpretation of the dispositif in Foucault’s sense is, “Why would it make 
sense for all such disparate elements to exist simultaneously?”   
 To evoke Atwood’s dystopia alongside Flynn’s alarmist call to resilience is not to 
name a dispositif, but to recognize heterogeneous forms of knowledge production that 
consist of similar motives even despite their widely varied intents. The representative 
texts that I interpreted above point toward a dispositif; they do not constitute one. A 
dispositif is a conceptual apparatus that must be deployed, must be composed. Where one 
might see the heterogeneous elements as Agamben does, with such diverse elements 
corralled together – “prisons, madhouses, the panopticon…. [with] agriculture, cigarettes, 
navigation, computers…” – Agamben vanquishes nearly all meaning from what might 
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unify different elements at all. That is to say if one wants to know why we might mention 
the panopticon in the same breath as computers, one must impose upon those elements a 
correspondence that they do not have themselves: a reason common to them that is not 
composed by them alone—a rationale. This is also why Agamben misses an opportunity 
when he mentions “cigarettes” and not, say, cancer: If one wonders why there is a 
concern (or not) for cancers resulting from “mobile phones” or “cigarettes,” one may 
begin to wonder why such a concern emerges. There is widespread fear of lung cancer 
and a range of other issues resulting from such objects and practices. This is not the point. 
The point, to be clear, is that Agamben takes the range of objects to have empirical 
meaning by virtue of their capacity to be associated. But he makes little effort to associate 
them, to focus on what narrows them. A difference between the way that he uses the 
dispositif and the way that I read the concept, is that he takes for granted the presence of 
the object. In the discourse of catastrophe the question has already limited phenomena. 
Many people die of cancer, or of automobile accidents, or a laundry list of other 
phenomena. But why are these not seen as “catastrophic”? The dispositif allows for 
interpretation to speak to this question, but beyond a mere matter of concern. It unifies 
the earlier chapters above with the discussion of literature, ethics, public policy, and 
imaginative security. It speaks to the resources devoted and to the governmental concern; 
it also speaks to what those resources and concern correspond to – which I intend by 
stressing the “unsaid” in Foucault’s description. The dispositif allows the narrowing of 
phenomena to correspond to a sense of urgency, to a rationale, that limits the field of 
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correspondence. It speaks to the specificity, even when the concept of catastrophe 
represents an abstraction, of how catastrophe gains conceptual and rational force. 
Why else would the litany of writers referenced here all simultaneously opine 
about the future of humanity as a result of terrorist attacks, natural disasters, economic 
meltdowns, but not include in their set of concerns cancer, which kills routinely 8 million 
people per year—the leading cause of death worldwide—and unevenly, as it kills the 
poor at rates exponentially higher than the affluent?169 The answer lies in the production 
of knowledge; an anticipatory dispositif articulates what and who matters and is 
marginalized, renders unsaid, in this case the most common killer of human beings alive 
today. So as Margret Atwood parabolizes the myth of scientific progress, or Flynn warns 
of pending doom to a civilization, they each together seize on a technique not only 
common to them, but also to their readers. They speak to a shared reality, which is 
inhabited by the authors and their readers, but does not come to any of them – authors or 
readers – except for through the filtration of discourse. In this sense, we might read 
Atwood or Flynn, or Mulgan, or any other writer interpreted to this point in the 
dissertation in isolation. It would makes sense in isolation to show concern about their 
methods, the rigor of their analysis, etc. But when taken together, on a common theme, 
even as they agree and disagree, the commonality of the theme – premature death 
because of a specific threat, future catastrophe – allows for more than just a 
phenomenological analysis of disasters. It shows the ways that the question inhabits and 
haunts and, indeed, informs ways of meaning-making. The purpose of the “unsaid,” is not 
                                                
169 World Health Organization factsheet on cancer: 
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an authorization to pontificate, but a symptomatic question about what kind of meaning-
making would associate different perspectives, institutions, purposes, agencies, and 
interests. 
At stake is the notion that the meaning produced is not merely meaning at the 
level of its intrinsic utility for itself. Meaning also produces subtleties (the “said as much 
as the unsaid”) in the sense that when a constellation of productive mechanisms of 
knowledge produce different meanings operating as a heterogeneous assemblage or 
ensemble of productive orientations—at once they produce a unity, at just the same time 
as they define deviations. In other words, what occurs in a dispositif is as much about 
producing a unified logic of sense-making as it is about producing independent modes of 
knowledge production required of expertise in a given cultural moment of writing.  
 So in a mode or moment represented in a dispositif by a diverse field of writing 
about pending catastrophe, there are multiple dimensions at play. There is first the 
aforementioned element in which the presence of a dispositif renders a set of relations 
visible and organizes kinds of knowledge invested in “distributing the visible and the 
invisible, generating or eliminating an object, which cannot exist without it.”170 In this 
sense the knowledge produced by speculating about coming catastrophe operates in the 
same realm of discourse in which the concept of catastrophe comes to be, becomes 
emergent under a particular lens and light, and hence is rendered palpable and knowable 
in diverse ways. It is almost as if the catastrophe to come gains more reality by virtue of 
the spectrum of different values lent to it in compounded speculations.  
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This diversity of values is what Deleuze calls the “curves of utterance,” which 
“refer to the lines of enunciation where the differential positions of the elements of an 
utterance are distributed.” Such curves, which give conceptual grip to Deleuze’s unique 
way of reconfiguring Foucault’s “the said as much as the unsaid” are “regimes that must 
be defined for the visible and the utterable with their derivations, transformations, 
mutations. In each apparatus [dispositif], the lines cross thresholds that make them either 
aesthetic, scientific, political, etc.”171 Deleuze offers Foucault’s concept an elevated 
account of what is enfolded between different modes of practice in the dispositif. Put 
simply, if for Foucault much of what is important within the dispositif is the “said as 
much as the unsaid,” that is also because for Foucault it is what is unified (as well as 
rendered hidden) by any arrangement of discourses within the apparatus. So Deleuze’s 
account shifts the focus somewhat from where Foucault had outlined it—principally at 
the level of the “heterogeneous elements”—and breathes oxygen into the ways that the 
“derivations, transformations, mutations” are brought to intelligibility as “either aesthetic, 
scientific, political, etc.” In truth, Deleuze enables the Foucauldian to see precisely how 
the relationship between discourse and “heterogenous elements” in the dispositif both 
conceals and reveals the presence of a rationality common to all practices, though not 
necessarily known to the practitioners themselves. Such knowledge requires 
interpretation. 
 
 
 
                                                
171 ibid. 
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V. Conclusion  
 
We are told that our lives are increasingly defined by precariousness and uncertainty. It 
isn’t that increased vigilance could protect us, nor are the problems that challenge 
stability matters of individual concern. In part, that catastrophe requires collective action 
itself makes it a political problem. Yet catastrophe – and especially the notion of 
catastrophes to come – rarely unify people. The diversity of authors whose concerns 
focus on catastrophe are almost as various as the kinds of catastrophic events themselves.  
The aim here was to present for the reader an evocatively representative range, 
and not a comprehensive list, of textual preoccupations with “the coming catastrophe,” or 
the possibility of high-impact, broad-scale human loss. As the readings unfolded, my aim 
was neither to give comprehensive reviews of the texts (as a critical review or 
commentary might), nor to represent the entirety of each text’s work (including all that 
each text engages), but instead to give the reader a sense of the way that each text orients 
itself toward the notion of future catastrophe. In each, the text is oriented toward 
catastrophe in a particular way: Each deploys catastrophe in service of a political 
argument, and each harnesses the rhetorical purpose of catastrophe in order to project a 
political claim for consideration. To this extent, one might see a proliferation of the 
“politics of catastrophization” pace Vázquez-Arroyo’s description. But the distinction 
that I hope to make is that, rather than a conscious rhetorical deployment à la his notion 
of depoliticizing threat of catastrophic consequence, what we see here is a heterogeneous 
landscape of different annunciations. In effect, instead of a mode of rhetoric bent to 
disenfranchise, we see a differentiated field of voices pronouncing the value of life in the 
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face of potential danger. We begin to see the evident rationality of the orientation toward 
future catastrophe through the very stories that culture tells itself. 
Where through literature Margret Atwood constructs an allegory regarding the 
myth of scientific progress, through theoretical philosophy Tim Mulgan offers an ethical 
dilemma and therefore a pedagogical watchword of unmitigated climate change. 
Likewise, where writing publicly about national security Stephen Flynn evokes the 
speculative (and abstract) terror of under-preparedness, the DHS Analytic Red Cell 
project conjures speculative nightmare scenarios in order to construct new possibilities 
for preparedness and security against terrorism. All together, the dispositif and its 
attendant realities—but also its variant strategies, textual orientations, and purposes—
find vividness. The different corners of the dispositif come together to demonstrate an 
edifice of an anticipatory dispositif adequate to creating knowledge about future 
catastrophes. In their vividness, however, it is critical to remember that each of them 
produces a fiction because catastrophism produces political orientations to fictive 
landscapes, dreams or nightmares of what do not (yet) exist. Catastrophism requires a 
catastrophe, but one that must be conjured, suggested, projected. These and many other 
authors may claim a necessity in their projects, but the projects are radically inventive, 
speculative. 
This chapter did not advance the argument that catastrophic thinking—a 
preoccupation with coming catastrophe—is novel, or more potent than before, but instead 
only that one can see the preoccupation with securing against future catastrophe now 
permeating many sectors of intellectual life. With reference to a dispositif where 
 254 
anticipations of the future animate a range of writings similar to those outlined above, it 
is tempting to conclude with the empirical observation that there are many voices 
discussing similar things simultaneously. From this perspective one can deduce that 
catastrophe is in vogue, or that it carries a political cachet in the sense that it is on the tips 
of many tongues at once. In such a dispositif, one which always mobilizes catastrophe as 
the worst-case scenario, though in different ways (necessarily different ways), limiting 
our analysis to the “heterogeneous elements” offers only the empirical components 
loosely organized by coupling it with a concept and noting the synchronic presence of 
different people discussing the same topic or concept differently all at the same time. 
 Yet to limit the dispositif in this way also overlooks an emergent rationality, that 
element of the said and unsaid that ties together—and renders sensible—the question in 
the first place. In no uncertain terms, to go beyond the empirical observation that there 
are different sorts of writing mobilizing the same force, and to recognize that a rationality 
common to such pursuits is in place, draws upon a political rationality of profound 
political force, and bearing the name, catastrophism. 
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Catastrophism II: Doomsaying and Critique 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
I. Introduction: Anxious Traumas in the Future Tense 
 
Catastrophe marks not only a terrible disaster, it lurks in the contemporary mind.1 A 
haunting, maybe, or an anxiety. Catastrophe, I argue, when taken in the future tense, is a 
collective concern. Depictions of future catastrophes in literature and cinema, never mind 
the news or social media, seize upon and orient political subjects to questions about death 
and survival, protection, prevention, and their inevitable failures. This orientation 
underscores countless projects of meaning making, and reflects back upon the cultures 
that create them as a sensibility – as rationality, as catastrophism.  
A recent book takes up this notion through the lens of the contemporary cinema, 
submitting to the lexicon of political and cultural theories surrounding disaster the 
concept of “Pretraumatic Stress Syndrome.”2 E. Ann Kaplan argues that in addition to the 
now well-understood theory of psychological trauma known as Post-Traumatic Stress 
Disorder, contemporary Euro-American societies are experiencing an emergent form of 
                                                
1 Kindervater 2017 
2 Kaplan EA 2015 
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trauma where “future catastrophic events could also be traumatic.”3 Following her earlier 
work on media and cultures of trauma, Kaplan develops this idea as it is expressed 
through the cinema. 4  Transformations in narrative not only reflect the ways that 
individuals feel about their prospects for survival, they also mirror the way that narrative 
comes to inform and shape their prospective senses of efficacy in the face of what they 
are told is an impending dystopian nightmare.5 Audiences experience cinemas of social 
and environmental collapse through the suspension of disbelief, where they project 
themselves as future selves, identify with those undergoing the tumults of dystopia, and 
in a sense, transmogrify into “virtual future humans” who experience by fiat the struggles 
on screen as a motion sickness of future-oriented sympathy turned anxious trauma.6 
 It may be the case that contemporary political subjects identify with their personal 
and collective path forward off-screen in a similar way. Could it be that the narration of 
catastrophism in the previous chapter marks out the web of discursive relations shaping 
contemporary political subjects as a pretraumatic stress syndrome? Could it be that 
contemporary political society suffers from a future-oriented psychological disorder? 
Kaplan seems to think that her research can be extrapolated to consider cultural politics 
under a new light. Catastrophe to be sure has long been the province of dystopian 
nightmare scenarios, despite recent narrative transformations in cinema and literature. 
But these transformations matter.  
                                                
3 Kaplan EA 2015, 1. 
4 On collective trauma see Kaplan, EA 2005, esp. 24-41.  
5 This results from Kaplan treating cinematic audiences as witnesses, Kaplan 2015, 24. On 
the politics of witnessing, trauma, and image, see Azoulay 2008 & 2015 
6 Kaplan 2015, 3. 
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Consider for example Aradau and Van Munster, who notice that, in the most 
recent phase of disaster cinema, humans no longer aim to outmaneuver the disaster as 
was the case for so long, likely because of the hegemony of modern protagonism 
overcoming adverse conditions offered by teleological narrative arcs.7 By contrast, so 
much of the current disaster cinema begins either with the catastrophe, or with it already 
passed. They write:  
[Now]…the cause of the event often remains unknown and unknowable… and the 
narrative instead enacts a future that invites audiences to inhabit a world where 
the catastrophic event has already happened. Humans are not seen as acting in the 
pre-evental present but in a post-evental future. As an article in the Wall Street 
Journal puts is, “[t]he story line of what happens after an inevitable disaster 
permeates nearly all the new projects, in contrast to movies like ‘Armageddon,’ 
which showed humanity warding off an impending threat.8 
 
This break in interpretation where before human agency was allowed to triumph over 
disaster in a distinctly modernist way, and now the fully dystopian imaginary beginning 
with disaster certainly marks a different rationale in filmmaking, at least, if not a further-
reaching logic indicating an exasperated posture toward the future of catastrophic events 
themselves. 
 This is Kaplan’s point: That cinema reflects a cultural anxiety she calls pretrauma, 
and that pretrauma can be detected in the cognitive corridors of contemporary psychology 
as it presents itself as a disorder. She borrows this from the field of cognitive psychology 
and extrapolates from there to investigate the ways that  
Filmmakers and novelists create fictional worlds relating both to the end of the 
“mass utopian dream of a social world in alliance with personal happiness” and to 
the destructive geological force that humans now occupy on planet Earth. Utopian 
discourses have given way to dystopian imaginaries on a scale rarely seen in 
                                                
7 Aradau and Van Munster 2011, 2.  
8 ibid. 
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earlier aesthetic periods. Indeed, the dystopian/utopian oscillation is fundamental 
to the pretrauma genre addressed here. Films reflect pretrauma operating in 
culture and discourse along with the twin processes of fear and hope. In trying to 
understand the complex psychological mechanisms that inhibit humans from 
coming together to save themselves and the planet, I argue that such processes 
have first to be grasped and then changed.9  
 
There is much at issue here. Key to my purposes, however, are the ways that Kaplan 
rightly recognizes that rather than film and literature dictating to culture, political culture 
creates discourses in which such narratives make sense to audiences anyway. But this 
process is neither new, nor complete. Dystopia has enjoyed a place in literature for quite 
a long time, and Metropolis, a classic of the genre is nearly a hundred years old.10 
Regardless of the novelty of the genres, cinema and literature are perhaps clearer genres 
in which to see culture reflected; but what is new is that we can now see this 
catastrophism now resident in nearly all corridors of life in the west. Part of what I 
showed earlier in this dissertation illustrates that while given birth in cinema and 
literature, the imaginative capacities – and what they respond to – have effectively taken 
hold in the practical world of politics and security provision. But, as I have been slowly 
building the argument, much of that political entrenchment amongst elites is due to shifts 
in political culture. These pretraumas are no more reflective of a psychological disorder 
than they are of the metabolism of a sense of reality itself. 
In other words, rather than cinemas and literatures dictating to culture, or 
reflecting cultural anxieties, or furthermore political culture being diagnosable with a 
psychological disorder, it makes more sense to begin from cultural and political 
production following this simple insight: Culture is oriented toward the thought of 
                                                
9 Kaplan 2015, 8. 
10 See Thacker 2011; Paik 2010 
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omnipresent threats of unexpected death. It is not a disorder, psychological or otherwise, 
but a reflection of what western political society seems to worry about losing most, and to 
what sinister causes. The particular imagination of catastrophic futures is a signature of 
cost for the society that gives it voice. Or, to borrow a phrase from Adi Ophir in his 
critique of cognitive psychology’s view of catastrophization as a “cognitive bias,” he 
adds: 
Cognitive psychologists seem quite confident in their ability to distinguish their 
patients’ distorted sense of reality from their own sober evaluation of what is 
really dangerous. They may believe that catastrophe is in the eyes of the beholder, 
but sometimes catastrophes do happen, and a sober understanding of reality must 
overcome an opposite cognitive bias—the tendency to deny this possibility. 
Taking the possibility of real catastrophes into account, one may say that 
“catastrophization” is a disorder, indeed, but of the world, not of the mind.11  
 
This idea – that catastrophization is a disorder of the world, not of the mind – makes 
sense within the conceptual apparatus of Ophir’s work.12 Catastrophization operates on 
the discursive register to determine what is worthy of being deemed actionable, whose 
lives are worth intervening for, and how that discursive terrain operates to articulate a 
vast complex of political affairs.13 But can’t it be said that there also exist elements of 
such a process at the level of rationality? Ophir intervenes upon cognitive psychology to 
insist that individual biases, pace cognitive psychology’s view of catastrophization, is 
altogether unremarkable. For him, what’s important is that discourse shapes the sorts of 
actions taken in a world of danger precisely because of how danger is managed through 
the institutional politics of knowledge production.  
                                                
11 Ophir 2008, 40. 
12 On this set of ideas see my explanation in Chapter Four, §II. 
13 Ophir 2008 
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 Yet I must insist that another layer of this puzzle remains unresolved. 
Catastrophism – not catastrophization – commands certain questions, articulates certain 
anxieties, defines certain threats (and less so actions) as inevitable. In this sense, 
catastrophism preempts action of one kind – a critical kind – in favor of the generic and 
general orders of protectionism that maintain the political status quo. This is what the 
first three chapters above set into place. Now, having shown the presence of 
catastrophism in the previous chapter, but not its effects, this chapter demonstrates how 
catastrophism shrouds the manifold causes of potential catastrophes –climate change, 
economic collapse, terrorism, for example – by virtue of the ways that it makes the future 
catastrophe seem inevitable. As such, structural change seems impossible, even unworthy 
of meaningful critical enterprise, for in a political milieu where the coming catastrophe is 
always already imminent, there is frankly never time. That is the argument of this 
chapter. 
 In the previous chapter, I registered the culture-political presence of 
catastrophism. In this one, I aim to outline its effects by taking aim at those who advocate 
for catastrophisms of different sorts. I take as inspiration the following passage from 
Michel Foucault’s History of Sexuality, Volume One, recasting it for my purposes in the 
present tense with a view of the general network that composes catastrophist rationality:   
…let us not look for the headquarters that presides over its rationality; neither the 
caste which governs, nor the groups which control the state apparatus, nor those 
who make the most important economic decisions direct the entire network of 
power that functions in a society (and makes it function); the rationality of power 
is characterized by tactics that are often quite explicit at the restricted level where 
they are inscribed (the local cynicism of power), tactics which, becoming 
connected to one another, attracting and propagating one another, but finding their 
base of support and their condition elsewhere, end by forming comprehensive 
 261 
systems: the logic is perfectly clear, the aims decipherable, and yet it is often the 
case that no one is there to have invented them, and few who can be said to have 
formulated them: and implicit characteristic of the great anonymous, almost 
unspoken strategies which coordinate the loquacious tactics whose “inventors” or 
decision makers are often without hypocrisy.14 
 
In short, it may disappoint that in the end there will be little blame to be placed, few 
agents to admonish. Through the concept of catastrophism I aim to present the function 
of power as it organizes a society contemplating its future, and potentially its demise. 
And I want to make sense of how, despite their being a range of actors, powers, 
knowledges, prejudices, and mistakes, that in part what confuses us when making sense 
of what is to be done, is that discourse (as a cause and as an effect) unites knowledge and 
power in ways that more subtly reorganize what can be thought and said; and in “dark 
times,” potentially what or whom can survive. 
 
II. Catastrophism Revisited 
 
In a recent work of non-fictional essays, the novelist Amitav Ghosh wonders, with 
climate change and its potentials for mass extinction looming, why is it so difficult to 
understand that planetary ecosystems might be at a tipping point? 15  For Ghosh, 
unsurprisingly given his life’s work in literary fiction, central to the issue is a failure of 
modern literature. Certainly science fiction and other genres of fantasy have long relied 
on doomsday narrative in order to deliver contemporary criticism. But for Ghosh, these 
endeavors lack the capacity to improve our understanding about the magnitude of the 
problems we face.  
                                                
14 Foucault 1990, 95 
15 See Part One of Ghosh 2016 
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 Ghosh does not render this assessment as a slight against lesser literary genres in 
his perception. Instead, importantly, critically, it is precisely because such literatures 
require the reader to suspend their beliefs of reality, and enter into an imaginative 
construction, that they remain outside the world. In other words, because literatures 
lacking a certain degree of realism ask the reader to set aside their understanding of 
reality and inhabit another world altogether, literature so far fails to confront the 
problems of climate change in a way that truly registers in the contemporary imagination. 
In other words, Ghosh is begging literary fiction to engage in literary catastrophism.  
 In English, this word “catastrophism” has a controversial history. In academic 
usage it actually stems from the work of French paleontologist Georges Cuvier, who 
according to most was the progenitor of the concept of species extinction.16 Before 
Cuvier, the notion of catastrophism referred to biblical readings telescoped onto 
interpretations of planetary history, where for example great floods and plagues dictated 
dramatic changes of course.17 Cuvier found in the fossil record strange anomalies – 
fossilized impressions of species unknown – as an hypothesis, Cuvier argued from his 
laboratory in Paris, perhaps such species had once existed, but then, for some reason, 
ceased. It was a controversial idea to say the least, mostly for those who were incredulous 
that a natural theory of planetary change threatened Christian theology. Never before had 
a discovery so unexplained taken place in the fossil record in the growing scientific 
                                                
16 Davies 2016. As a nominal note, it might be important to clarify that Davies distinguishes 
between “catastrophism” as biblical hermeneutics and “neocatastrophism” as scientific 
enterprise. 
17 See discussions of this in Kolbert 2015 
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enterprises of stratigraphy and geology.18 From this initial thesis, Cuvier deduced that 
perhaps the planet had not always been hospitable to forms of life existent in his time; 
and further, perhaps, great events had occurred that might have thrust species to the 
breaking point of their capacities to adapt to their environments. The scientific theory of 
planetary change, driven by unforeseen and suddenly cataclysmic events was born. 
Borrowing a phrase from those that understood history through a now superstitiously 
unscientific lens, those attributing change to Noah’s flood or the rain of fire and 
brimstone, Cuvier argued that catastrophes at a planetary scale punctuated otherwise 
temperate and hospitable conditions for certain kinds of life. He called this theory le 
catastrophisme.19  
 In England, Charles Lyell was aghast at this notion that not only had great 
catastrophes changed the course of life on Earth, but that it was possible for species to 
simply cease existence.20 As a student of William Buckland at Oxford, Lyell rejected his 
teacher’s efforts to relate the scientific discoveries associated with catastrophism with 
Biblical narratives.21 He and his students had been considering global historical change as 
well, and also through the fossil record. As Charles Darwin sailed around the world in the 
HMS Beagle he collected fossils wherever he could find them, attempting to add depth 
and comprehension to the growing fossil record depicting the history of living species, 
permanently cast in strata of stone.22 The result was a competing theory to catastrophism 
                                                
18 Some earlier naturalists, Buffon primary among them, had speculative arguments that 
something like extinction may occur, but failed to postulate the theory with evidence. 
19 Davies 2016 
20 Brantlinger 2013, 23. 
21 Buckland 1832; Kolbert 2015, 45. 
22 Kolbert 2015, 50-53. 
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– gradualism23 – which argued that species did not cease existence, they adapted to 
changing conditions. As such when their environments changed, adding new stimuli and 
challenges, some members of species would of course fail in the wake of more arduous 
environments, but those whose particular aptitudes allowed them to flourish must have 
caused genetic transformations. Species didn’t go extinct. They evolved.  
 In this case it might be true that some fossils weren’t representative of what 
scholars knew at the time, the gradualists argued.24 But that would more so reflect the 
inadequacy of the fossil record at the time. Surely as the fossil record became more 
comprehensive, it would become clear that a more even arc of evolution had transpired.25 
The assumption that the gradual evolutionary telos of species survival triumphed over 
catastrophism for nearly 150 years. Only in the final decades of the 20th century did 
geologists begin warming to the idea of catastrophism again, after so many excavations 
showed vast populations of incomparable species, and the discovery of the Chicxulub 
crater in the Gulf of Mexico.26 With the underwater discovery of Chicxulub in the 1980s, 
planetary historians such as geologists and paleontologists reconstructed a narrative 
birthed nearly two hundred years prior in a research laboratory in Paris. An asteroid had 
surprisingly struck the planet in an age where dinosaurs ruled as supreme predators, 
ending their existence in a matter of hours. 27 
                                                
23 Gradualism is also frequently referred to as “uniformitarianism.” 
24 Luciano 2015, 175 
25 Dawson 2016 
26 Davies 2016, 29 
27  Known as the Alvarez hypothesis, the empirical journey to substantiating dinosaur 
extinction as a result of an asteroid was first argued in a scientific publication in 1980 
(Alvarez and Alvarez, et all 1980). Earlier attempts were published as early as 1953, see 
Kelly and Dachille 1953. 
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 Nevertheless, outside of the English use of catastrophism as a niche view in 
geology, mostly as a contrasting thesis to the dominant view of planetary gradualism, the 
word catastrophism seeped into common usage. In French, the word un catastrophist is 
an epithet for a paranoiac, a streetcorner doomsayer. Those people we come across on 
occasion with sandwich boards or signs declaring “The End Is Near! Repent!” These are 
catastrophists. But anymore they needn’t be zealots or apocalypticists in the religious 
sense. The word represents a failure to grasp a sense of reality, and by deploying the 
notion, the utterer means, of course, that the end is not near. The catastrophist is some 
kind of madman. 
 Beyond a conceptual migration from the sciences to quotidian pop psychology, 
the concept of catastrophism in its everyday use is fascinating because of the ways that, 
even in a moment defined by the omnipresent representation of catastrophic possibilities, 
the strangeness of someone believing the end is imminent cannot be but disorienting. 
Doesn’t the presence of the coming catastrophe, in all of its magnificently powerful 
abstraction, mean that we all, in one way or another, are catastrophists? Wouldn’t we all 
believe in some way – or in a litany of ways – that be it climatological, technological, 
economic, moral, or some combination, that the future is as bleak as the streetcorner 
doomsayer says, even if we deny this madness in ourselves?  If we agree with Davies that 
“high speed global warming is not an imminent threat but the new condition of the earth,” 
shouldn’t we at least reasonably accept the catastrophist’s posture to the slightest 
degree?28 Don’t the stakes of being wrong in our certainty that human life will persist 
                                                
28 Davies 2016, 40. 
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with gradual evolutions against changing conditions suggest that a bit of catastrophism is 
in order? 
 Just before his death, Ulrich Beck published an essay entitled, “Emancipatory 
Catastrophism: What does it mean to climate change and risk society?” Therein Beck 
argues for a “cosmopolitan perspective” beyond the logics of nation-states and global 
elites, where a “community of risk” can coalesce around the idea of common doom 
stemming from climate change, or even potentially work to resolve what might cause it.29 
In a sense, Beck means that a common awareness of catastrophic futures – especially 
with reference to climate change – is not merely dystopic and stultifying, but actually 
productive: 
Climate change is not climate change; it is at once much more and something 
very different. It is a reformation of modes of thought, of lifestyles and consumer 
habits, of law, economy, science and politics. Whether presenting climate change 
as a transformation of human authority over nature; as an issue of climate 
(in)justice; as concerning the rights of future generations; or as a matter of 
international politics and international trade; or even as an indication of suicidal 
capitalism – all this is about the dramatic power of the unintended, unseen 
emancipatory side effects of global risk, which already have altered our being in 
the world, seeing the world and imagining and doing politics. Global climate risk 
could usher in a rebirth of modernity.30 
 
He continues, only several lines later, “The global climate risk, far from an apocalyptic 
catastrophe, is instead – so far! – a kind of ‘emancipatory catastrophe.’”31 In an echo of 
Homer-Dixon’s “upside of down” thesis, rightly excoriated by Vázquez-Arroyo, Beck 
seeks to find the ways that community emerges and transforms in the foreground of 
                                                
29 Beck 2016a, 76 
30 ibid, 79 
31 ibid. 
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catastrophes both past and future.32 In a rather strange way, recalling Kurasawa, Beck 
argues that communities make meaning in such dreaded times, and as a result cohere and 
innovate in ways that may create new sparks of hope through a “symbolic environment” 
inclusive of climate aesthetics and a range of tributaries to what I have been referring to 
as discourse.33  
The problem of course is that such communities are frequently constricted by 
regional and territorial outlines of the nation-state, and as such, even when calcified by 
the looming crisis, solutions are usually still guided by logics of competitiveness in 
capitalist political economy, as is the case with green technology and eco-capitalism. 
Shinichiro Asayama recognizes the nature of this technocratic disposition in what Ulrich 
Beck, in a slight critical correction, calls “technocratic catastrophism.”34 Yet, Beck thinks 
that the presence of cosmopolitan networks of norms could lead the Kurasawian 
community of meaning-making to transcend this order toward something like a global 
village of catastrophists. This is his view of emancipatory catastrophism: That the crisis 
might bring about a new community borne through new expectations, in a “cosmopolitan 
moment” promising a new modernity.35 He might be right that such a view offers “a new 
variant of critical theory,” but its utopian liberalism is unbridled. And as for the 
presumably emergent “cosmopolitan moment,” I remain skeptical at best.36 
 After all, catastrophe does not affect all equally. I showed in Chapter Two just 
how pernicious this line of thinking can be for the poor and vulnerable, especially as 
                                                
32 Homer-Dixon 2006; Vázquez-Arroyo 2013, 745. 
33 Beck 2016a, 81 
34 Asayama 2016; Beck 2016b 
35 Beck 2016a, 83 
36 ibid 
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states abandon security measures in favor of thick programs of resilience. Hans Magnus 
Enzensberger, the poet that I have returned to on occasion for illumination of the 
pervasiveness of catastrophic thought, wrote, unsurprisingly poetically, already in the 
1970s:  
We have also lost another traditional aspect of the end of the world. Previously, it 
was generally agreed that the event would affect everyone simultaneously and 
without exception: the never satisfied demand for equality and justice found in 
this conception its last refuge. But as we see it today, doom is no longer a leveler, 
quite the opposite. It differs from country to country, from class to class, from 
place to place. While it is already overtaking some, others can watch it on 
television. Bunkers are built, ghettos walled in, fortresses erected, bodyguards 
hired, on a large scale as well as a small. Corresponding to the country house with 
burglar alarms and electric fences, we have whole countries, on the international 
scale, who fence themselves in while others go to ruin. The nightmare of the end 
of the world does not end this temporal disparity, it simply radicalizes it. Its 
African and Indian versions are overlooked with a shrug of the shoulders by those 
not directly affected—including the African and Indian governments. At this 
point, finally, the joke comes to end.37  
 
Enzensberger saw in the 1970s a certain prospective denial by the privileged; and now 
humanists and social scientists realize that climate catastrophe is already underway.38 In 
short, the battle to ward off future climate calamity has already been lost by some. And 
many of those populations whose vulnerability is overlooked by Beck in his new 
cosmopolitanism, emergent or not, have already become refugees, or victims of climate 
wars. 
 Emancipatory catastrophism, insofar as it points toward a hopeful rationality that 
mobilizes a future catastrophic threat in order to finally convince people to have new 
expectations is both unnecessarily homogenizing, as well as Panglossian at best. Luckily 
Beck’s catastrophism was not the only one on offer. Other, richer attempts have been 
                                                
37 Enzensberger 1978, 75-6 
38 See Parenti 2011; Klein 2014; Morton 2013 
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made to draw upon the catastrophisme of the doomsayer. And they are deployed in a way 
that aims to address the problems that might help move beyond Beck’s simple liberalism. 
These ideas do not begin from the presumption that people the world around have an 
intuitive sense of looming catastrophe, at least not from climate events, and certainly not 
with the full gravity of potential species extinction. In a word, these earlier philosophical 
catastrophists seek to induce catastrophism upon those who may believe in disaster, but 
fail to understand its magnitude. 
Jean-Pierre Dupuy and others, but first Dupuy, have sought to recuperate the 
speech of les catastrophists as a model for outmaneuvering the pending catastrophe that, 
with the force of a planet, could potentially spell the end of life as human beings have 
come to understand it.39 The problem, recalling Amitav Ghosh, might not be that we 
could perish, but that we are so deranged that we cannot see the damage that we have 
done.40 But Never to mind the effects that human activity has already had on a fragile 
planet historically predisposed to calamitous tumult. Hence Dupuy articulates a concept 
of “enlightened catastrophism,” revolving around a new metaphysics of time to which I 
will return in short order. But this enlightened catastrophism is juxtaposed to a more 
everyday sort of catastrophism in which people can lament what has gone wrong, yet 
leave things at the level of conversation. This is mostly because the catastrophe that 
Dupuy sees pending isn’t real to most of us – it remains a figment of the imagination, or a 
dream of potentiality rather than something serious enough to deserve our attention. 
                                                
39 Dupuy 2002, 2005, 2013 
40 Ghosh 2016 
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Dupuy’s idea of our contemporary predicament evolves from one paradox to 
another. The first is a paradox of modern humanism itself; the second, he calls a paradox 
of doomsaying.41 I will arrive at the paradox of doomsaying soon enough, but should first 
outline what renders it logical – even if its outcomes seem so faulty in reason.  
So, first, the humanist paradox recognizes that modern humanism values its 
innovative capacities, at the same time as modern innovation heightened both the terms 
and the magnitude of modern catastrophes. Modern humanism, for Dupuy, in other words 
produced both the direness of the problem of catastrophe and at the same time laid an 
exclusive claim to the amelioration of its own effects: 
We now know that the conceited humanism that brought the modern world its 
incredible dynamism places human affairs in peril. We are living in the shadow of 
catastrophes that perhaps systematically threatens the disappearance of the 
species. Our responsibility is enormous since we are the sole cause of that which 
we will become. But the sentiment of responsibility is likely to increase 
exceedingly the arrogance of its cause. Once we persuade ourselves that the 
wellbeing of the world is in our hands and that humanity owes it to itself to be its 
own savior, we risk ourselves always rushing headlong in a great panic, looking 
evermore like the destiny of humankind.42 
 
Dupuy opens his Petite Metaphysique des Tsunamis in this way. Announcing that at the 
heart of a text on the politics and metaphysics of so-called natural disasters in an age of 
climate change, but also at the moment frothing at the mouth about the global impacts of 
                                                
41 Dupuy’s English translator often renders “le catastrophisme” as “doomsaying,” a choice 
that is clear and literal. I render it as “catastrophism” so that the conceptual specificity 
remains in tact and related to epochal change resulting from episodic ruptures rather than 
continuous change, in other words, as it is well established in English by way of the 
discipline of Geology. For useful conceptual histories, see Ager 1993, Palmer 2010, and 
Huggett 1998. For attempts to politicize the word, see Lilly 2012. In describing the paradox 
of doomsaying, Dupuy however uses a different verbiage than catastrophism: “le paradoxe de 
la prophétie de malheur,” perhaps most literally rendered as a paradox of the prophesy of 
misfortune, or the paradox of woeful prophesy. I find “doomsaying” to be closer to his sense 
of style and use it here as a result. 
42 Dupuy 2005, 9. My translation. 
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terrorist networks, that modern humanism is both the cause of climate change by way of 
its “conceited” belief in ceaseless progress, as well as potentially the only solution to its 
productive capacities available.43 Modern humanism proclaims that reason allowed for 
technological innovation, the self-same innovation arguably productive of industrial 
pollution the scale of which could alter the climate of a planet. And yet, this same modern 
humanism knows only itself as its plausible solution. As such, the “arrogance of the 
modern world” is that it sees its most destructive capacities also as its only recourse to 
survival.44 It is the unanticipated outcome of Descartes’s dream that practical philosophy, 
as the rational deployment of scientific thought against superstition, would render 
humankind “masters and possessors of nature.”45  
 This is not by chance. So different from the theory of catastrophization, Dupuy’s 
catastrophism does not allow for depoliticizing rhetoric because the stakes of the largest 
catastrophes – those tied to climate change and species annihilation – remain obscure to 
most people. It isn’t that people aren’t aware that climate change is an issue, or that they 
don’t have some idea of what it might foreshadow, but that contemporary human beings 
often enough cannot fully grapple with the stakes because they cannot believe such a 
future is real.46 Western people might be alert to their own vulnerability in a cinematic 
way, but Dupuy insists that when it comes to the worst-case scenario, that people are too 
caught in an intuitive belief in progress to trust that any other outcome is truly possible. 
                                                
43 The following discussion of Dupuy and Neyrat draws heavily on Kindervater 2017. 
44 op cit, 29; my translation 
45 Descartes 1998, 35. 
46 This insight betrays a diagnostic affinity between Ghosh and Dupuy, even if their 
proscriptive differences are quite stark. 
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In other words, for Dupuy a paradox of humanism languishes in a faulty 
metaphysics, not just an ideological predisposition: the promises of humanism (especially 
the notion of scientific progress as a tool of self-determination) created the problems 
facing humanity today and can only offer its tools as solutions. The modern notion of 
time, of linear cause and effect, as promised by modern humanism operates as a 
rectilinear decision tree. That notion of time enables a false sense of security to the extent 
that it obscures a range of aleatory frequencies of cause and effect to be shrouded by an 
understanding that innovation always causes solutions to problems – this may not be 
obvious in the moment of decision, but always appears so historically.47 In other words, 
modern humanism relies on a temporality that it cannot make use of if it wishes to 
transcend itself and secure its survival from itself. Dupuy refers to this as an “ordinary 
metaphysics.”48  
In his view, ordinary metaphysics – the temporality common to contemporary life 
that forecloses on real action against mounting catastrophic dangers – results from 
                                                
47 Agamben on the idea of “modern time” versus its various iterations according to particular 
philosophies: “The modern concept of time is a secularization of rectilinear, irreversible 
Christian time, albeit sundered from any notion of end and emptied of any other meaning but 
that of a structured process in terms of before and after. This representation of time as 
homogenous, rectilinear and empty derives from the experience of manufacturing work and 
is sanctioned by modern mechanics, which establishes the primacy of uniform rectilinear 
motion over circular motion. … Before and after, notions which were vague and empty for 
Antiquity – and which, for Christianity, had meaning only in terms of the end of time – now 
become meaning in themselves and for themselves, and this meaning is presented as truly 
historical. As Nietzsche had already grasped, with Hartmann’s “process of the world” (“only 
process can lead to redemption”), the idea governing the nineteenth-century concept of 
history is that of “process.” Only process as a whole has meaning, never the precise fleeting 
now; but since this process is really no more than a simple succession of now in terms of 
before and after, and the history of salvation has meanwhile become pure chronology, a 
semblance of meaning can be saved only by introducing the idea – albeit one lacking any 
rational foundation – of a continuous, infinite progress.” (Agamben 2007, 96-7).  
48 Dupuy 2005, 18. 
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modern thought itself. The future, in the view of ordinary metaphysics, lacks reality. 
Modern thought, in Dupuy’s mind, understands “the” future, as only one among many – 
plastic in its possibility – where action in the present determines it as one future or 
another, but by no means the only future.49 This is an interesting way of underscoring his 
paradox of humanism. One can see the conceptual flexibility of the future – that the 
future is not a determined outcome – as determined in present practice. The modern 
disposition and why the future catastrophe seems less believable results from the modern 
metaphysical understanding of time wherein the future relies on present action. This 
means as much that the future catastrophe could be avoided or prevented, as created. 
Most importantly, it means that major catastrophes always rely on human activity.  
It isn’t a controversial assumption to state that human activity depends somewhat 
upon what is believed possible. Practical regimes of action exist that attempt to designate 
rational actions in lieu of perfect knowledge. The first three chapters of this dissertation 
expose some. The precautionary principal is another well-known strategy for dealing with 
inadequate knowledge. But, Dupuy insists, the precautionary principle will fail because it 
prioritizes knowledge over belief; fact over intuition:  
It is not enough to know in order to accept what one knows and then to act on it. 
This fundamental reality is foreign to the so-called precautionary principle, whose 
implicit premise is that we do not act in the face of catastrophe because we are not 
sure of knowing enough to act effectively. It is plain, however, that even when we 
know something with certainty, we may be incapable of believing what we know.50 
 
The precautionary principle, also sometimes referred to as the one percent doctrine, 
judges adequate knowledge against unknown knowledge with a view against the potential 
                                                
49 ibid, 15-20. 
50 ibid, 11. My translation and emphasis 
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impact of inaction.51 In short, the precautionary principle argues that extreme caution 
should be taken when results (or data) are uncertain. From Dupuy’s perspective, 
however, we often suffer from a superabundance of information.52 Even when a dearth of 
information is not the problem, inertia can persist. For him the issue is not the reliability 
of information; it is the incapability, sometimes, to “believe what we know.” 
 To summarize, for Dupuy, the conviction of modern thought prioritizes 
technological advancement as progress. Progress led to astonishing achievements, but 
will also drive human civilization to the brink of collapse, if not beyond it. The irony is 
that modern thought is so entrenched in progressive metaphysics, that it is nearly 
impossible to believe that the dystopia we almost certainly tend towards will come to 
pass because it is only one of many possible problems that modern innovation is 
supposedly so well-poised to solve. The refusal to accept the coming catastrophe, or what 
Dupuy refers to as a “blindness to the apocalypse” feeds upon the fact that “the 
willingness of a community to recognize the existence of a risk depends on the degree to 
which it is conceived that solutions exist.”53 
 The ultimate effect of this ordinary metaphysics carries a stultifying effect. When 
on occasion a knowledgeable catastrophist speaks, the modern attitude tends to deny his 
                                                
51 Suskind 2007; see also Kriebel, et al. 2001 
52 Aradau and Van Munster make a very similar argument in 2011, 7. Though, as I 
established in Chapter One, Aradau and Van Munster differ from Dupuy who is skeptical that 
people generally believe that the worst will occur because, coming from a study of security 
experts, they see more certainty: “Although not present yet, the future of catastrophic events 
seems taken for granted in current discourse: the catastrophe will happen” (Aradau and Van 
Munter 2011, 13). Their argument focuses largely on the work of security experts and, as 
such, is less capable of addressing the broader implications – not to mention the broader 
belief in the coming catastrophe – of this trend in contemporary political culture. 
53 Dupuy 2013, 27 
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or her plausibility. If it is the case that we might often have adequate knowledge – 
especially in terms of “natural” catastrophes to come – then those who profess a deeper 
knowledge, not just of the facts, but of what they portend, are often “mocked and 
jeered.”54 In the presence of cinemas and literatures of disaster, it cannot be that such 
catastrophes are literally too difficult to imagine. It is much more likely that it seems 
unlikely that such a future could transcend modern technological nimbleness. So when a 
catastrophist speaks, even standing upon good knowledge, the catastrophist speaks in 
contradistinction to what is known: That modern technological capabilities surmounts the 
most beguiling of problems; and, as a result, at best, this catastrophist’s nightmare has 
become only the newest problem to be solved.  
 Dupuy’s second paradox then is the paradox of doomsaying. This paradox has 
two sides. On one hand the catastrophist – the Cassandra, the prophet – bespeaks the 
future, making claims about the catastrophe to come. On the other hand modern thought 
rejects this teleology, this future-orientation, not because of its lack of rationalism, but 
because of its dedication to the catastrophist’s central principle that the future is real. If 
ordinary metaphysics operates in a rectilinear way, though through a series of decisions 
that betray its rectilinearity, toward the only future out of a formerly flexible idea of many 
futures to come, then the catastrophist stands orthogonal to this futurism. Dupuy’s 
catastrophist, especially when attempting to make political claims for salvation, cannot 
but believe the future to be both singular and real.55 
                                                
54 ibid 
55 Dupuy 2005, 11.  
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 Therefore, for Dupuy, in an age of catastrophe where states of affairs seem to tend 
only toward worsening states of affairs, a new metaphysical orientation is necessary; that 
is, if future catastrophe is to be not only known, but also, fatefully, and perhaps more 
importantly, believed.  Otherwise, the humanity of today will remain “on a suicidal 
course, headed straight for catastrophe.”56 Because in the sense that he renders ordinary 
metaphysics, the future catastrophe only becomes believable “once it has occurred,” a 
point at which late quite obviously it is already too late.57 
 Dupuy’s solution is to understand time as a project (le temps du projet) which 
transforms the future into a guaranteed reality, rather than a merely unformed not-yet.58 
In the way that ordinary metaphysics treats the future, events to come are merely possible 
and subject to their rendering in the present. In time as a project, however, the future 
gains reality from being believed – from being “fixed” by narrative and discourse. In 
making the future singular and real, in fixing it in imagination, the catastrophist removes 
the innovative potential of modern thought because the future is no longer preventable 
because there is no alternative, only the project of forestalling the inevitable.59 In this 
sense, le temps du projet is both time as a project, but also projected time.60 
                                                
56 Dupuy 2013, 21 
57 ibid 27.  
58 Dupuy 2002, 175-97. 
59 Compare with Koselleck, who through his three layers of temporality (short-term actions, 
middle-term procedural constraints, and long-term permanently repeatable possibilities) 
makes a strikingly similar comparison, though in the end deeming such a version of foresight 
reliant upon utopia: “…prognostic certainty ought to increase again if it becomes possible to 
incorporate more delaying effects into the future, delaying effects that become calculable as 
soon as the economic and institutional framework conditions of our actions become more 
stable. But this is probably only a utopia, one which cannot even be derived from previous 
history” (Koselleck 2002, 147).  
60 Dupuy 2007, 11.  
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 Projected time as the metaphysical modus operandi of enlightened catastrophism 
operates as a temporal futur antérieur.61 Invoking the undesirable future endows it with 
meaning and attempts to empower the language of a fixed future to affect both action, 
and action motivated by belief, in the present: 
…enlightened catastrophism invites us to make an imaginative leap, to place 
ourselves by an act of mental projection in the moment following a future 
catastrophe and then, looking back toward the present time, to see catastrophe as 
our fate – only a fate that we may yet choose to avoid.62  
 
To deploy this projected time, to align oneself with a complicated metaphysical posture 
toward the apocalypse, enlists the everyday catastrophist as an “enlightened” one because 
rather than merely projecting paranoia, the enlightened catastrophist projects knowledge 
and belief to crystalize a future that carries with it unbelievable potential impact. As he 
writes, “It may be that the future does not need us, but we, we have a need for the future, 
for it is it who gives meaning to everything that we do.”63  
 The enlightened catastrophist recognizes that the future – the projected future 
made real – must be produced in a manner in which the severity of its reality appears 
important enough to recognize. In essence, the projected future must challenge survival 
itself. The projected future must reflect back on the present, codifying the future as 
unavoidably disastrous, and necessarily catastrophic. Enlightened catastrophism is not 
simply a metaphysics, then, but a “ruse,” a sleight of hand intended to disabuse modern 
thought and its obsession with progress from its reliance on itself:  
                                                
61 Dupuy 2013, 33. See also Fuggle 2014, 37 for a nice comparison between Dupuy and 
Benjamin on this subject matter. 
62 ibid. 
63 Dupuy 2004, 16. My translation and emphasis. 
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Enlightened catastrophism is a ruse, that consists in separating humanity from its 
own violence, in making this violence its destiny, without intention but capable of 
its annihilation. The ruse consists in acting as if we will all be its victims in 
keeping with the spirit that we are the unique cause of that which will come of us. 
This double game, this ploy, may just be the condition of our salvation.64  
 
Dupuy’s enlightened catastrophism thus produces the future catastrophe – however 
metaphysically – as a rhetorical move. If in the present the future catastrophe remains 
opaque to most people in their “ordinary” metaphysical orientation to time, the ruse of 
enlightened catastrophism does not simply invoke a catastrophe, it invokes catastrophism 
in order to frighten, in order to render political subjects more predisposed to act in 
accordance with the gravity of their actions. Moreover, if the coming catastrophe is 
“real,” if it has been made real, then it stands to reason that is because discourse has 
rendered it both material, as well as to some degree operable – as strange outcome for a 
theory that attempts to circumvent the modern progressive sentiment privileging 
innovative action.  
 There also exists here a strange point of connection between Dupuy and Vázquez-
Arroyo, who the reader will recall focuses on an authoritarian deployment of the rhetoric 
of catastrophe in order to consolidate political power.65 Though, different from the way 
that Dupuy imagines this process, Vázquez-Arroyo laments what Dupuy understands as 
necessary – the paramount dependence of human survival on a discursive ploy threaded 
through the complexity of an alternative metaphysics. Dupuy’s enlightened catastrophism 
implores this necessity, places the survival of the species (and likely many other species 
as well) on the possibility that such a ruse might just work. Regardless, where Dupuy’s 
                                                
64 Dupuy 2004, 100. My translation 
65 Vázquez-Arroyo 2013, 745 
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optimism is measured, it still places a great deal of importance upon whether or not such 
an “enlightened” stance might prevail. Which, it should not go without saying is an 
optimism that many, Vázquez-Arroyo foremost among them, are more than skeptical of 
because of how it overlooks both the contested politics over, as well as the experiences of 
many who already suffer from catastrophism’s prominence.  
 Frédéric Neyrat takes the notion of catastrophism even further than Dupuy’s 
somewhat pragmatic approach. Neyrat’s argument pushes the streetcorner doomsayer – 
and therefore a more quotidian vision of catastrophism – to the forefront. In this day and 
age, he argues, one needn’t rely on a “new metaphysics” (though Neyrat’s work engages 
metaphysics quite closely). Neyrat’s view of the catastrophist is not one who is governed 
by a notion of “time as a project,” but in a “crazy relation to the world.”66 For him, the 
notion of catastrophism is much more intuitive. We are in a crazy relation to the world. 
We do live in an age where we are sometimes rendered impotent to change things that 
may cause our destruction. That should admit some anger and some fist shaking. In fact, 
to be a catastrophist, according to Neyrat is a legitimate madness (légitime démence).67 
 Yet Neyrat doesn’t encourage the reader to embrace paranoia. Rather he describes 
catastrophism as a result of inhabiting a particular kind of socio-political order: “the 
‘society of catastrophe’ presents the conditions of possibility for a feeling of vulnerability 
to catastrophe.”68 In other words, Neyrat’s catastrophism has no need, as does Dupuy’s of 
being induced, but emerges from social order, from discourse, that seems to prioritize 
                                                
66 Neyrat 2009, 36. “…un rapport démentiel au monde…” 
67 Neyrat 2006, 108 
68 Neyrat 2009, 108 
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catastrophe – and especially future catastrophes – in a way that derives their meaning not 
from convoluted metaphysics, but maybe as Ophir might put it, “[from] the world.”69 
 Catastrophism from below, one might call it. Nevertheless it is imperative to 
understand Neyrat’s catastrophism emerging from a radical immanence – from a world, 
not descriptively understood as capable of transcending itself – but immanently imperiled 
by its very possibility.70 Such a world inspires as it were new sensibilities, and new 
orientations to life in its present tense.71 Seizing on a passage in Ulrich Beck, Neyrat 
organizes his thesis as resulting from the complex formulations of globalization – a 
transformative force of geography, surely, but also of thought, in which ideas of an 
intricately interconnected world makes one global imaginary possible while 
simultaneously foreclosing another, transcendent, mode of thought. In contemporary 
thought Neyrat recognizes a conceptual landscape intrinsically global in scope (or at very 
least immanent in its cosmology), animated fully by the associated risks and magnitude 
of catastrophe: “While all earlier cultures and phases of social development confronted 
threats in various ways, society today is confronted by itself.”72 
 Neyrat aligns in a way here with Dupuy. The cosmology of a planet is de facto 
globalized. What modern thought and its priority of practicality wrought was a phase of 
human thought that was fully global in nature. Therefore when Neyrat (citing Beck) 
asserts that “society …is confronted by itself,” the point emphasizes that it isn’t “the 
                                                
69 Ophir 2010, 60 
70 Jean-Luc Nancy (2012) makes a very similar argument where various technological causes 
unify the planet, but also transform Earth into a planet rendering both disaster and its causes 
roughly equivalent.  
71 Neyrat 2009, 37 
72 Beck 1992, 183. Cited in Neyrat 2009, 37  
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world” as an object transcendent to humans or their knowledge that has changed, but that 
knowledge-making has changed. This new immanent comportment, and fully afflicted by 
the possibilities of disaster, means that ideas about existence, what is at stake in 
existence, and how to provide security are also at stake.  
 Such is the case for why Neyrat’s argument for catastrophism corresponds to a 
sympathetic critique of biopolitics. It is well known that for Foucault the emergence of 
biopolitical order sprung from shifts in the administration of life in the modern age. 
Biopolitical modes of governance were contingent upon rendering life – administering 
life – as a calculable object, thus bringing the concept of life into full view under the 
reach of modern governance. This transformation from what Foucault called “sovereign 
power” to biopower had many consequences, but one most important for our purposes, 
was that life and death should become less arbitrary under biopolitical regimes. Life and 
death should become loci of management within modern executions of power, 
knowledge, and governance. Thus the famous Foucauldian dictum, “to make live and to 
let die” corresponds to an emergent productive apparatus of promoting life as object of 
governance.73 As such, biopolitics, it follows, also mitigated the threat of arbitrary 
death.74 Neyrat builds on this idea, focusing counterintuitively on the focus on death: 
“…it is because the grip of death has slackened that biopolitics could be put into place.”75 
But in a moment where it can be seen so clearly that states who might be assessed as 
biopolitical in nature regularly recognize how future threats exceed their administrative 
capacities, it is possible that a chasm is opening from within the biopolitical emphasis of 
                                                
73 Foucault 2003, 241; Foucault 1990, 136. 
74 Mbembe (2003 and 2017) critiques the completeness of this notion. 
75 Neyrat 2009, 42 
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Foucauldian political theory. How else could the management of life take place, 
especially in a sense when states cannot “let [their subjects] die,” especially if states 
cannot even really predict or defend against the coming catastrophe? Or, as Neyrat will 
put it, “the proliferation of risks and the web of catastrophes seems to tighten the grip of 
death.”76 
 Neyrat argues this to the hilt, so much so that he entitles his book, Biopolitiques 
des Catastrophes. Such a biopolitics, when seen through the lens of an administrative 
state still obsessed with life, yet incapable of ameliorating the threat of death beyond its 
speculative capacities, requires another look. In a state of affairs in which practical 
strategies like the precautionary principle are less sensible approaches, and regularly fail, 
the maxim of making life and letting die loses some salience to be sure.77 In fact the 
precautionary principle doesn’t simply fail to address uncertainty; it fails because 
catastrophe in and of itself exceeds certainty, leaving those who expect some semblance 
of biopolitical security all the more ridden by anxiety. 
 This anxious catastrophism could not be more different in the end from Dupuy’s 
induced “enlightened” version. Dupuy’s diagnosis of the problem resulted in his 
requirement for a new metaphysics borne from the intuitive insight that perhaps we are 
already equipped with the data that our destiny is extinction—yet we cannot grapple with 
this destiny because we cannot believe it to be true. As a result, in a wicked political 
maneuver, that for what it’s worth Dupuy does not believe can be political, the 
“metaphysics” exists merely as a trick, a “ruse,” in which contemporary humans besiege 
                                                
76 ibid 
77 The critique of the precautionary principle is yet another point of connection between 
Dupuy and Neyrat 
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themselves with enough anxiety that perhaps they will take their destiny as foregone 
conclusion.  
 Neyrat’s catastrophist already suffers from this anxiety. His catastrophism 
recognizes their own life “as if the Apocalypse could happen to us constantly, as if the 
catastrophe now continuously defines a crazy relationship to the world.”78 Neyrat’s 
catastrophist is haunted and, insofar as that haunting presents the catastrophe with its 
condition, is oriented not only to human vitality, and to its existential vulnerability, but 
also expresses a kind of catastrophic subjectivity at the nexus of governmentality, 
biopolitics, and the pretexts of rationality itself. In an incisive passage, Neyrat elaborates 
this nexus, again, though this time as cause of his “legitimate madness”:  
But the madness…seems legitimate: our heightened sensitivity to risk is 
constructed, it is not an ideological production. And it is certainly this sensibility 
that takes the shape in what we call the biopolitics of catastrophe, a form of 
“governmentality” that would have incorporated the so-called “precautionary 
principle”: the biopolitics of catastrophes is a hyper-biopolitics which, in a mode 
of warding off or regulating, attempts to take charge of the totality of human life 
and of whose living it makes use.79 
 
In a catastrophic age, biopolitics exceeds itself in its failures. A hyper-biopolitics that 
simultaneously “makes life,” and also reproduces itself as a mechanism of security at the 
very same time as it realizes it is incapable of security provision, at the very same time 
that it begins to grapple with the limits of calculability. The biopolitical calculus, if one 
can still call it that, incorporates a desire while at the same time recognizing its very 
limits. 
                                                
78 Neyrat 2006, 108. 
79 Ibid. Interestingly, in the book chapter developed from this earlier article, Neyrat replaces 
the word “idéologique” with “une illusion.” See Neyrat 2008, 36. 
 284 
 As a result, the attendant rationality of catastrophism, the rational orientation to 
vulnerability in a catastrophic age – catastrophism as legitimate madness – persists as a 
mode of thinking that keeps the living contemporary subject on the precipice of its own 
finitude. And it maintains that subject of a catastrophic age as the constant object of 
contemporary security precisely because of calculative security’s inability to formulate 
credible ideas about catastrophic futures. The biopolitical landscape shifts as a 
consequence, becoming hyper-biopolitics (as the proper name of a biopolitics of 
catastrophes) at precisely the same moment that it recognizes what cannot be calculated, 
regulated, maintained, recorded, in short, governed.80 
 
III. Conclusion 
In the previous chapter I showed the presence of catastrophism, how we can see it 
manifested across so many corridors of political life, and provided a concept – the 
dispositif of anticipation – could include a wide array of political and cultural knowledge 
production. In short, there I tried to show the presence of a widespread political 
rationality.  
 In this chapter, I tried to take that further by introducing into the explanatory arc 
of the dissertation other political and theoretic thinkers who had addressed similar 
phenomena. In approaching their work, I tried to make several points concerning 
catastrophism as political rationality. First, while some thinkers (Dupuy principal among 
them) make distinctions between everyday doomsaying and more philosophical 
approaches to it, on the strength of the previous chapter, we might not require a more 
                                                
80 Kindervater 2017 
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conceptual version of catastrophism for the concept to function powerfully. Second, 
following Neyrat, simply becoming aware of finitude in an age increasingly defined by 
the drumroll of catastrophe shows us a lot. For in the end, even some extraordinarily 
complex descriptions of vital security – as is the case in biopolitics – are compromised, 
pushed to their limits, by the prospect of the coming catastrophe. 
 Therefore, catastrophism, as I have deployed it here over the past two chapters 
should allow us a few important conclusions: 
1. We can detect a general rationality surrounding contemporary life that orients 
people to questions that are future-oriented, and that evoke the possibility of death 
in ways that seems to motivate desires for political action. Therefore, it is 
extremely difficult to assume as many do – Aradau & Van Munster and Vázquez-
Arroyo – that the turn to catastrophe in contemporary politics is “depoliticizing.” 
 
2. Instead, because the awareness of finitude, and its pleas for security and 
transformation persist, to the contrary, we can see precisely how politicizing such 
discourses are. Catastrophe and catastrophists exist in political states of affairs in 
which they are constituted and reconstituted by questions of survival – a series of 
questions biopolitics takes seriously, as do the agents that Adi Ophir recognizes in 
his formulation of catastrophization. 
 
3. Catastrophism as rationality exposes not only a contemporary condition of 
political rationality, but also exposes the way that these concerns are not the sole 
province of apparatuses of security, governance, knowledge and power.  
 
The politics of catastrophe, therefore, are politics obviously involving the exercise of 
power. But perhaps more importantly the politics of catastrophe operate through 
knowledge. In the contemporary scene, it might be useful to emphasize one other point: 
The knowledge politics of contemporary catastrophe involve knowledge creation – ideas, 
discourses, rhetorics, pedagogies – but especially in the moment we are in, the knowledge 
politics of catastrophe express the limits of certain kinds of knowledge. Neyrat performs 
welcome work showing how the incalculability of future disasters exposes holes in 
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biopolitics as a regime overly reliant on metrics and calculi. The emphasis on imagination 
at the core of disaster politics can also lead us in this direction.81  
 The dispositif in Foucault that I interpreted in the last chapter should once again 
aid us in understanding this phenomenon: recall “… the said as much as the unsaid.” 
Scholars studying security institutions have produced entire literatures about how 
catastrophe has transformed the practices of security provision. This literature is the 
“said.” But the unsaid, only occasionally recognized, is that such an apparatus is driven 
by a similar desire as literature and the cinema: To produce knowledge where there is a 
dearth of it. 
 The aporia of knowledge is constantly reproduced by the coming catastrophe. The 
coming catastrophe, as I showed in Chapter One is ontologically undetermined. This is 
not solely an ontological claim. Its lack of determination demands produced knowledge if 
we wish to survive it. It demands efforts to imagine it in the absence of its reality. This 
ontological-epistemological bind assures the expansion of modes of governance that aim 
to perform their duties as protectorates. But they also therefore perform an important 
foreclosure.  
 Jeremy Walker and Melinda Cooper, in a now-classic critique of neoliberalism in 
resilience policy, recognized that the problem of systemic vulnerability was so vast that it 
foreclosed upon resistance.82 I offered a partial critique of this idea in Chapter Two, but 
recall it now because the security politics revolving around catastrophe seem to function 
in interestingly similar ways, leaving aside an important caveat for the moment. For 
                                                
81 Recall that the 9/11 report officially condemned the U.S. security apparatus for a “failure 
of imagination.” 
82 Walker and Cooper 2011 
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Walker and Cooper resilience thinking tends to subsume even its critiques, rendering it 
more resilient – and for them, therefore, more thoroughly neoliberal – as it gains 
momentum.83 What catastrophism shares, despite the reservations I espoused in Chapter 
Two, is a similar impenetrability to criticism. Though, in my view, the two theories resist 
criticism for different reasons. For Walker and Cooper, resilience adapts criticism into its 
framework, using resistance to it as a mechanism of growth.  
 Catastrophism implies an existential risk looming on the horizon. Amitav Ghosh 
suggests that the reason we don’t act more forcefully against agents of global warming is 
because we are “deranged.” Dupuy seems to concur in a different way – because we are 
unenlightened. But catastrophists will often argue that it is clear what causes climate 
change, or will recognize the postcolonial or imperial roots of global terrorism, or defer 
to the endemic structures of capitalism that makes it tend toward crises. Yet to seek 
structural change? There is never time.  
 Catastrophism and its orientation to everpresent death is not merely a 
misalignment of the modern psyche, or a cognitive disorder for which those who suffer 
its indignities require treatment. Catastrophists lean simultaneously toward their own 
mortality, while imagining the amelioration of their precariousness out of temporal reach.  
 Despite their attention paid to political authorities, I think this is what Vázquez-
Arroyo and Van Munster & Aradau really mean when they argue that catastrophic speech 
                                                
83 “In its tendency to metabolize all countervailing forces and inoculate itself against critique, 
‘resilience thinking’ cannot be challenged from within the terms of complex systems theory 
but must be contested, if at all, on completely different terms, by a movement of thought that 
is truly counter-systemic.” Walker and Cooper 2011, 157. 
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“depoliticizes.” Their arguments tend toward means far more agentic than mine. But they 
recognize the shrugging acceptance of vulnerability, even as they argue it differently.  
 Nevertheless, my view of catastrophism revolves around the idea that it expresses 
a litany of failures in modern governance. It expresses a vacancy of knowledge about 
what cannot be known. And it illuminates what it means to be alive, and potentially to 
survive in the contemporary age.   
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Conclusion 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 In August of 2015, Rolling Stone magazine published a frightening essay by Eric 
Holthaus entitled “The Point of No Return: Climate Change Nightmares Are Already 
Here,” bearing the boorish, but poignant opening line, “Historians may look to 2015 as 
the year when the shit really started hitting the fan.”1 Heat waves in India and Pakistan 
had taken over 1,000 lives; a rainforest in the State of Washington had burst into flames; 
the usually temperate London had reached nearly 100 degrees Fahrenheit in the 
summertime; an unusually intense El Niño was underway motivating extreme water 
rationing on Caribbean islands.2 Holthaus’s essay argued that climate change – long a 
future-oriented problematic that many feared but few truly understood – had arrived, and 
2015 marked the inauguration of a new idea of normal. Those who thought that climate 
change mitigation would be enough were wrong, never to mind those who deny its very 
existence. In other words, the future as speculation had crashed ashore of the present. The 
                                                
1 Holthaus 2015 
2 ibid 
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catastrophe to come became the present itself. The essay was published one month shy of 
the ten-year anniversary of Hurricane Katrina’s dystopic landfall.  
As I began writing this conclusion, the hillsides in California smoldered in flames 
again. Mobile phone videos captured the landscape ablaze, engulfed in a hellscape of fire 
amidst the largest recorded wildfire in California history. The Thomas Fire, 2017’s 
answer to 2003’s Cedar Fire, previously the largest in state history, consumed over 
280,000 acres in less than a month.3 Images captured automobiles wending their way 
through the curves of the 405 as an inferno carbonized the earth. Not only droughts, but 
counterintuitively, increased rain encouraging new small plant growth, likely exacerbated 
the fires,4 leaving many to speculate even before the fire occurred that such enormous 
burnings were California’s destiny.5 
 While making national news, after a cataclysmic year of storms, the Thomas Fire 
provided little more than a shake of the head for many outside of California. 2017 had 
already wrought a drumroll of catastrophes, surmounting $306 billion dollars in 
economic losses, nearly doubling the previous year’s estimated $188 billion.6 Among 
them were the worst hurricanes in recent memory for the United States. Hurricane 
Harvey hit the greater Houston, Texas area and dwelled above it for an unusual span, 
accumulating more than forty inches of rain in four days. 17,000 people were rescued 
from a diluvial inundation of water in the nation’s fourth largest city. Hurricane Irma 
came next, rendering Bermuda and other islands temporarily uninhabitable, and some 
                                                
3  Daily Nexus: http://dailynexus.com/2017-12-24/thomas-fire-becomes-largest-wildfire-in-
modern-california-history/ 
4 Nuccitelli 2017 
5 Yoon, et al. 2015, 8; See also, earlier, Miller and Schlegel 2006 
6 Swiss Re 2017 
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seemingly permanently. Florida, in anticipation of suffering Irma’s direct impact, 
evacuated 7 million people, leaving most south Florida gas stations completely dry of 
petrol.7 Hurricane Maria formed on the heels of Irma, pounding Caribbean islands again 
only days later, decimating Puerto Rico perhaps most gravely. Now, already in 
December, with three months separating the storm from today, the island remains without 
electricity in 65% of its territory.  
It is well known that often catastrophes do not affect victims equally, but when 
comparing Puerto Rico to Houston and Florida, a stark difference becomes visible. Even 
within empires, devastation is not understood and therefore addressed equally. Take for 
example Donald Trump, the American President, upon his visit to Puerto Rico in the 
aftermath of Maria:  
If you look at the – every death is a horror. But if you look at a real catastrophe 
like Katrina, and you look at the tremendous hundreds and hundreds and hundreds 
of people that died, and you look at what happened here with, really, a storm that 
was just totally overpowering – nobody has ever seen anything like this. What is 
your death count, as of this moment – 17?8 
 
It is one thing to compare one event to another. Even to compare data in a manner tone 
deaf and cruel. But Trump’s comments reveal also an intrinsic concern – or lack thereof – 
for some over others. Consider the construction of the sentence preceding what I quoted 
above, wherein Trump bloviated: “I hate to tell you, Puerto Rico, but you’ve thrown our 
budget a little out of whack because we’ve spent a lot of money on Puerto Rico, and 
that’s fine. We’ve saved a lot of lives.”9 
                                                
7 Sutta 2017 
8 Donald Trump, remarks in Puerto Rico. Transcript, Boston Globe, October 3, 2017. my 
emphasis 
9 ibid 
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While much was covered in the course of this dissertation – perhaps at times even 
too much in terms of scope – much was by necessity outside of its scope or capabilities. 
Part of its argument avers that the stakes of loss, the magnitude of catastrophe in the 
future tense, can help to express what really matters to a political population. What, then, 
to do with the differences in response between Texas and Puerto Rico, a de facto colony 
of the United States? Or in a phrase that is often attributed to the novelist William 
Gibson, “…as I’ve said many times the future is already here — it’s just not very evenly 
distributed.”  
 Some readers of early chapter drafts rightly criticized how homogenous my theses 
were, asking me something like, “Okay. But catastrophe for whom?” This is a question 
that I have struggled with from the early stages to this final draft, but that I have tried to 
account for throughout, even while remaining committed to theorizing a broad scale 
phenomenon. The truth is that catastrophe, when deployed conceptually, which is to say 
when it is invoked politically, means many things to many people. This is especially the 
case in the future tense. In Trump’s comments in Puerto Rico, the reader sees a man 
organizing a “we” – “we’ve spent a lot of money on Puerto Rico” – and a “you” 
indicating that Puerto Rico is detached critically from the “we.” Catastrophe functions 
not only to devastate, but to separate. Vázquez-Arroyo and Ophir articulate this rhetorical 
politics especially well as I showed in several chapters above.  
But another element of Trump’s strange comments show something buried in the 
ignorant cruelty of his phrasing. Despite standing before survivors of a historically 
destructive storm, Trump recognizes a triumph of preparedness. Viewed sympathetically 
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(despite being loathe to view this man’s comments sympathetically), the president meant 
in his comparison between Katrina and Puerto Rico something counterintuitive. 
Revisiting the most controversial comment – “But if you look at a real catastrophe like 
Katrina, and you look at the tremendous hundreds and hundreds and hundreds of people 
that died, and you look at what happened here with, really, a storm that was just totally 
overpowering – nobody has ever seen anything like this. What is your death count, as of 
this moment – 17?” Trump doesn’t mean that the storm wasn’t significant, or even that it 
was less significant. His comparison betrays a triumph of the logic of preparedness. 
Maria was “just totally overpowering – nobody has ever seen anything like this…” yet 
successes in preparedness and response limited fatalities to, he believed, a “death count, 
as of this moment – 17?” 
 Trump’s comments should not be viewed as anything other than vulgar. Yet they 
also express a false confidence in the politics of all-hazards preparedness. At the time of 
his visit on October 3rd, unofficial death tolls surpassed 500, despite as of this writing the 
official death toll claiming 64 lives. As of early-December the New York Times reports 
more than 1,000 deaths over normal death rates in an average year, counted since the 
advent of the storm.10 Even this back and forth over death tolls seems a semantically 
trivial argumentative path given the ongoing catastrophe of a territory largely without 
power, with thousands in desperate need of food, potable water, and medicine. Yet the 
data points – the political argument – of fewer lives lost heralds an implicit success story 
that unlike Katrina, this time we knew what to do. It bespeaks a politics of security that 
distills suffering into costs manageable for some, or as Vázquez-Arroyo or Ophir might 
                                                
10 Robles, et al. 2017 
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put it, a tolerable loss for those whose lives have been rendered tolerably catastrophic for 
others.11  
 Yet part of the work of this dissertation endeavored to show not only the cruelty 
of such politics, but also the rationalities that underwrite such logics. Excellent work has 
been published – and discussed exhaustively in preceding chapters – that focuses on the 
ravages of how abusive and dehumanizing politics of preparedness can be. I tried to show 
how the element of rationality or common sense comes to render it commonplace. For 
many scholars, the focus on disasters – past or future – illustrates a shift among political 
elites and experts. As a result, the “politics of catastrophes” focuses for these authors on 
the ways that the question of catastrophe transformed political decision-making, the 
exercise of power over others, and the vexing problems that temporality impose upon the 
provision of security. My efforts have been to supplement those works with a further-
reaching attempt that tried to compose a theory capable of showing the various attempts 
and failures, as reflective of culturo-political production, forming a rationality that gave 
birth to a future-oriented politics of human survival; rather than imagining the decisions 
by political elites affecting cultural and political life as passive subjects.  
This dissertation therefore argued that a detectable political rationality exists in 
contemporary political culture. Calling this rationality “catastrophism” allowed 
distinctions to be drawn from other theories similar in nature, while remaining animated 
by the seeming ever-presence of catastrophe in everyday political life. Politics of human 
survival concern themselves with events that have not yet occurred – and those politics 
are not limited to political elites and experts, but suffuse contemporary culture, and are 
                                                
11 See Ophir 2010; Vázquez-Arroyo 2012 and 2013. 
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reproduced by that culture. This means that “the future,” or more precisely, “as yet 
undetermined events,” preoccupy theories of human survival more than the coercive 
actions of states, balances of power, security dilemmas, etc. – as most frequently 
explained by professional scholars in security studies. It also means that the concept of 
the coming catastrophe organizes contemporary political life as much as it does the 
questions asked in the course of security provision. 
As I showed in the earliest chapters above, future-oriented security strategies – 
perceived necessities of foresight – frequently ended in failure. Even when deemed 
successful, as in the strategic capacity to avoid nuclear war, new techniques of 
governance as well as strategic reason were created. The strange result? The field of what 
was thought to be catastrophic grew as the perception of success expanded; likewise, as 
the field of disastrous phenomena became more inclusive – synthesizing so-called 
“natural” and “manmade” (moral) catastrophes – the notion that covering all security 
bases seemed less possible. And so both the perception of what was catastrophic grew 
concomitantly with the range of techniques meant to cope with living in what was now 
understood to be an overwhelmingly catastrophic age. 
The growth of the field of catastrophic events can be accounted for by several 
measures. The category of what could be catastrophic was enhanced by the prospect of 
nuclear war to the extent that future catastrophes could now be imagined as previously 
unimaginable, and potentially annihilative scales. And the category of catastrophe grew 
to encompass conventional threats to life – war (especially nuclear war) – but also a 
wider range of events spanning “natural” and moral disasters. Statistically speaking, each 
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of these sorts of events is highly improbable. But as securitized societies expanded their 
foci to attempt to imagine more and more kinds of mass casualty events, the idea of “the 
coming catastrophe” ensconced an increasing number of potential events. Groundwork 
was laid to provide shelter against unknown storms; and practical theories of survival 
were undertaken to account for the new statistical probability that security against their 
new sense of inevitability was scarce at best, impossible at worst. As the real abstraction 
of the coming catastrophe gained material importance for the prospect of securing human 
populations, and the category continued to encompass more types of events, the 
singularly highly improbable catastrophe – now abstracted – became the altogether 
probable coming catastrophe.12  
Many of these components of this argument have been studied in fragments by 
scholars of security studies, but few if any have succeeded in showing the relationship 
between the growing field of “uncertain” future events and shifts in the way that such 
threats are treated as existential in nature – never to mention their cultural political affects 
or effects, nor their seemingly autocatalytic causality. Further, a disciplinary discrepancy 
exists where scholars of security studies (usually under the larger umbrella of 
international relations) tend to study the shifts among security provisions and experts, 
while political theorists and philosophers tend to study the shifts in meaning and power 
surrounding catastrophic politics. But now, in the contemporary moment, it seems less 
fruitful than ever to hold the phenomena of security and meaning-making separate – 
especially as they fuse to inform one another on the subject of existential persistence. 
                                                
12 See Chapters 4 & 5 above; on “real abstraction,” see Toscano 2008. 
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It should not go unsaid that catastrophism, as a rationality merging questions of 
survival and meaning, carries with it its own measures of preemption. While motivating 
future-oriented policies and rationalities meant to foreclose on disastrous futures, it also 
produces and reproduces urgencies that claim protection paramount for survival against 
the idea of imminent disaster.13 Yet this miasmic sense of urgency so often springing 
from catastrophic rhetoric also forecloses on critique – one might even say that 
catastrophism preempts structural critique – in ways that prioritize surviving what I have 
already shown is an imaginary construction (the coming catastrophe) over the criticism of 
its most noxious causes in empire and capital.14 Theorists like Ophir and Vázquez-Arroyo 
know this all too well.15 But they often lean too heavily on the agency of political elites, 
with the result that it is possible they themselves reproduce a certain logic of 
catastrophism. In what I have developed above, the concept of catastrophism ought be 
viewed as a meaningful symptom of political culture’s inability to imagine other modes 
of politics more capable of fostering both survival and a politics of the common, which 
might – difficultly, but vitally – restructure survival within the greater context of the web 
of life.16  
This dissertation showed the possibility of a project that re-introduce the 
phenomena of human survival to political theory; and likewise, security studies needs to 
take account for shifting meanings in discourses of human survival. It is clear from this 
study that the future threat of catastrophe preoccupies thinking about human survival at 
                                                
13 See Vázquez-Arroyo 2013, 745, as well as my critical reading in Chapter 4 above. 
14 In a different register, but still a way that will inform this line of argument, see Walker and 
Cooper 2011. 
15 op cit. 
16 Moore 2015 
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many levels of the political spectrum – from official institutions to literary imaginaries – 
and this is a change that should not be overlooked. In fact, in an age of “terror,” of 
“climate change,” of “crisis,” and so on, it might be the case that the projects of theory 
and security have merged in an age of catastrophe, where to carry out studies of political 
and cultural society, one must engage with its deepest existential concerns. And to carry 
out research in security, one must begin with cultural production. This dissertation is one 
such effort to bridge that important gap, one held apart seemingly more so by academic 
convention than by its politico-cultural object of concern. 
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